

**HUMAN SECURITY  
AND EU-AU COOPERATION**

**FLORENCE K.  
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## REFERENCE

## **LIST OF ANACHRONISM**

ABHS	Advisory Board on Human Security
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific (countries)
AFDB	African Development Bank
AFP	African Peace Facility
AMIB	African Mission peace in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Peace in Somalia
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
AU	African Union
AU	ECOSOC African Union Economic, Social and Cultural Council
AUC	African Union Commission
AUMS	African Union Member States
CFSDP	Common and Foreign Security Defence Policy
CHS	Commission on Human Security
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSO	Civil-society organisation
DG DEV	Directorate-General for Development
DG RELEX	Directorate-General for External Relations of the European Commission
DG SANCO	Directorate-General for Health and Consumer Affairs
EBI	European Bank of Investment
EC	European Commission
EC	European Commission
ECDPM	European Center For Development Policy Management
EDF	European development Fund
EEC	European Economic Community
EES	European Security Strategy
ETUC	European Trade Union Confederation
EU	European Union
EWS	Early Warning System
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FTA Free	Trade agreement
HSU	Human Security Unit
ICC I	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty

ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IT	Implementation Team
ITUC	International Trade Union Confederation
JAES	Joint African European Strategy
JEG	Joint Expert Group
NAFTA	Nord America Free Trade Agreement
NEPAD	New Partnership For Africa Development
NGOs	Non Governmental Organisations
OCHA	Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
PAP	Pan-African Parliament
PSC	African Peace Security Council
REC	Regional Economic Community
SAP	Structural Adjustment Plan
TCDA	Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement with South Africa
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNFPA	United Nations populations Funds
UNTFHS	United Nations Commission on Human Security

## INTRODUCTION

The discourse on human security has been broadly discussed over the past 15 years, both in international and in academic areas. Our main concern in this research is to focus on how the issue of human security is going on in the European and African partnership.

The United Nations has brought the greatest intellectual contribution to the endeavour in defining the concept of human security. Since 1948 it has predicted that human rights shall be the foundation of the international order.<sup>1</sup> Further, human security and human rights appear to be two sides of the same coin. For the United Nations, human security is designed to protect human fundamental freedom as related to human rights.

After the Cold War, in the late 1994, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) conceptualised the issues of human security by underlining seven areas of its framework: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security.<sup>2</sup>

The UNDP provides two definitions of human security. First of all, it means safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression; secondly, it refers to protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions.

Following the path of the UNDP, other contributions come in addition to define the human security issue. Among these, we can remember the United Nations Millennium Declarations published in the 2000s and the Secretary General report title “In larger freedom.”<sup>3</sup> In his report, Koffi Annan stated that, human security has three aspects, freedom from want; freedom from fear; and freedom to live in dignity.<sup>4</sup> Inequities and inequalities as well as systematic discrimination is among the root of violent conflict.

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1 Mascia, Marco. Obiettivo sicurezza umana. Per la Politica Estera dell’Unione Europea. Cleup, Padova, 2010: 28

2 Jolly, Richard. Emmerij, Dharam Ghai. Lapeyre, Frédéric. UN contributions to development and practices. United Nations intellectual history project series, Indiana University Press, 2004

3 Koffi, Annan. In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All. <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/>

4 Ibidem

He also mentioned the relation between denial of human rights, disputes over political participation or long-standing grievances over land and other resource and human security<sup>5</sup>. To sum up, deprivation of human security nurture the root of instability on a global scale. His analysis seems to be confirmed by the UNDP reports on Human Development which survey seem to show that, most area of world instability are connected with less developed countries. The United Nations have organised the implementation of the human security agenda between four organs<sup>6</sup>:

- the UNTFHS, United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security;

the CHS, Commission on Human Security ;

the ABHS, Advisory Board on Human Security;

the HSU, Human Security Unit.<sup>7</sup>

Moving to the academic area, discussion on human security has found different interpretations. Critics highlight the ambiguity of the concept which results from the grouping of broad and vague threats under one heading.

Beyond these comments, human security can also be defined by answering the three questions of the security debate as follows: security for whom? from what/whom? and by what means (which actors and which actions)? This way of proceeding brings out concerns, challenges and consequences that can provide a clear vision of the issue. On the basis of these questions, we can find the scope of coverage, the system-based approach<sup>8</sup> to have a comprehensive vision of the matter. This brings us to raise a range of questions in this research:

1. The changing nature of the EU-AU cooperation since the end of the Cold War.
2. The influence of the international agenda in shaping the framework of the partnership.
3. The implementation of the joint agenda since 2005.

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5 Amouyel Alexandra. What is Human Security? Human Security Journal - Issue 1 - April 2006

6 There have been established successively in 1999, in 2001, in 2003 and in 2004

7 Mascia, Marco. Obiettivo sicurezza umana. Per la Politica Estera dell'Unione Europea. Cleup, Padova, 2010: 40

8 Amouyel Alexandra. What is Human Security? Human Security Journal - Issue 1 - April 2006

4. The commitment of China and the implication of “non conditionalities” in African Affairs.
5. The nature of the rapprochement between the United Nations, the European Union and the African Union.

Human security for whom rise the debate which shifts the security from state interest to focus attention on “people’s security.”<sup>9</sup> Human security for what focuses on the threats and lastly, human security by which means refers to the actors.

The British University of Columbia in Canada with its Commission on Human Security contributed to highlight the concept of human security. The commission published the report on human security which lay emphasis on a “wide sense” of human security which means security to protect fundamental rights of people thus, human rights whilst, “a restrictive sense” underlines the violent threats.<sup>10</sup>

In the global level, the EU and the AU are classified as Intergovernmental Organizations which share some common characteristics:

they are based on a legal agreement between the governments of nation states;  
they include three or more states which are part of the organisations;  
they have a permanent secretariat for the implementation of the tasks stipulated by the states members.<sup>11</sup>

The history of the European and African partnership is based on a long and common background. The European Union history can be briefly summarised in 5 phases:

- 1945 - 1950, the beginning of the cooperation;

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9 Papisca, Antonio. Mascia, Marco. Le relazioni internazionale nell’era dell’indipendenza e dei diritti umani, Padova, Cedam, 2004

10 Mascia, Marco. Obiettivo sicurezza umana. Per la Politica Estera dell’Unione Europea. Cleup, Padova, 2010: 40

11 Papisca, Antonio. Mascia, Marco. Le relazioni internazionale nell’era dell’indipendenza e dei diritti umani, Padova, Cedam, 2004: 247.



1960 - 1969, the period of economic growth;

1970 - 1979, the growing of the Community and the first enlargement;

1980 - 1989, the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall;

2000 - 2010, the expansion.

Concerning the African countries, “African independence is less than fifty years for many countries.”<sup>12</sup>

The main events that have influenced the history of African countries over this period are colonialism, the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall. Colonialism has set the root of Pan-Africanism that “had emerged from the African Diaspora of North America and the Caribbean, the realisation of the pan-African dream of “Africa for the Africans” was to be the work of the continental Africans themselves. With representative delegates from all corners of the African continent, the fifth and most important of the pan-African congresses under DuBois was held at the Manchester City Hall in 1945 in the United Kingdom. Participants included Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Jomo Kenyatta and Tom Mboya of Kenya, Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Peter Abrahams of South Africa. The call went forth that each delegate should return home and lead the struggle for independence. Until then, the pan-African project consisted of the vision of Africa as a single federal union.”<sup>13</sup>

In the aftermath of independence, African states with the exception of few, became more and more authoritarian whilst, economically they fell into marginalisation. In the past 10 years, a new generation of leaders has sought to shift the vision of African countries in the world. Moreover, with the commitment of new actors such as civil society, NGO, and Asian countries, the European Strategy for Africa<sup>14</sup> describes Africa as an emergent continent. How can the European and African partnership manage the

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12 Gordon A, April. Gordon L, Donald. Understanding contemporary Africa. Lynne Rinner Publishers, INC, United Nations, 2007.

13 *Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges. Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa: Implementing a New Africa-EUPartnership. An African Perspective. Istituto Affari Internazionali, May 2010: 17-18*

14 Commissione Delle Comunità Europeo. Comunicazione Della Commissione Al Consiglio, Al Parlamento Europeo E Al Comitato Economico E Sociale Europeo, Strategia dell'Unione europea per l'Africa: verso un patto euroafricano per accelerare lo sviluppo dell'Africa, {SEC(2005)1255}, Bruxelles, 12.10.2005.

political, economic and social shift which is going on in the continent for the common interest of the two partners? The partnership is rooted in a solid structure which underlines the commitment of the European and African countries as we can see bellow. As we stressed above, human security coverts a broad area, therefore some might get ignored whilst we choose to connect human security to international cooperation.




Diagram 1. Institutional Architecture of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES)<sup>15</sup>

In this sense, we want to link the issue of human security to the international cooperation by underlining some of its elements such as national security, trade and especially international solidarity.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Beyond Structures? Reflections on the Implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, 2009: 8 [www.ecdpm.org/dp87](http://www.ecdpm.org/dp87) : (the chapter three will provides additional explanation of the diagram)

<sup>16</sup> Papisca, Antonio. Mascia, Marco. Le relazioni internazionale nell'era dell'indipendenza e dei diritti umani, Padova, Cedam, 2004: 403

The first chapter presents the evolution of the security concept between the European and African countries. This approach will give us the opportunity to focus on the shift from national security to the concept of human security. At this point, the connection with international solidarity will be underlined to answer the question of human security by which means?

In the first place, we will analyse the international context and its consequences for the EU and African partnership. The chapter will outline the trend of the EU-AU cooperation in the global context.

Secondly, the mechanism of the EU-AU cooperation, the role of regional arrangement, the prerequisites and the joint institutions will be the object of the third chapter. The remaining chapter will look at the implication of dialogue especially, the impact in building African new institutions such as NEPAD and lastly, the EU-AU future in the global context. We will consider that, some elements such as: the rapprochement between UN-EU-AU in matter of peacekeeping; the common intervention EU-AU for peacekeeping; the commitment of EU to achieve the MDGs seems to favour and encourage the cooperation. Whereas, financial problem seems to be the abrasive subject of the cooperation.

# **CHAPTER I**

## **THE RECENT SHIFT IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE EU-AU COOPERATION**

The purposes of this chapter is to elaborate about the evolution of the security and the international context. We will focus our attention on how the concept of national security move progressively to those of Human Security which underlines the protection of some basic human rights. This change implies new approaches of the European and the African partnership, and the intervention of new partners which gave a different shape to this cooperation. Our concern is to present the European an African partnership by emphasizing on the security aspect.

We will also look at how the irruption of China and the Non Government Organisation are affecting the ongoing of the partnership. Are they elements of complementarities for security or are they working for opposite interests?

### **1.1. The late 1970s and 1989s and the concept of security**

What motivates us to choose this period is the fact that, the negotiations between the European and the African countries was launched around the late 1963s 1975s. There are many international events which can be taken in consideration, our argument will follow two main lines: first of all, we will look at the general context of the Cold War and the concept of security. Secondly, we will focus our attention on the position of the new African independent countries and their relationship with the European Community.

We found two definitions of the security that is lie on the international context. The concept of national security and those of human security.

The first one emphasises on the external threats and has been developed in two issues. One make reference to the perception of those who govern with regard to what is necessary to maintain this 'one's identity'(it refers to the state). The second one

concerns the threats against these interests and the perception that they are protected.<sup>17</sup>

Whilst the human security, according to ICC report usually make reference to the “underlying [...] causes of armed conflict”<sup>18</sup> such as poverty, political repression, uneven distribution of resources, diseases overwhelming burdens of debt.

Our interest is to see how this twin concepts move through the last tree decades. Nugent has stressed that, “Decolonisation and the Cold War are in [a] sense completed history”<sup>19</sup> which can help to understand Foreign Policy behaviour during the last tree decades.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States of America “spend their time worrying and trembling”<sup>20</sup> about an enemy attack. This period was characterised by military and ideological rivalry between East and West. The United States claimed liberty and democracy whereas the Soviet Union were speaking about peace. During this period dominated by capitalism and communism, international cooperation was orientated to preserve the interest of national security. The most famous example is certainly the Marshall Plan.<sup>21</sup>

The aim of the two states were to extend their power all over the world. Moreover they build “strongpoint defence”<sup>22</sup> which tended to distort international relation.

The sphere of influence were spread in Asia, in Africa in Latin America with the aim to control the enemies position and to have external areas of confrontation. These countries were the “most favourable terrain upon which to confront.”<sup>23</sup> According to Gaddis “the European program, was aimed [...] as bulwarks against soviet expansion.”<sup>24</sup>

The national security strategy carried out controversial results. It gives birth to bilateral and multilateral form of cooperation. Tree aspects of international cooperation can be

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17 Papisca, Antonio. Mascia, Marco. Le relazioni internazionale nell'era dell'indipendenza e dei diritti umani, Padova, Cedam, 2004: 423.

18 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty(ICISS, The Responsibility to protect, Ottawa, 2001, PP VII-XIII e PP 1-18.

19 Nugent, Paul. Africa since independence, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004: 1.

20Ivi, p. 24.

21 Launched in 1947.

22 Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of containment: critical appraisal of American National Security policy during the cold war, Oxford University press, 2005:8.

23  
24 Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of containment: critical appraisal of American National Security policy during the cold war, Oxford University press, 2005: 58.

taken in consideration. It can responds to the need of national security, trade and international solidarity.<sup>25</sup> Which aspects prevails for the European and African partnership in the late 1970s-1989s? To give an answer to this short question, let us draw the situation of African's states during this period. Various studies have analysed the painful attempt of African States to build a modern economic system. Most of these studies have brought out two conclusions. First of all, the failure of African development to improve their level in the context of global economy. Secondly, the crippling imbalance of African economy seems to be the result of the interaction between different factors.

Belluci emphasises on the "formal independence"<sup>26</sup> of the African's State qualified as "flag independence." His point of view is that, the weakness of the social, political and economic system is the natural consequence of this formal independence. Similarly, Nugent<sup>27</sup> outlines some significant international event (Cold War, oil crisis) which affected the African's states in the late 1970s and 1989s. Unfortunately, "this was obscured by the euphoria of the independence [...], but it did not take long for the truth to emerge."<sup>28</sup> In the immediate aftermath of the independence, the imperative of "Nation Building" was the main preoccupation.<sup>29</sup> Therefore, "it was possible to argue that Africans were making their own choices"<sup>30</sup> despite an incredible list of complex problems:

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25 Papisca, Antonio. Mascia, Marco. *Le relazioni internazionali nell'era dell'indipendenza e dei diritti umani*, Padova, Cedam, 2004.

26 Belluci, Stefano. *Storia delle guerre Africane: dalla fine del colonialismo al neoliberalismo globale*, Caracci, 2006:10.

27 Nugent, Paul. *Africa since independence*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004: 70.

28 Ibidem.

29 Ivi, p. 24.

30Nugent, Paul. *Africa since independence*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004: 326.

the dependence upon the export of primary commodities while international markets were highly vulnerable to price fluctuation;

the bureaucratic structure of the states;

different ideological tendencies and conflict of leadership between African leaders;

the weakness of states lies on a territorially fragmented continent;

the chronic lack of internal capital;

a position of clear autonomy to the metropolis suffered strong ostracism;

unnecessary and disproportionate military spending that had taken resources from other sectors such as education and health. "This broadly negative assessment covers the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa."<sup>31</sup>

Let us turn back to our guide question,<sup>32</sup> whose aspect of the international cooperation prevails in the partnership between the European community and the African countries in the early 1970s 1989s.

Our concern in this chapter is an attempt to look at the evolution of the security concept by emphasising on the European and the African partnership.

One of the most important event in the late 1969s and 1974s, was that, the European Community and Japan were facing the first post-war economic distress. The causes of the crisis has been outlined by Amstrong who argue that the underground of the crisis had two roots.<sup>33</sup> First of all, the wage explosions as a product of overaccumulation of the capital<sup>34</sup>, consequently, "the government responded to the profits squeeze and loss of competitiveness by deflation and income policies."<sup>35</sup>

The oil crash of the late 1974s which have a deeper effect on third world economy was

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31 Ibidem.

32 About National security, trade and International solidarity.

33 Armstrong, Phillip. Glyn, Andrew. Harrison, John. Capitalism since 1945, Basil Blackwell, 1991.

34 Ivi, p. 194.

35 Ibidem.

the direct cause of the first agreement between the European Community and the African countries.<sup>36</sup> The aim of the agreement was to introduce the STABEX<sup>37</sup> system to compensate the ACP<sup>38</sup> countries for the shortfall in export earning due to the fluctuation in the prices of primary commodities. The agreement was based on 4 points:

the non-reciprocal preferences for most exports from ACP countries to EEC;

equality between partners, respect for sovereignty, mutual interests and interdependence;

the right of each state to determine its own policies;

security of relations based on the achievements of the cooperation system.

It can be mentioned that, among the objectives of the agreement, trade, aid and political aspects were mentioned.

Turning back to the issue of the Cold War, we saw that, African countries were a “sphere of influence” for both the superpowers. The African countries use their strategic position as a tool to enhance their position and obtain grant. For example, some countries like Guinea, Tanzania and Ghana<sup>39</sup> were hostile to capitalism and “imperialism was identified as the principal enemy.”<sup>40</sup> Whereas “the states which were hoping to benefit from French economic assistance could hardly afford to annoy their powerful patron.”<sup>41</sup>

Naturally they joined the European Community partnership. In the context of international tension, suspicion and permanent threat, this cooperation played a key role in the area of security. It insured to European Community countries a “sphere of influence” which means, a peaceful and strategic area to contrast the Soviet Union threat. For instance, the African French area were well known as (*précaré de la France*).

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36 ACP agreement was signed in 1975.

37 *Système de Stabilisation des Recettes d'Exportation*.

38 Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries.

39 Nugent, Paul. *Africa since independence*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

40 Ivi, p. 100.

41 Ivi, p. 101.



In contrast with this point of view, Goran and Finelli<sup>42</sup> outlined the aid aspect of the partnership between the European community and the African's countries. They argue that, the special partnership implemented by EDF<sup>43</sup> and the EBI<sup>44</sup> was aimed to improve some key sectors like education, health and environment etc. Following the position adopted by these authors, it can be opportune to ask why the African economy failed despite this opportunity. In order to have a comprehensive vision of the issue, we will move through the austerity plan of the late 1980s and 1989s, which were implemented by the IMF and the World Bank after the diagnosis of African's economy characterised by:<sup>45</sup>

unsustainable debt burden;

permanent trade deficit;

an acute fiscal crisis;

low overall economic growth;

sluggish agricultural performance as the result of the fallout from the economic downturn in the industrial country after 1974, the rising energy of prices, the weak prices for the continent's primary commodity and ill-chosen policies.<sup>46</sup> In others words, "the state was unable to maintain basic infrastructure or fund essential services."<sup>47</sup>

Therefore, the IMF and the world Bank proposed some reforms to restructure an improve the African's economy through the SAPs (Structural Adjustment Plan). The plan was divided in tree phases: "stabilization, adjustment and take-off phase."<sup>48</sup>

We resume the objectives and the controversial<sup>49</sup> result of the SAPs which the global

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42 Goran, Floridan. Finelli, Luca. Innovazione e cambiamento nella politica di cooperazione internazionale, Fondazione cassa di Risparmio di Bologna, 2009.

43 European development fond.

44 European Bank of Investment.

45 Nugent, Paul. Africa since independence, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

46 Berg Report.

47Nugent, Paul. Africa since independence, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004: 326.

49 Ibidem.

aim were to let the market rules the exchange rates:

- the subsidies to the industry were too be end (that means the end of protectionism);

the end of the state intervention; (includes the end of free medical and educational services);

SAPs also implied a drastic reduction of public sector employment;

the close down or privatisation of parastatals;

the reform of agriculture including the rising producer price.

At this point, the linkage between the European and African countries partnership were affected by the IMF and the World Bank programme. “The IMF and the World Bank had begun to overlap in terms of their functions and to co-operate in formulating reforms”<sup>50</sup> whereas the cooperation between the European Communities and the African countries were going on.

Following what we say above, it can be noticed that, at the same moment for the same countries, two economics and opposite strategies were going on. The first example is that, the ACP agreement were aimed at providing facilities to African’s states to minimised the price fluctuation and the oil crash. The second example is that, the IMFs and the World Bank were expected a complete liberalisation of African economy including key sectors like education, health and agriculture etc. Following the measures taken by the IMFs and the World Bank to restructure the African economy, Nugent stresses that, “there is remarkable level of disagreement how much was accomplished and who actually benefits.”<sup>51</sup>In addition to his comment he gave a list of examples<sup>52</sup>:

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<sup>50</sup>Nugent, Paul. Africa since independence, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

<sup>51</sup> Ivi, p. 332.

<sup>52</sup> Nugent, Paul. Africa since independence, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

the introduction of SAPs did not lead to spectacular rates of economic growth. The African economy have been contracted between the 1980s and 1990s;

the African terms of trade continued to deteriorated although the drastic measures;

African industry was squeezed to encourage foreign investment, unfortunately, foreign investment fails on it;

the escalation of foreign debts become unsustainable for more countries and seems to be one of the worst counter part of the SAPs adjustment;

in many countries, the living standard deprive with the SAPs;

before, the poor were concentrated in the rural areas, in coincidence with the SAPs, African's cities are showing manifestations of impoverishment.

That bring us to our focal point, the international context of security when the partnership between the European Community and the African countries were going on. How do the intervention of the IMFs and the World Bank have impact on a context dominated by National Security? We found an interpretation in the approach of the geopolitical world gives by Toal.<sup>53</sup> He provides a comparative study of geopolitics as “geographical dimensions of world politics, most especially the struggles for power by states with worldwide reach and power projection.”<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Toal, Gerard. Post-Cold War geopolitics: contrasting superpower in a world of global dangers, School of Public and International Affairs, Virginia Tech, Northern Virginia Center, 2001.

<sup>54</sup> Ivi, p. 8.

TECHNO TERRITORIAL COMPLEX	GEOPOLITICAL WORLDS	GEOPOLITICAL WORLD ORDER	GEOPOLITICAL ECONOMY	GEOPOLITICAL DISCOURSE
The nuclear weapons complexes of the superpowers. The communications and entertainment networks of the west	Cold War, 1945-1991	Conflict between the superpowers over their spheres of influence, ideology and relative power position across the globe	Dominated by a geopolitically organized form of liberal capitalist modernization in the West and Soviet style socialist modernization in the Eastern bloc. More extensive and toxic forms of pollution	Cold War discourse represents world politics as a worldwide struggle between, in Western terms, a free world. and a totalitarian world.. In Soviet terms, the struggle was between Western imperialist states. and liberation

Table 1. Geopolitical world (1945-1991)<sup>55</sup>

The geopolitics revived the dimension of the security state centric <sup>56</sup> around the national security concept. Moreover, “Geopolitical discourses, in other words, are frequently conspiracy discourses in which self-generated anxieties are projected onto externalized foreign others and rendered as colossal threats organized on a worldwide scale.”<sup>57</sup> As we can see in the table 1, economy is a part of geopolitical game.

Therefore, the aim of the IMFs and the World Bank during the Cold War was to extend the geopolitically organized form of liberal capitalist and consequently, to insure the national security of Western bloc by contrasting the Soviet Union. As a result of this foreign policy behaviour, they were not interested in taking into consideration the social aspect for the implementation of the SAPs programme.

The issue of SAPs is widely documented and often focus attention on their failure aspects. Whilst, the partnership aspect between the European Community and the African countries was also oriented (there are many characteristics) to minimise the impact of the 1974s -1979s world crisis. Our concern at the beginning of this chapter was to look at the security aspect in the partnership between the European community

<sup>55</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>56</sup> Papisca, Antonio. Mascia, Marco. Le relazioni internazionali nell'era dell'indipendenza e dei diritti umani, Padova, Cedam, 2004: 432.

<sup>57</sup> Toal, Gerard. Post-Cold War geopolitics: contrasting superpower in a world of global dangers, School of Public and International Affairs, Virginia Tech, Northern Virginia Center, 2001.

Ivi, p. 8.

and the African's countries. A brief overview of the international context can bring us to conclude that, the concept of security was dominated by the geopolitical policy. Moreover, studies show that, this partnership has evolved in a situation of complexity.

The next era we propose to look at can be characterised as the period of Human rights, governance, human security and the European and African partnership. Following our way on proceeding, we will maintain our guide question. We consider three aspects of international cooperation (national security, trade and international solidarity)<sup>58</sup> to have a comprehensive vision of the security concept in the partnership between the European Union and the African countries.

## **1.2. The late 1990s up to now**

Studies have described the end of the Cold War as “a heady time, full of optimism and possibility”<sup>59</sup> Some authors “signalled a new beginning in world affairs, an era of promise beyond the shadow of nuclear war. The world seems a much safer place with an absence of an overriding ideological confrontation between two heavily armed and hostile superpowers.”<sup>60</sup> In the late 1990s, Boutros-Boutros Ghali<sup>61</sup> argued that, the end of the Cold War should give the opportunities to the United Nations to achieve his fundamental goal which is to build a peaceful world. We can recall that, the Cold War rivalry had rendered the United Nations impotent. The former General Secretary of the United Nations seized the occasion to highlight the challenges of the new world and for that matter, he proposes an “agenda for peace” to achieve the programme.

The main challenge was the widespread of democracies in the third world coupled with the rise of ethnic, religious and social conflicts. In the same way, he argued that, if the concept of peace is easy to understand, those of international security is more complex.

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<sup>58</sup> Papisca, Antonio. Mascia, Marco. *Le relazioni internazionali nell'era dell'indipendenza e dei diritti umani*, Padova, Cedam, 2004: 403.

<sup>59</sup> Johnson, Rebecca. *Post-Cold War Security: the Lost Opportunities*, Disarmament Forum, 1999: 1.

<sup>60</sup> Toal, Gerard. *Post-Cold War geopolitics: contrasting superpower in a world of global dangers*, School of Public and International Affairs, Virginia Tech, Northern Virginia Center, 2001: 4.

<sup>61</sup> Former General Secretary of the United Nations.

This complexity will explode barely “in less than a decade[...]much of the optimism has been lost.”<sup>62</sup>

There are several ways by looking at the problem; by issues, by period, by event etc. We consider two periods: the first one is the 1990s to 2000s and, the second one is the after 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001.<sup>63</sup> The first part was guided by the general euphoria of the end of the Cold War, which did not take long to evaporate. As we stressed above, the collapse of Soviet Union brings out new issues like democracy, human rights and human security. The fundamental question was how to make a miracle which can permit African countries to achieve these goals whereas most of them (there is particularity inside and between countries) were facing impoverishment.

Nugent argues that, “whereas the rest of humanity still seemed to be on the virtuous path to progress, the African continent appeared to be in the opposite direction.”<sup>64</sup> The successive report of the World Bank reveal the root of the African economy distress and conceded “a lack of sensitivity to the human dimensions of the SAPs whilst incorporating “and systemic corruption as factor accounting for economic failure.”<sup>65</sup> The IMFs and the World Bank changed the implementation of the SAPs and introduced a social aspect.

Local governments were asked to “draw up Poverty Reduction Strategies to ensure that aid will direct to the most needy sections of the populations.”<sup>66</sup> Meanwhile, corruption and lack of democracy surge amongst the “acronyms” of system according to (Nugent).<sup>67</sup> With the end of the cold war, the IMFs and World Bank brought out the fact that, international aid was serving a class of longer-lived dictators both with corrupt elites. Therefore, “The new discourse in the pot[became] crisis of governance”<sup>68</sup> and human rights which was opposite to the discourse of the Cold War years. “During the

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62Johnson, Rebecca. Post-Cold War Security: the Lost Opportunities, Disarmament Forum, 1999: 2.

63 Terrorist attack in the United States.

64Nugent, Paul. Africa since independence, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004: 327.

65 Ivi, p. 331.

66Nugent, Paul. Africa since independence, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004: 331.

Ivi, p. 326.

68 Ivi, p. 331.

Cold War years state practice reflected the unwillingness of many countries to give up the use of intervention for political or other purposes as an instrument of policy.

Leaders on both sides of the ideological divide intervention in support of friendly leaders against local populations, while also supporting rebel movements and other opposition causes in states to which they were ideologically opposed. None were prepared to rule out a priori the use of force in another country in order to rescue nationals who were trapped and threatened there.”<sup>69</sup> Cassese argues that, human rights is a revolutionary theory designed to create tensions and conflicts between states. It has mainly involved the tearing of the veil that once covered and protected state sovereignty.

Today the doctrine of human rights forces states to give account for how they treat their citizens.<sup>70</sup> Human being became the aim of the “people’s security.”<sup>71</sup>

To compel African countries to achieve this programme, the International Financial Institution introduced the “political conditionalities”<sup>72</sup> namely transparency and good governance[and that ] reflect the disquiet within the international financial institutions [...] and Africans leaders. Longer-lived head of states and elites at power were reluctant to fulfil the new conditions and therefore to have access to financial support. “This shortcomings of Africa’s unaccountable leadership, persistent corruption and conflict formed the basis of a convergence between G8 and African initiative.”<sup>73</sup>

Unfortunately, they were “manifesting signs of acute economic distress, reflected in a mounting and unsustainable debt burden.”<sup>74</sup> Moreover, after the demise of the Soviet Union, the African countries had lost their international geostrategic situation. Thus, they were forced to admit their defeat and most of them joined the new international

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<sup>69</sup>International Commission on Intervention and state Sovereignty (ICSS), *The responsibility to protect*, Ottawa, 2001 :12.

<sup>70</sup> Cassese, Antonio. *Diritto internazionale*, 2004: 83.

<sup>71</sup> Papisca, Antonio. Mascia, Marco. *Le relazioni internazionali nell’era dell’indipendenza e dei diritti umani*, Padova, Cedam, 2004: 428.

<sup>72</sup>Alden, Chris, *China in Africa*. Zed Books, London, New York, 2007.

<sup>73</sup> Alden, Chris, *China in Africa*. Zed Books, London, New York, 2007: 96.

<sup>74</sup> Nugent, Paul. *Africa since independence*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004: 326.

cooperation programme based on political “conditionalities.”

The new international context was also characterised by the extension of the concept of security from national security to continental and global security, from unilateral to collective security.<sup>75</sup> Following this evolution, more attention were given to decentralized cooperation in the form of participatory partnership including a great variety of actors from civil society. The partnership challenge concerns the basic needs of people in their daily life as education, health, food access to productive resource for women.<sup>76</sup> Meanwhile, at the international level, the partnership between the European Union and the African Countries was strengthened by the United Nations Charter which promote multilateral and regional partnership.

This brings us to the conclusion that, the early 1990s were carried out hope of a world firmly decided to promote human rights, human security, sustainable development and peacekeeping etc. Some international events (terrorism, internal conflict, economic distress) bring out the complexity of international security and break down the hope to achieve a different world.

The “horrificing events of 11 september 2001 brought to center stage”<sup>77</sup> the question of national security and international terrorism. The United States has seized the occasion to give an unilateral and global response to the global terrorism. The 2nd of august 2002, at the Aspen Institute in Colorado, the Former President of the United States present the National Security programme. The aim was “to insure the United States against implausible but possible worst case scenarios combined often with hostile rhetoric as part of America’s highly public and partisan competition.”<sup>78</sup> Moreover, new security challenges have been identified:

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75 Papisca, Antonio. Mascia, Marco. *Le relazioni internazionale nell’era dell’indipendenza e dei diritti umani*, Padova, Cedam, 2004.

76 Ivi, p. 428.

77 International Commission on Intervention and state Sovereignty (ICSS), *The responsibility to protect*, Ottawa, 2001: 12.

78 Johnson, Rebecca. *Post-Cold War Security: the Lost Opportunities*, Disarmament Forum, 1999: 6.



the growth of ethnic nationalism and extremism;

international terrorism, and crime;

drug trafficking.

Global danger as :

borderless socio-environmental threats like AIDS, acid rain, toxic chemicals, global warming and rising sea levels;

borderless politico-economic threats like transnational crime and narco trafficking, cyber attacks and global terrorism;

borderless catastrophic threats like nuclear energy accidents and proliferating weapons of mass destruction.

Toal gives a comparative approach of the new international security context which brings out the interaction between five dimensions of the geopolitics. Considering the post Cold War security problems underline in the table 1, it seems that “the opportunities of the Post-Cold War era have been squandered and already there is little room left for new security thinking to take root in policy and planning.”<sup>79</sup>

GEOPOLITICAL WORLDS	GEOPOLITICAL WORLD ORDER	TECHNOTERRITORIAL COMPLEX	GEOPOLITICAL ECONOMY	GEOPOLITICAL DISCOURSE
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<sup>79</sup> Ivi, p.11.

<p>Post-Cold War,</p> <p>1991 to present.</p>	<p>Relative predominance of the United States and unpredictable challenges to its power, influence and symbols across the globe.</p> <p>Persistent regional antagonisms.</p>	<p>The aging nuclear weapons complexes of the superpowers. The Internet, wireless communication and pervasive computer controlled</p> <p>infrastructures. The catastrophic potential of accidents, terrorist attacks and information system vulnerabilities.</p>	<p>Neoliberal globalization based on an ideological commitment to unregulated markets, privatization and the virtues of advanced technological systems.</p> <p>Embedded corruption across large parts of the world. Pollution and toxicity too encroaching to fully ignore. Growing energy crises.</p>	<p>Global dangers.</p> <p>Discourse represents world politics as characterized by a range of borderlessness threats.</p> <p>Debates over which threats are the most pressing and how states should pursue national security..</p>
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Table 2. <sup>80</sup> Tree distinctive geopolitical world (1991 up to now)

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<sup>80</sup> Toal, Gerard. Post-Cold War geopolitics: contrasting superpower in a world of global dangers, School. of Public and International Affairs, Virginia Tech, Northern Virginia Center, 2001.

In reference to the guiding question we have chose in this chapter, it can be mentioned that, after the 11 September 2001 the United States as the only superpower, turn back to the national security policy. We stressed that, national security is the discourses “ of danger that specify a parade of threats that powerful interest groups consider important. This discourse defines the meaning of national security and, most importantly as far as defence contracting corporations are concerned, sets the agenda for the state spending necessary in order to address these threats.”<sup>81</sup>

However the new international crisis of security did not introduce significant change for the partnership between the European Union and the African countries. To renew this partnership, the former president of South Africa Thabo Mbeki together with the president Wade of Senegal, have launched the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). The “NEPAD envisaged a reconfiguring of donor-recipient relations such that, market approaches to development would be encouraged among African states, as good governance and transparency.”<sup>82</sup> Moreover the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) was aimed at compelling the Africans’ leaders signatory, to “put themselves up for periodic review to assess their adherence to best practice in pursuing democratic governance and liberal market criteria.”<sup>83</sup> These initiative show the willingness of some African governments to integrate the new system of international security both as to tie partnership with some Asian countries. The Asian economic system is known to be dominated by Japan and China. Meanwhile, taking in consideration the fact that, “Despite its financial weight and significant investments in international aid and international organizations, Japan has not played a significant role in global politics during the last decades”<sup>84</sup>, we will focus our attention on the Chinese inroads in Africa.

Turning back to the concept of security, Boutros-Boutros Ghali had underlined its complexity. The Chinese inroads in Africa have raised some complex questions which show this complexity. “China’s role in Africa can be characterized as [...] development

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<sup>81</sup> Ivi, P. 10.

<sup>82</sup> Alden, Chris, China in Africa. Zed Books, London, New York, 2007: 98.

<sup>83</sup> Alden, Chris, China in Africa. Zed Books, London, New York, 2007: 98.

<sup>84</sup> GU, Jing, Humphrey, John. The Implications of the Rise of China, institute of Development, German Development Institute, Bonn, Germany, World Development Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 274–292, 2008: 276.

partner, economic competitor or colonizer.”<sup>85</sup> Referring to our guide question, our main arguments will attempt to underline the implication of the Chinese behaviour in relation with security matter in Africa. What is the background of Chinese commitment in Africa? Who are the actors and how do they achieve their agenda? What is the response of Western countries? These are the main issues which will dominate this part.

### **1.3. The European Union and China in Africa**

In the late 1960s and 1970s, China promoted an alternative way to both Soviet and United States ideologies. Beijing attempted to build a South-South dialogue to counter the two superpowers. “This period of support for revolutionary change in the Third World was followed by self-imposed isolation of the cultural revolution. Relations with far-flung areas like Africa were severely curtailed as the Chinese political system turned itself in a struggle for both the leadership of the country and the economic direction that it should ultimately take.”<sup>86</sup> Following the end of the Cold War period, Chinese commitment in underdeveloped nations change radically from the political interests to economic interests.

The recommitment of China in Africa is symbolised by the visit of the Chinese leader Jiang Zemin in Africa in 1996. He seized the occasion to build an agenda with African countries which gave birth to the Beijing conference in 1995. The Forum on China-Africa partnership was the occasion for African delegations to have an overview of the emergence of the China.

Gu and Humphrey reported that, in the past two decades, “The Chinese economy accounted for 2.9% of global income in 1978, reached 4.7% of global income in 2004 and is predicted to reach 7.9% by 2020. China contributed 28% to the increase of global GDP during 1990–2005 (the United States: 19%; Rest of OECD: 18%). If [this] rapid growth is maintained, it is estimated that China could account for 37% of global GDP increase during 2005–20–more than all the OECD<sup>87</sup> countries together. The OECD

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<sup>85</sup> Alden, Chris, *China in Africa*. Zed Books, London, New York, 2007: 125.

<sup>86</sup> Ivi, p. 10.

<sup>87</sup> Organisation For Economic Development.

Economic Survey of China predicted that it will overtake Germany and the United States to become the world's largest exporter by 2010 (reported in the press, 17 Sept 2005).<sup>88</sup>

This phenomenal growth attracts the whole African continent which is looking for the opportunity to have an alternative model of development. Therefore, many African countries have opened their doors to China's investment. The Chinese Foreign Policy in Africa is based on "overarching brilliance."<sup>89</sup> By employing diplomatic instruments, financial incentives in the form of investment and development assistance, as well as limited peacekeeping and military cooperation.<sup>90</sup> The politic of "rayonnement"<sup>91</sup> is achieved through actors like: multinational companies, Chinese construction firms, small and medium enterprises, small-scale retailers often spread in rural African area.<sup>92</sup> The final aim of this mobilisation is to have access to raw material necessary for Chinese growing economy. The result of China and Africa partnership is often presented in terms of positive and negative aspects. China invests on project that aim to improving infrastructures and this contribute to reinforce his diplomacy success. "Big projects, such as investment in Sudan's oil industry from 1996 onwards, whereby the China National Petroleum Corporation has transformed an energy sector plagued by war and Western sanction into the country's leading export [...], are clearly at the forefront of the China's interest in Africa."<sup>93</sup> Various projects have been achieved in Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, in Tanzania, Botswana, in Zambia, Kenya, Namibia etc. The investment cover different sectors as: Transport, education, textile, agriculture, construction telecommunications, manufacturing, health etc.

The success of Chinese multinational companies has believed to lie on three factors. They provide lower labour cost, they introduce their contract workers and they use the strategy on linking investment to tie-in projects.<sup>94</sup> As a result of these strategies, China "had actually been the catalyst for development and, with that, a new level of improved

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88 GU, Jing. Humphrey, John. The Implications of the Rise of China, Institute of Development German Development Institute, Bonn, Germany, World Development Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 274–292, 2008: 276.

89 Alden, Chris, China in Africa. Zed Books, London, New York, 2007: 35.

90 Ibidem.

91 Ibidem.

92 Ibidem.

93 Alden, Chris, China in Africa. Zed Books, London, New York, 2007: 13.

94 Ibidem.

livelihoods such as Africa had not known for decades.”<sup>95</sup> Despite this investment, some aspects of Chinese behaviour have raised a wave of protest both in Africa and in Western countries. The critics are lead by NGOs and the civil society. We identified four areas which attract the attention of these organisation:

environment;

local labour trade;

Proliferation of Chinese retailers;

governance.

Concerning the issue of environment, “in October 2006, Gabon ordered the Chinese energy firm Sinopec to halt exploration in Loango National Park. Concerns have also been raised over the environmental impact of various Chinese-run mining operations in Africa, including copper mines in Congo and Zambia, as well as titanium sands projects in ecologically sensitive parts of Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Tanzania.”<sup>96</sup> The second point which sees the suspicious evaluations of NGOs and the civil society is the use of Chinese “unskilled” labour for infrastructure labour, whilst unemployment is among the cause of poverty in Africa. Moreover they are wondering that, China is transferring “his poor people’s” in Africa. Concerning the widespread of Chinese shop’s, it brings discontent because they “concurrently, threatened to undermine established retailers.”<sup>97</sup> The last critics move around the sensitive area of governance and human rights.

It can be observed that, the difference between the principles which guide the Chinese policy and the Western policy in Africa, are deeper. The Chinese policy emphasises on the “non interference” in state affairs, the “non conditionalities” and the best way to obtain license for raw material. Therefore, “In the area of development policy, China’s pragmatic goals [is to secure ] economic resources and diplomatic support comes up clearly.”<sup>98</sup> He has developed the cultural sense of “practical, common sense, and

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<sup>95</sup> Ivi, p. 4.

<sup>96</sup> Bates Gill and James Reilly *The Tenuous Hold of China Inc. in Africa*.

<sup>97</sup> Alden, Chris, *China in Africa*. Zed Books, London, New York, 2007: 49.

<sup>98</sup> GU, Jing. Humphrey, John. *The Implications of the Rise of China*, institute of Development, German Development. Institute, Bonn, Germany, *World Development* Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 274–292, 2008: 285

utilitarian way of adapting to particular relationships”<sup>99</sup> convinced by the vision that open confrontation will not serve his interest. Therefore, China enhance “Multilateralism[...] as a means of avoiding conflict. Chinese support for United Nations reflects its desire to avoid conflict and to resolve disputes peacefully.”<sup>100</sup> This include participation to peacekeeping mission, the admission to World Trade Organisation in the late 2001s, and its active role as international donor.

African leaders are particularly attracted by the non inter-interference in domestic affairs and the promotion of sovereign integrity.<sup>101</sup> consequently, China has been pointed to support “pariah regime and weak democracy.”<sup>102</sup> Alden reported the Chinese support for the Sudanese regime over the Darfur crises whilst, the Western donors are talking about:

governance;

efficiency;

security;

environment;

restrictions on macroeconomic policy;

reductions in public spending;

transparency;

holding of democratic elections by African government etc.

These abrasive issues show “more clearly the tensions and rivalries between China and the West.”<sup>103</sup> Therefore, “what has been deeply troubling for the West is that China is playing is predicated on being seen as an alternative source of foreign investment and diplomatic support for African governments weary of all manner of western

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<sup>99</sup> Ivi, p. 282.

<sup>100</sup> Ivi, p. 281.

<sup>101</sup> Alden, Chris, China in Africa. Zed Books, London, New York, 2007: 105.

<sup>102</sup> Ivi, p. 60.

<sup>103</sup> GU, Jing. Humphrey, John. The Implications of the Rise of China, institute of Development German Development Institute, Bonn, Germany, World Development Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 274–292, 2008: 285.

interference.”<sup>104</sup>

The Chinese politic of soft power and non-interference tend to promote the vision of national security with African countries, whereas the western countries have choose the line of human security, human rights and environment etc. Following its foreign policy based on non confrontation and multilateralism, China has responded to the concern by increasing the investment for the African countries. He also attempts to cooperate and manage crisis, illegal immigration and criminal activities.<sup>105</sup> It is obvious that the ability of China to inroad in Africa have raised serious questions in the Western countries. German has proposed to open dialogue with China about African countries in the occasion of European Union and China summit.

The United States is moving between two approaches. The first one is looking for the possibility to establish a permanent dialogue on Africa issues with China and, the second one is an attempt to counter it. Whilst, the United Kingdom is close to the German position. French has not given a clear position about the issue.<sup>106</sup> To turn back to our guide question, it seems that the burdens between these tree aspects (national security, trade and international solidarity) of international cooperation has been eroded in the new international context. The last point of this chapter suggests to look at the behaviour of Non Government Organisations.

#### **1.4. The role of Non Government Organisation in the context of EU-AU cooperation**

The NGOs have played a key role on revealing some suspicious aspects of Chinese policy in Africa. This seems to show their importance in the new international context. Actually, NGOs are partner of the Social and Economic Council of the United Nations with consultative status. Moreover, their influence has increased both in international, in regional and national level.<sup>107</sup>

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104 Alden, Chris, China in Africa. Zed Books, London, New York, 2007: 101.

105 Ibidem.

106 Alden, Chris, China in Africa. Zed Books, London, New York, 2007.

107 Marco, Mascia. Rapporto Cardoso: la sfida della partnership nelle Nazioni Unite. Società civile, in “pace diritti umani/peace human rights”, 1, 2005, pp29-53: 30



The history of the NGOs has begun with the birth of the United Nations in 1945, and progressively they have increased in size and in number. They have maintained the first definition that have been given by three successive resolutions of the Social Economic Council of the United Nations.<sup>108</sup> According to the 288 B (X) resolution of the 27<sup>th</sup> December 1950, the 1296 (XLIV) resolution of the 23 may 1968, the 31 resolution of the 25 July 1996<sup>109</sup>, NGO is “any non profit organisation that is independent from government, engaged in advocacy, valued-based and largely (although not exclusively) dependent on charitable donations and voluntary service.”<sup>110</sup> The NGOs can be classified in terms of their objectives, their activities and their localisation.

In terms of their activities, NGOs usually work for the issues that cover human promotion including: human rights protection, sustainable development, education, health, peace building, disarmament, social service etc. In terms of objectives, some work in general issues whereas, other are specialised in specific issues. Finally, the NGOs are national, regional, continental and intercontinental.<sup>111</sup> according to Alden, “NGOs are to all intents and purposes, the conscience of their respective societies. In the case of West, they shape the outlook of G8 governments to a degree unknown in other regions, and this unprecedented influence means that Western NGOs’ influence over their governments’ foreign policy towards Africa is disproportionate to their size.”<sup>112</sup>

As the conscience of their societies, the increasing number of NGOs (there were 40 in 1948 and 2418 in 2004)<sup>113</sup> in Western and in African countries shape the partnership between the European Union and the African countries. In the late 1980s-1989s, the NGOs became the pillars for the implementation of the International Financial

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108 Ibidem.

109 Ibidem.

110 E. McCullough. can NGOs play the peace and security game? In “pace diritti/peace human rights”, 2, 2006, pp 47-59: 47

111 Papisca, Antonio. Mascia, Marco. Le relazioni internazionali nell’era dell’indipendenza e dei diritti umani, Padova, Cedam, 2004: 254-255.

112 Alden, Chris, China in Africa. Zed Books, London, New York, 2007: 134.

113 Papisca, Antonio. Mascia, Marco. Le relazioni internazionali nell’era dell’indipendenza e dei diritti umani, Padova, Cedam, 2004: 268.

Institution programme both as hope for social sector in Africa. Following the African's economy diagnosis, the IMF and the World Bank has looked for accountable partners able to manage their aid programme. The "NGOs were expected to mobilise constituencies which were conducive to SAPs, whilst improving efficiency and exposing corruption and other lapses of government."<sup>114</sup> Therefore, some International Financial Institution have chosen the NGOs to channel aid investment.

The Western NGOs has built a wide network with local NGOs which were "quick to spot the advantages"<sup>115</sup> to joint the international area. We have already draw the situation of African's economy countries in the late 1970s-1989s. We said that, they were afflicted by persistent economic distress. Among the reasons that appear to have been the root of the crisis, we talked about corruption and misruling. The economic crisis, couple with SAPs enfeebled the African's state and eroded their sovereignty. Therefore, Many states were unable to assume some basic social service.<sup>116</sup> The distress of the ordinary population open space to an increase number of NGOs and they "became the moral and financial beneficiaries of a diagnosis which cast the state in the role of villain or at the best as a hopeless bundle of incompetence."<sup>117</sup> It can be noted that, NGOs can face government or internals barriers which tend to reduce their efficiency.

Relevant problems against NGOs result from government which consider the increase competence of NGOs as a disturbing characters.<sup>118</sup> Meanwhile, the participation of NGOs as consultative member of the Social Economic Council of the United Nations means that, states should accommodate to the new system of governance.<sup>119</sup>

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114 Nugent, Paul. Africa since independence, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004: 331.

115 Ivi, p. 347.

116 Nugent, Paul. Africa since independence, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

117 Ivi, p. 327.

118 M. Mascia, Rapporto Cardoso: la sfida della partnership nelle Nazioni Unite. Società civile, in "pace diritti umani/peace human rights", 1, 2005, pp 29-53: 37.

119 Ivi, p. 53

## **CHAPTER II**

### **THE NEW CONCEPT OF SECURITY AND THE EU-AU COOPERATION**

In the first chapter, we draw the conclusion that, the burdens between the National security, trade and International solidarity<sup>120</sup> seems to erode over time. In the next chapter we find it opportune to look at the trend of the European and African cooperation in the context of globalisation. Our attempt will be to find if “It is possible to discern an increasingly common moral perception that spans the world's nations and peoples, and which is finding expression in international laws”<sup>121</sup> through international solidarity.

We consider that, European and African partnership is shaped by the international agenda even if it preserves its particularities. For this reasons, the first paragraph will recall some key issues in the international agenda in connection with the European and African framework. In the three remaining paragraphs we will move into practical issues like the requirement of the human security, the capabilities of the European countries to tackle the challenges of African partnership and lastly, some aspects of Chinese commitment in Africa

#### **2.1. The international context**

In the first chapter, we look at the evolution of the security concept between the European and African countries. An overview of the issue helps us to draw broad conclusions in relation with our main question.<sup>122</sup> The first conclusion is that, the partnership between European and African Countries has begun in the international

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<sup>120</sup> Papisca, Antonio. Mascia, Marco. *Le relazioni internazionali nell'era dell'indipendenza e dei diritti umani*, Padova, Cedam, 2004: 403.

<sup>121</sup> Boutros-Boutros, Ghali. “Un agenda per la pace”, New York, United Nations, 1992.

<sup>122</sup> The main question is related to the three aspects of international cooperation (national security, trade and international solidarity).

context of Cold War, when the discourse of national security was predominated.

The next feature is that, With the end of the cold war, the emphasis on human security and human rights led to the lessons that “We have entered a time of global transition marked by uniquely contradictory trends. Regional and continental associations of States are evolving ways to deepen cooperation and ease some of the contentious characteristics of sovereign and nationalistic rivalries. National boundaries are blurred by advanced communications and global commerce, and by the decisions of States to yield some sovereign prerogatives to larger, common political associations”<sup>123</sup>

On the one hand, after the terrorist attack in the United State, the global contradiction brought out the issue of national security. On the other hand, The issue of human rights and human security were mainly guide by the United Nations with the support of Non Governmental Organisations. These ultimate (NGO) played the twin role of new impetus for human rights protection as well as disturbing characters for national government. The shift in security discourse tends to lay emphasis on “an increasingly common moral perception that spans the world's nations and peoples.”<sup>124</sup>

In this paragraph, we will look at the tree aspects of international cooperation<sup>125</sup> considering that, the view of the former General Secretary of United States is close to the approach of international solidarity. Our concern is to draw up the global perception of human security through short illustrations. The ICC report defines “The fundamental components of human security (the security of people against threats to life, health, livelihood personal safety and human dignity) can be put at risk by external aggression, but also by factors within a country. Most “governments spend more to protect their citizens against undefined external military attack than to guard them against the omnipresent enemies of good health and other real threats to human security on daily basis.”<sup>126</sup>

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123 Boutros-Boutros, Ghali. “Un agenda per la pace”, New York, United Nations, 1992: 3.

124 Ibidem.

125 National security, trade and international solidarity.

126 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty(ICISS, The Responsibility to protect, Ottawa, 200: 15.

The paradox underlines above seems to be confirmed by the global military expenditure amount. It has increased since 1997<sup>127</sup> as the figure below demonstrates. Furthermore the SIPRI report reveals that, between 2000 and 2009, only three of the thirty world conflicts were interstate.<sup>128</sup>



Figure 1. World military expenditure <sup>129</sup>

The trend to increase the military expenditure can be understood in the sense of the global contradiction underlined by Boutros-Boutros Ghali.

In addition world military expenditure can raise relevant questions if we admit that “drought and disease can decimate no less mercilessly than the weapons of war.”<sup>130</sup>

Therefore, one question is that, how useful can be the increase of military expenditure?

Following the same way, what the European security strategy report describes as “threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable”<sup>131</sup> seem to increase.

The emphasis which was placed on Human Security issues give us the opportunity to recall some recent events.

For instance, we observe that event relating to the earthquake in Haiti(2010) can give us

<sup>127</sup> Mascia, Marco. Obiettivo sicurezza umana. Per la politica estera dell’Unione Europea. Cleup, Padova, 2010: 13.

<sup>128</sup>SIPRI Year Book. Armament and disarmaments and international security, 2010 <http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2010/summary.pdf>.

<sup>129</sup> World military spending <http://www.globalissues.org/>.

<sup>130</sup> Boutros-Boutros, Ghali. “Un agenda per la pace”, New York, United Nations, 1992: p 2.

<sup>131</sup> A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy Brussels, 12 December 2003, [www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf).

an overview of the emergency with which this country is challenged. Such circumstance reveals the aspect of international solidarity which ICC describes as “an international responsibility to protect populations at risk,”<sup>132</sup> and this also includes “a responsibility to react by appropriate means if catastrophe is occurring, or seems imminent.”<sup>133</sup> Haiti was partly destroyed and therefore, has called for international assistance. The fact that the country receives aids from the global world can be understood in the sense of “an increasingly common moral perception” for international intervention. Naturally, we find concern about the implementation of the aid. However, these concerns cannot diminish the efforts vis-à-vis de Haiti. It still handles the aftermath earthquake with the cooperation of the international community.

To sum up, we live in an era of complex interdependence in which, the internal and external aspects of security are mutually interconnected and multidimensional security encompasses: economic prosperity, political stability, human rights, democracy, human development, social peace,<sup>134</sup> population growth, unsustainable debt burdens and climate change etc. These issues seems to be considered as a single package in the international agenda.<sup>135</sup> A brief overview of the literature can resume the deeper complexity of the global and human security threats.

Arrighi and Silver<sup>136</sup> have focused their arguments on the transition of the world by highlighting the contradiction of the globalisation. The main characteristics of globalisation are summarised in few words: political uncertainty, instability and insecurity, ethnic violence, the collapse of stock exchanges, the uncertainty for states to build strong states. To sum up, they describe an uncertain world which can lay foundation for future disruption.

Likewise, “A porous ozone shield could pose a greater threat to an exposed population

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132 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), *The Responsibility to protect*, Ottawa, 2001, PP VII-XIII e PP 1-18.

133 Ibidem.

134 Mascia, Marco. *Obiettivo sicurezza umana. Per la politica estera dell'unione Europea*. Cleup, Padova, 2010: 8.

135 G8 and G20 summit

136 Arrighi, Giovanni. Silver, J. *Caos e governo del mondo: come cambiano le egemonie e gli equilibri planetari*. Paravia Bruno Mondadori Editori, 2003.

than a hostile army.”<sup>137</sup> The UNFPA<sup>138</sup> bring out concerns lie to the climate change. The 2009 report <sup>139</sup> underlines that, Climate change’s influence on people is also complex, spurring migration, destroying livelihoods, disrupting economies, undermining development and exacerbating inequities between the sexes[...], among various groups, in terms of vulnerability and ability to cope with the effects. In general, vulnerable and socially marginalized groups, such as the poor, children, women, the elderly, and indigenous peoples, tend to bear the brunt of environmental change.<sup>140</sup>

The world also challenge demographic problems. The UNFPA reveals that “High population growth remains a salient concern in the developing world nearly half of the governments of developing countries still viewed their population growth as too high in 2009. Among the least developed countries, the percentage of countries that viewed population growth as too high rose from 50 per cent in 1986 to 76 per cent in 2009.”<sup>141</sup> Whilst, in the developed countries, problem of low population growth has led to growing concerns about the future.<sup>142</sup> We can also mention the failure of the Western model of market, the economic growth in China and the tremendous competition to control f resources in Africa etc.<sup>143</sup>

We recall that, the purpose of this paragraph on the one hand, is an attempt to have a global vision of human security threats. On the second hand, to draw up the trend of the international cooperation on these tree aspects (national security, trade and international security).

Globalisation seems to be among the disturbing character of the international system. Rao<sup>144</sup> give a key interpretation of globalisation as a trend of homogenization (culture, communication, trade, etc. ). He emphasises on the anarchy of the international market which causes deeper problems in many states and within states.

Among these problems, he invokes the disparity between rich and poor. He argues that,

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137 Boutros-Boutros, Ghali. “Un agenda per la pace”, New York, United Nations, 1992: 2

138 United Nations populations Funds.

139 UNFPA. State of world population report, facing a changing world: women, population and climate, 2009.

140 Ibidem

141 UNFPA, World Population Policies 2009, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, population division, United Nations, New York, 2010, ST/ESA/SER.A/293.

142 Ibidem.

143 Mascia, Marco. Obiettivo sicurezza umana. Per la politica estera dell’unione Europea. Cleup, Padova, 2010, p 309.

144 Rao, Antonio. Come uscire della globalizzazione. Pace o Guerra fra le nazioni? Cleup, Padova, 2008.

globalisation exacerbates the imbalance between North and South countries and consequently, has raised a wave of frustrations across the world. Terrorism and other forms of violence are in this way, expression of dissatisfaction of those who are believed to be excluded.

The world commission on social aspect of globalisation<sup>145</sup> presents a critical aspect of globalisation which shows that, if globalisation means for some “freedom and prosperity” for many other it causes “frustration and injustice.”<sup>146</sup> The commission makes the diagnosis of the statement of globalisation by underlining its weakness and it proposes the best way to reoriented the issue.

“The current process of globalisation is generating unbalanced outcomes, both between and within countries. Wealth is being created, but too many countries and people are not sharing in its benefits. They also have little or no voice in shaping the process. Seen through the eyes of the vast majority of women and men, globalisation has not met their simple and legitimate aspirations for decent jobs and a better future for their children. Many of them live in the limbo of the informal economy without formal rights and in a swathe of poor countries that subsist precariously on the margins of the global economy. Even in economically successful countries some workers and communities have been adversely affected by globalisation”<sup>147</sup>

We found different interpretation of this global crisis. Some interpret it relation with the interconnected effect of our civilisation. Following this way, they put together climate change, energy scarcity, (gas crisis and fuel crisis), economic distress and other social problems. The debate is turning around the necessity to think about the new civilisation. We will not extend our argument to such complex issue. Our aim is an attempt to find out how international cooperation is moving through national security, trade and international solidarity<sup>148</sup> in the European and African partnership. In the next chapters, it will emerge that these issues are part of the European and Africa agenda. One example can be that, “[NEPAD] insist on the importance of it leaders embracing the realities of globalisation and

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145 Commission on social aspect of globalisation <http://www.commissiononglobalization.org/>

146 Mascia, Marco. Obiettivo sicurezza umana. Per la politica estera dell'unione Europea. Cleup, Padova, 2010: 41.

147 World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization. A Fair Globalization, Creating Opportunities For all, <http://www.commissiononglobalization.org/>.

148 Papisca, Antonio. Mascia, Marco. Le relazioni internazionale nell'era dell'indipendenza e dei diritti umani, Padova, Cedam, 2004.



fashioning realistic plans for economic development.”<sup>149</sup>

Turning back to the relevant problems of globalisation, the commission proposes an interminable and vague list of solutions which aim at giving a human face to globalisation.

“We seek a process of globalisation with a strong social dimension based on universally shared values, and respect for human rights and individual dignity; one that is fair, inclusive, democratically governed and provides opportunities and tangible benefits for all countries and people. To this end we call for: A focus on people. The cornerstone of a fairer globalisation lies in meeting the demands of all people for: respect for their rights, cultural identity and autonomy; decent work; and the empowerment of the local communities they live in. Gender equality is essential. A democratic and effective State. The State must have the capability to manage integration into the global economy, and provide social and economic opportunity and security. Sustainable development. The question for a fair globalisation must be underpinned by the interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars of economic development, social development and environmental protection at the local, national, regional and global levels.”<sup>150</sup>

Recent natural disasters<sup>151</sup> revive the problem of environmental protection in relation with climate change and disasters.

Referring to natural disasters, the UNFPA warns that the earth’s surface is warming, the temperature increases and the impact on people is likely to be profound. As the temperatures rise, weather patterns shift with potentially catastrophic consequences, especially for the world’s poor.<sup>152</sup>

The common risks are: water scarcities; intense tropical storms and storm surges; floods and loss of glacial meltwater for irrigated agriculture; food shortages and health crises etc. Even in this area, “the poor are more likely to live in areas vulnerable to floods, storms and rising seas. And they are more likely to depend on agriculture and fishing for a living and therefore risk going hungry or losing their livelihoods when droughts strike, rains become unpredictable and hurricanes move with unprecedented force.”<sup>153</sup> Moreover, When poor

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149 Nugent, paul. Africa since independence, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004: 366.

150 World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization. A Fair Globalization, Creating Opportunities For all, <http://www.commissiononglobalization.org/>.

151 Wildfire in Russia, floods in Pakistan, Hurricane, mudslide in china, earthquake etc.

152 UNFPA. State of world population report, facing a changing world: women, population and climate. 2009.

153Ivi, p. 8.

countries face natural disasters, rebuilding becomes problematic when they are already burdened economic despair, social injustice and political oppression.<sup>154</sup>

Often, poor countries suffer with many lost of lives and or livelihoods. Aid and disaster relief often does come in from international organizations, rich countries and international institutions. These intervention can underlines that, solidarity is within the priorities in the international agenda.

As illustration, we found a comparative data of earthquake in Haiti. An estimated 200,000 peoples have died and around one millions left homeless.<sup>155</sup> The next figure<sup>156</sup> shows that, the imbalance between poor and rich countries is exacerbated in statement of disaster. Haiti is among the poor countries in the world as a result, the country was unable to handle a disaster of such scale.

The economic cost of the earthquake was estimated to several billion of dollars as the figure below describes. Compare to it gross domestic income, Haiti makes several steps behind and the reconstruction is believed to lie on international solidarity.




Figure 2. Cost of the earthquake in China, in Italy and Haiti<sup>157</sup>

The UNFPA have already predicted further consequences of climates change in Asia. Indonesia could lose as many as 2,000 small islands by 2030 as a result of rising seas. This change will especially affect Poor households, because their marginal income

<sup>154</sup> Boutros-Boutros, Ghali. "Un agenda per la pace", New York, United Nations, 1992.

<sup>155</sup> World Bank report, PDNA Haiti 2010, Working Document <http://go.worldbank.org/PF8ERYHLA0>

<sup>156</sup> China earthquake (2010), Italy (2009), Haiti (2010).

<sup>157</sup> Ibidem

provides little or no access to health services, or other safety nets to protect against the threats from changing conditions and because they lack the resources to relocate when crises strike.<sup>158</sup> The recent floods in Pakistan is believed to have been in relation with climate change. More than 20<sup>159</sup> millions of people are believed to be affected by the disaster. The figures below highlights the complexity and the cost of the disaster.




Figure 3. Cost of floods in Pakistan July 2010.<sup>160</sup>

Likewise, Italy, Australia, Benin and Niger are among the countries which challenge flood crisis in 2010. We take these few examples among dozens in the field of human security and naturally, those related to recent international agenda. Critics have been raise again the incoherence of the international intervention. This seems to confirm that, human security is a new field of interest and therefore, it need a global approach to overcome these crisis. To sum up, it seems that, viable mechanism needs to be identified to address the new human security threats. European and African countries are working toward this matter.

## 2.2. The approach of Human Security in the EU-AU cooperation

The European strategy for Africa<sup>161</sup> report provides a coherent vision of European and

<sup>158</sup> UNFPA. State of world population report, facing a changing world: women, population and climate. 2009: 8.

<sup>159</sup> Office for the coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. OCHA. <http://www.ochaopt.org/>.

<sup>160</sup> Ibidem

<sup>161</sup> A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy Brussels, 12 December 2003, [www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf).

African strategy in order to deliver hopeless people from daily needs:

“The European Union should therefore help to make health education and basic social services available for the poorest people in Africa (MDGs 1-6), contributing to the establishment of a social safety net for the most vulnerable: women, elderly, children and disabled people. It will also help to encourage employment and decent work as a key tool for preventing and eradicating poverty. In this context, the EU should promote increased cooperation between state and non-state actors (NGOs, private sector, trade unions, etc.) to ensure greater effectiveness in service delivery.”<sup>162</sup>

Both the ESS<sup>163</sup> and the Barcelona reports<sup>164</sup> form a single package for the European human security strategies although they bring out different fields of intervention.

The Barcelona report focuses its approaches on three main arguments. The first one refers to the “moral duty” based on the right for every human being to live in security with dignity everywhere. The next one considers that, it is jurisdictional duty of states to have concern about global security. The last reason is that, Europe cannot be secured if other citizens are living in deeper insecurity.<sup>165</sup> These principles refer to the “common moral perception” and the international solidarity we mention above. Moreover, the European strategy for Africa report gives more details about the discourse of solidarity between European and African countries.

“The EU should support African efforts to develop enhanced intra-African solidarity between these three different levels of governance. This solidarity consists of, for instance, recognition that peace, security and governance is a shared responsibility of the entire African continent. The principle of ‘non-indifference’ promulgated by the African Union lies at the heart of this new doctrine. Swift reactions by the African Union following coups d’Etat, breaches of constitutional orders or violations of human

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162 Commissione Delle Comunità Europee. Comunicazione Della Commissione Al Consiglio, Al Parlamento Europeo E Al Comitato Economico E Sociale Europeo, Strategia dell’Unione europea per l’Africa: verso un patto euroafricano per accelerare lo sviluppo dell’Africa, {SEC(2005)1255}, Bruxelles, 12.10.2005.

163 European Security Strategy.

164 Council, Presidency Conclusions, presidency Report on military crisis management of the European Union, Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/Conclusions.pdf>.

165 Ivi, p. 182.

rights vividly illustrate this attitude. The establishment of the Peace Facility, to which all Sub-Saharan African countries contributed via their EDF<sup>166</sup> envelopes, is a good example of how Europe can support this African” commitment. Another example could be to set up a mechanism supporting countries which are vulnerable and exposed to disasters and catastrophes etc.”<sup>167</sup>

In terms of discourse, the European strategy is clearly designed to reduce poverty <sup>168</sup> and to ensure that globalisation can become a positive trend for Africa’s development.<sup>169</sup>

Among the requirements of the European and African Partnership, it needs to accommodate the international context. How is the European Strategy is perceived in the context of globalisation?

Meunier and Kalypso observe that, the trade power of the European Union also serves to build a network of solidarity. First of all, They stress that, special agreement with ACP and the EPA<sup>170</sup> countries are both the sign of the social commitment of the European Union. Secondly, the European countries face criticism relating to their social commitment. This critics are especially formulate by the WTO.<sup>171</sup> “Here, the EU chooses a classic strategy of accommodation”<sup>172</sup> which is contrary to the liberalism. The challenge is how to accommodate the requirement of liberalism and the social aspect of the European Union.<sup>173</sup> Moreover, “With just five years remaining until the MDG target date of 2015”<sup>174</sup> the effort to address the millennium goals is undermined by constant

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166 European Development Fond.

167 Commissione Delle Comunità Europeo. Comunicazione Della Commissione Al Consiglio, Al Parlamento Europeo E Al Comitato Economico E Sociale Europeo, Strategia dell’Unione europea per l’Africa: verso un patto euroafricano per accelerare lo sviluppo dell’Africa, {SEC(2005)1255}, Bruxelles, 12.10.2005.

168 Meunier, Sophie. Kalypso, Nicolaidis. The European Union as a conflicted, trade power, Journal of European Public Policy 13, 6 September 2006: 917.

169 Commissione Delle Comunità Europeo. Comunicazione Della Commissione Al Consiglio, Al Parlamento Europeo E Al Comitato Economico E Sociale Europeo, Strategia dell’Unione europea per l’Africa: verso un patto euroafricano per accelerare lo sviluppo dell’Africa, {SEC(2005)1255}, Bruxelles, 12.10.2005.

170 European partnership for Africa.

171 World Trade Organisation.

172 Meunier, Sophie. Kalypso, Nicolaidis. The European Union as a conflicted. trade power, Journal of European Public Policy 13:6 September 2006, 917.

173 Ibidem.

174 An Agenda for Global development. G8/G20 Civil Society Coalition Platform executive Summary, G8/G20 Canadian Civil Society Platform, 2010, <http://www.icad-cisd.com//>.

challenge like two years of global crisis, the various requests for European intervention to address disaster crisis in the world, the irruption of China as alternative for African countries etc.

### 2.3. Some aspect of EU and China competition in Africa

In the first chapter we observed that, China inroad in Africa is among the new challenges for the European and Africa partnership. We went through the historical aspect and we look at how china's irruption revives some contradictions. We propose to return to this issue focusing on how the competition is moving on the ground. The figure below shows the trend of Chinese investment in some African countries.

China's imports from Africa	(US\$m)	%
Angola	3422.63	27.4
South Africa	2567.96	20.6
Sudan	1678.60	13.4
Republic of Congo	1224.74	9.8
Equatorial-Guinea	787.96	6.3
Gabon	415.39	3.3
Nigeria	372.91	3.0
Algeria	216.11	1.7
Morocco	208.69	1.7
Chad	148.73	1.2
TOTAL	11043.72	88.4

Table 3. International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics (May 2005).<sup>175</sup>

The Chinese investment is challenging the African weakness infrastructure by building railways, dams, power plants etc. The Chinese politic of "rayonnement" is orientated toward areas which are giving immediate visibility to its investments.

For instance, "The Chinese, unlike Western countries, finance grandiose and prestigious buildings (presidential palaces, football stadiums) that African leaders highly appreciate

<sup>175</sup> M. Tull, Denis. China's engagement in Africa: scope, significance and consequences, J. of Modern African Studies, 44, 3 (2006), pp. 459–479. f 2006 Cambridge University Press.

for their own political reasons.”<sup>176</sup>

Whereas, the European commitment emphasises on the prerequisites to attain the millennium goals.

In this perspective, relevant issues are identified: conflict prevention; State reform; human rights abuses and democracy; poverty and environmental degradation; violent conflict and the lack of basic social services and essential investment; climate change; exploitation and unequal distribution and access to land and natural resources; weak governance and gender inequality etc.<sup>177</sup> There are conceived in a single package with the philosophy to build conditions for peace, stability, good governance, economic growth and the protection of environment

In reference to the framework of the two partnerships, they are moving on different directions. Consequently, the question is how useful are these partnerships for African countries? The document on European Strategy for Africa defines the China role in this term: “China merits special attention given its economic weight and political influence. Sino-African trade has increased from \$10 billion in 2000 to \$28.5 billion in 2004 and since 2000 more than 25% of China’s crude oil is imported from Africa. Despite radical domestic changes, the country has retained links with different African countries, which are now attracted by China’s trading potential. Especially for oil- and commodity dependent countries, China represents a substantial and continued source of financial income, mostly outside the traditional development and governance frameworks.”<sup>178</sup>

As a result, “China overtook the UK as Africa’s third most important trading partner in 2005 (after the US and France). However, Africa’s share of Chinese external trade is only about 2%, and Chinese-African trade represents a mere 40% of the US-African trade volume.”<sup>179</sup> China also move around the sensitive subject of debt cancellation. The

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<sup>176</sup> Ivi, p. 467.

<sup>177</sup> Commissione Delle Comunità Europeo. Comunicazione Della Commissione Al Consiglio, Al Parlamento Europeo E Al Comitato Economico E Sociale Europeo, Strategia dell’Unione europea per l’Africa: verso un patto euroafricano per accelerare lo sviluppo dell’Africa, {SEC(2005)1255}, Bruxelles, 12.10.2005.

<sup>178</sup> ibidem.

<sup>179</sup> M. Tull, Denis. China’s engagement in Africa: scope, significance and consequences, *J. of Modern African Studies*, 44, 3 (2006), 2006 Cambridge University Press, pp 463-465.

annex 1 illustrates more than words the extension of African indebt countries in the world.

Foreign debt is believed to be “unsustainable”<sup>180</sup> because it compels African countries to cut back spending on healthcare and education.

Joining the international political agenda on debt cancellation, “Beijing points to its support for debt cancellation in favour of African countries. Over the past few years, China has cancelled the bilateral debts of 31 African countries, totalling some \$1.27 billion. Underline the quasi-natural convergence of interests between China and African countries.”<sup>181</sup>

Following the same analyses, recent data show that China has increased its aid to Africa countries to one billions of U.S. dollars in 2009; he also creates a development fund of 5 billions of dollars and have opened the Chinese market to African products, the number of products entering duty-free tariff have rise to 190 to 440. The annual number of scholarships granted to African students have reached 4000 a year. More than seven hundred Chinese companies now operating in Africa.<sup>182</sup> We will not turn back to the controversial aspects of the Chinese role in Africa.

The European and Africa partnership is deeply rooted in history and gradually evolved into a strong partnership. “increasingly, the EU does exploit its formidable trade power to pursue non-trade objectives through conditionality or fostering regional trade blocs in its own image.”<sup>183</sup>

This non trade objectives certainly include political dialogue and solidarity with regional group as ACP, Latin American countries, Mediterranean countries and recently, with single countries as Iran and china.<sup>184</sup> China is also claim to acting to strengthen international solidarity and South- South dialogue. For this matter, “Although an

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180 Nugent, paul. *Africa since independence*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004: 335.

181 M. Tull, Denis. *China’s engagement in Africa: scope, significance and consequences*, J. of Modern African Studies, 44, 3 (2006), pp. 459–479. f 2006 Cambridge University Press.

182 Calandri, Elena (a cura di). *Il primato sfuggente: L’Europa e l’intervento per lo sviluppo (1957-2007)*. Franco Angeli s.r.l., Milano, Italy 2010: 51.

183 Meunier, Sophie. Kalypso, Nicolaidis. *The European Union as a conflicted trade power*, Journal of European Public Policy 13, 6 September 2006: 922.

184 Mascia, Marco. *Obiettivo sicurezza umana. Per la politica estera dell’unione Europea*. Cleup, Padova, 2010: 237.



emerging economic superpower, China continues to portray itself as a developing nation, at least to African audiences, to underline the quasi-natural convergence of interests between [China and African countries].”<sup>185</sup>

Our purpose is not aimed at giving a comparative assessment of European or China commitment in Africa. As we already stress above, our concern is an attempt to bring out some aspect of international cooperation which can be useful to understand the European and African partnership.

In this perspective, the interpretation that Tull provides can highlight some aspects of this partnership: “Beijing uses the pillars of its foreign policy, notably unconditional respect for state sovereignty and its corollary, non-interference, in the pursuit of its interests, be they energy security, multipolarity or the ‘One China’ principle. To achieve these goals, Beijing is prepared to defend autocratic regimes that commit human rights abuses and forestall democratic reforms for narrow ends of regime survival. Finally, China’s increasingly prominent role as a supplier of arms to Africa is also a source of concern. In summary, there is virtually no way around the conclusion that China’s massive return to Africa presents a negative political development that ‘almost certainly does not contribute to the promotion of peace, prosperity and democracy on the continent’. Despite this, Western decision-makers have little reason to claim the moral high ground vis-à-vis China. A fair number of flaws and criticisms that need to be levelled against Beijing’s politics in Africa do equally apply, though to a lesser extent, to Western policies towards Africa.”<sup>186</sup>

## **2.4. The capabilities of the European Union**

The European human security strategy for Africa is part of the CFSP<sup>187</sup> and the CSDP.<sup>188</sup> This paragraph will look at the global aspect of European human security strategy, whereas the next chapter will go through the specific aspect of the Human security issues

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185 M. Tull, Denis. China’s engagement in Africa: scope, significance and consequences, *J. of Modern African Studies*, 44, 3 (2006), pp. 459–479. f2006 Cambridge University Press, 462.

186Ivi, p. 476.


187 Common Foreign and Security policy.

188 The Common Security and Defence Policy.

in the European and Africa partnership.

Both the Helsinki<sup>189</sup> report on non-military management of crisis and the European Security Strategy have built the European human security doctrine. The first document affirms that, “With the enhancement and concertation of military and civilian crisis response tools, the Union will be able to resort to the whole range of instruments from diplomatic activity, humanitarian assistance and economic measures to civilian policing and military crisis management operations.” The involvement of civil personnel seems to increase in peace keeping operation. “Increasingly, peace-keeping requires that civilian political officers, human rights monitors, electoral officials, refugee and humanitarian aid specialists and police play as central a role as the military.”<sup>190</sup>

***Civilians deployed to peace operations,  
2000–2009***



Figures 4. Personnel and civilians deployed to peace operations in the world, 2000-2009<sup>191</sup>

189 Council, Presidency Conclusions, presidency Report on military crisis management of the European Union, Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/Conclusions.pdf>.

190 Boutros-Boutros, Ghali. “Un agenda per la pace”, New York, United Nations, 1992: 12.

191 SIPRI Year Book. Armament and disarmaments and international security, 2010, p7 <http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2010/summary.pdf>.

Civil involvement in peace operation aims at consolidating the resolution of military conflicts. Civilian crisis management is an important tool in the context of the Common Foreign and Security policy that strengthened its identity in terms of human security.<sup>192</sup>

Civilian crisis management is also among the solution proposed by the European security strategy report to tackle the new security threats.

“Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations.”<sup>193</sup> Some example can be taken: the police and judiciary system, governance, monitoring elections, protection human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions, and promoting processes of political participation experts to manage human rights and other institutional issues which can be rapidly employed to sustain peace operation.<sup>194</sup>

The two documents mention that, the strengthening of civilian capabilities is a key objective to improve the European effort to save lives in case of crisis, to maintain public order, to prevent the outbreak or escalation of conflicts, to consolidate peace and internal stability in transition periods.<sup>195</sup>

The policy of dialogue is the other side of the civilian crisis management. The dialogues are set up with European and Foreign partners with the aim to “To seek to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce conflict, and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before violence results”<sup>196</sup>

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192 Mascia, Marco. Obiettivo sicurezza umana. Per la politica estera dell'unione Europea. Cleup, Padova, 2010: 204.

193 A Secure Europe in a Better World European Security Strategy Brussels, 12 December 2003. [www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf).

194 Mascia, Marco. Obiettivo sicurezza umana. Per la politica estera dell'unione Europea. Cleup, Padova, 2010: 205.

195 Ivi, p. 308.

196 Boutros-Boutros, Ghali. “Un agenda per la pace”, New York, United Nations, 1992.

The social and civil dialogues is organised with European partners, whereas dialogues on political, intercultural and human rights issues is considered as the pillars of European diplomacy with its relations with non-European countries.

These dialogues include regional group in Latin America,<sup>197</sup> ACP, Mediterranean countries or single states as china and Iran. With the diplomacy of dialogue, the EU is moving around the world as purveyor of “soft power”.<sup>198</sup> The mechanism, the structure of these dialogues will be widely presented in the next chapter. In the global level, concerns have been raised concerning the European capabilities to address the new threat with the discourse of soft power. Concerning the civilians crisis management, the problem is that, the progress continue to be inadequate because of the increasing request to the EU to deploy wide and complex missions in the field<sup>199</sup>. Moreover, it seems difficult to assess the impact of political dialogue both in internal and global level.<sup>200</sup>

The 21st century seems to offer a lot of opportunities in terms of peace, development and human rights. Global progress have been made to improve the human being's condition in many ways even if, a part of the population in the world's are living out of the virtuous circle of development. Unfortunately, literature and the international agenda reveal that a lot of pitfalls are lying on the globalisation. The paradox is that, although the means to address these pitfalls have been identified, the world seems to show a certain difficulty in finding viable solutions. In this sense, our attempt, in the remaining chapter, will be to look at the mechanism of the European and African partnership. How possible can these mechanism help in solving some relevant problems that emerged in this chapter.

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197 Mascia, Marco. *Obiettivo sicurezza umana. Per la politica estera dell'unione Europea*. Cleup, Padova, 2010: 237.

198 Ivi, p. 309.

199 Ivi, p. 209.

200 Ivi, p. 264.

## **CHAPTER III**

### **THE MECHANISM OF EU-AU COOPERATION**

In 2007, the Joint Africa-EU report was published with the purpose of establishing a coherent approach to the EU and African partnership. Meanwhile, the document takes all its sense when it is connected to the European Security Strategy report. This ultimate report brings out the imperative of international cooperation to address the new and global threats and therefore, recommends that, international cooperation is a necessity to pursue these objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships with various actors.<sup>201</sup>

The mechanism established to achieve the EU and African Partnership is the main purpose of this chapter. The first paragraph will look at the politics of regionalism which emerges in the European strategy for Africa whilst, the second one will present the prerequisites that have been identified to improve human beings' condition in Africa. Lastly, an overview of the joint institutions of the European and African partnership will conclude this chapter with a special emphasis on the JAES institutions.

#### **3.1. The role of regional arrangement**

Regional arrangement aims at realising economic and political integration. "In the past, regional arrangements often were created because of the absence of a universal system for collective security; thus their activities could on occasion work at cross-purposes with the sense of solidarity required for the effectiveness of the world Organization. But in this new era of opportunity, regional arrangements or agencies can render great service if their activities are undertaken in a manner consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, and if their relationship with the United Nations, and particularly the Security Council, is governed by Chapter VIII."<sup>202</sup>

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201 A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy Brussels, 12 December 2003, p 13

202 Boutros-Boutros, Ghali. "Un agenda per la pace", New York, United Nations, 1992.

Regional arrangement can be interpreted as a principle of subsidiary and solidarity in the global context. The European strategy for Africa underlines two dimensions of the European and African partnership. Firstly, the deepening of the European integration give incentive to European ambitions for a greater political role on the international level. Secondly, regional and sub regional African integration is among the priority of European Union strategy in Africa.

Therefore, sustain has been given to African regional processes which shows a strong will to formulate answers to the diversity of African problems.

The report on European strategy states that, “There are many Africa’s. Different political regimes, historical experience, cultural and religious contexts, economic dynamics and geographic characteristics mean that local communities, countries and regions often differ considerably from one another.”<sup>203</sup> On the one hand, there is a vision of treating Africa as one, on the other hand, particular problems are specific to some regions. For instance “areas of conflict and instability remain: the Mano-River region in west Africa and a line extending from Sudan and the Horn of Africa down to eastern Congo in eastern and central Africa. These two areas are dominated by a large number of *countries in conflict* as well as a high proportion of *fragile states*, i.e. states that – often weakened by endemic crises and conflicts or natural disasters – lack credible, legitimate and/or effective governance. The first case, the Mano River sub-region, includes countries such as Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Fuelled by the presence of considerable natural resources, including diamonds and timber, over the last ten years conflict has spread across borders and engulfed the entire region in a severe refugee crisis, further contributing to the regional instability”<sup>204</sup>

Literature underlines the important trends and development of regionalism. The Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter draw up the international foundation of regional

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203 Commissione Delle Comunità Europeo. Comunicazione Della Commissione Al Consiglio, Al Parlamento Europeo E Al Comitato Economico E Sociale Europeo, Strategia dell’Unione europea per l’Africa: verso un patto euroafricano per accelerare lo sviluppo dell’Africa, {SEC(2005)1255}, Bruxelles, 12.10.2005: 10

204 Ivi, p.11.

arrangement. Each regional group is an attempt to build a framework in reference with the particular issues that their region are facing as a challenge.

Usually, regionalism refers to a type of international integration, following this way, it is lied to geographical extension ( UE, CEDEAO, Mercosur).<sup>205</sup> In the global level we identify a broad number of regional group and “the most integrated economic region [...] is Europe.”<sup>206</sup> The pre-conditions to the success of a regional arrangement seems to be lied on the interaction of numerous and complex elements within and between countries.

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205 Papisca, Antonio. Mascia, Marco. Le relazioni internazionalie nell'era dell'indipendenza e dei diritti umani, Padova, Cedam, 2004: 495

206 Hufbauer, Gary. Kotschwar, Barbara. Regional Integration: Lessons from Asia and the Western Hemisphere in Iqbal, Zubair. S. Khan, Moshin. Trade Reform Integration in Africa, International Monetary fund, Washington DC, 1998.

The need for a vision; it refers to the political will which must be clear in the top level of the regional initiative.

The leadership; the commitment of a “giant” in term of its economy and its political weight is necessary to insure the success of the arrangement.

Geography (distance between countries); as much as possible, the countries should be close or adjacent to ease the coordination of integration.

The integration of small economy; vulnerable countries need to be insured that, they will not be “swallowed” by the “giants”.

The private enterprise should be sustained as partners of integration initiative.

Liberalization; the members should bring down barriers. It is the main objective of the arrangement.

A coordinated approach; the implementation of the agenda should be clear.

The simplicity; initially, the agenda should be simple as much possible.

Move to Simple FTA<sup>207</sup> to Customs Union; the issue should be extended over time to move to a deeper arrangement (as the case of European Union show).

The simple rules of origin should be respected.

Political benefit: this tape should be the result of economic integration which is believed to evolve gradually<sup>208</sup> etc.

The United Nations assigns a subsidiary role to the regional arrangement to strengthen the international cooperation. Yet it can be opportune to ask which aspect of international cooperation<sup>209</sup> the United Nations underlines.

For the former United secretary General, “What is clear,[...] is that regional

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207 Free Trade Agreement.

208 Hufbauer, Gary. Kotschwar, Barbara. Regional Integration: Lessons from Asia and the Western Hemisphere in Iqbal, Zubair. S. Khan, Moshin. Trade Reform Integration in Africa, International Monetary fund, Washington DC, 1998, p 329-339

209 Papisca, Antonio. Mascia, Marco. Le relazioni internazionali nell'era dell'indipendenza e dei diritti umani, Padova, Cedam, 2004: 403.



arrangements or agencies in many cases possess a potential that should be utilized in serving the functions [of] preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, peacemaking and post-conflict peace-building.”<sup>210</sup>

Once again, it enhances the fundamental necessity of international solidarity to handle regional issue. International solidarity can be expressed in various forms. For instance through regional arrangement and humanitarian intervention etc. with the purpose to implement the human security agenda and other issues such as human rights, MDGs, etc.

To respond to the mission of multilateral cooperation draw by the United Nations, the European Security Strategy structured its partnership with this purpose : “In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective.”<sup>211</sup>

In Africa these objectives are organised in tree framework; the Cotonou Partnership Agreement defines various aspects of the relationship between African, Caribbean and Pacific countries and the European Union. It encompasses the development cooperation, political and trade dimensions. The Partnership begin in 1963 with the Yaoundé convention. In 2000s the Cotonou agreement replace the Lomé conventions which began in the late 1975s.

The former Barcelona process, establishes the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which has now been merged into the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). It defines Europe’s relationship with its neighbours as the European Security Strategy recommends “Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe. The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of

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210 Boutros-Boutros, Ghali. “Un agenda per la pace”, New York, United Nations, 1992: 14.

211 A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy Brussels, 12 December 2003. [www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf).

the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.”<sup>212</sup> With South Africa, the EU build a bilateral relationship. The Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement (signed in 1999), which has now been complemented by an EU-South Africa Strategy (2007), and entails the various dimensions of European relations with South Africa: trade relations, political dialogue and cooperation.<sup>213</sup>

Regional arrangement is believed to be among the solutions whose can improve the African political instability and drive economic growth. Surprisingly, although African countries houses a large number of cooperation and integration arrangement, it shares only 2% of world trade. Whereas, in 1950 its export mix was evaluated at 3%. The European Strategy for Africa lay emphasis on “A controlled and gradual increase in openness, first regionally and then toward the wide world, [...] as a basis for significant acceleration of growth and development.”<sup>214</sup> In the same way, “to consolidate the individual efforts of Sub-Saharan African countries, there is the need to speed up the regional integration as a pre-condition for future political unity. In this regard, the recent efforts of the economic Commission of West Africa States (Ecowas) must be applauded.”<sup>215</sup>

Similarly, many other African regional arrangement can be mentioned. Amu<sup>216</sup>, Cemac<sup>217</sup>, Comesa<sup>218</sup>, Cen-Sad<sup>219</sup>, Eac<sup>220</sup>, Eccas<sup>221</sup>, Ecowas<sup>222</sup>, Gafta<sup>223</sup>, Igad<sup>224</sup>, Ioc<sup>225</sup>,

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212 A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy Brussels, 12 December 2003: 7-8 [www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf).

213 Towards a Joint Africa-Europe Partnership Strategy: The EU-Africa Partnership in Historical Perspective. ECDPM, Maastricht (Netherlands), December 2006: 1. [www.ecdpm.org](http://www.ecdpm.org).

214 Commissione Delle Comunità Europeo. Comunicazione Della Commissione Al Consiglio, Al Parlamento Europeo E Al Comitato Economico E Sociale Europeo, Strategia dell’Unione europea per l’Africa: verso un patto euroafricano per accelerare lo sviluppo dell’Africa, {SEC(2005)1255}, Bruxelles, 12.10.2005: 13.

215 Akeya Agbango, Georges. Issues and trends in contemporary African politics: Stability, development and democratization, Peter Lang Publishing, Inc, New York 2003: 43

216 Arab Maghred Union.

217 Communauté Economique et monétaire de l’Afrique Central.

218 Common market of Eastern and Southern Africa.

219 Community of Sahel-Saharan states.

220 Eastern Africa community.

221 Economic Community of central Africa States.

222 Economic Community of West African States.

223 Greater Arab Free Trade.

224 Inter-Governmental Authority on development.

225 Indian ocean community.

Sacu<sup>226</sup>, Sadc<sup>227</sup>, Uemoa.<sup>228</sup>

Among these regional arrangement, we found a broad literature about Ecowas and Sadc. The leadership play by South Africa and Nigeria as political and economic leaders of Sadc and Ecowas seems to be the reason of this attraction.

Leadership is believed to be a fundamental aspect of regional arrangement success. “if a large country of the region is not sold in the effort, it will not succeed. In fact, leadership from the top is a necessary ingredient. A main reason for entering into a regional trade arrangement is to gain improved access to the market of a largest trading partner.”<sup>229</sup> For instance, the NAFTA<sup>230</sup> cannot go ahead without the sustain of the United States, the Mercosur without Brasil. Therefore, “if, for example Brazil sneezes, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay will catch cold. For Mercosur to remain healthy, thus, Brazil must take care to use a handkerchief- and not sneeze in the direction of these tree countries – to protect its regional trading partners from catching its cold.”<sup>231</sup>

In the same way, The Ecowas establishes the Ecomog (cease fire Monitoring group) in 1990. Since its creation, it took part in four peacekeeping mission (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Ivory coast) with a major part of Nigerian military.

The European Union Strategy for Africa makes the link between “the stability and governance performance of a country and the investment climate.”<sup>232</sup>

For this matter, the Ecowas have set up various treaty, protocol, declaration to challenge the sensitive issues of smuggling, democracies, governance, human rights, rights of child, mechanism of prevention, resolution of conflicts, security, free election, the unconstitutional change of government, internal displacement, migration in Western

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226 Southern African Customs Union.

227 South Africa Development Customs union.

228 Union Economique et monétaire Ouest Africaine.

229 Hufbauer, Gary. Kotschwar, Barbara. Regional Integration: Lessons from Asia and the Western Hemisphere in Iqbal, Zubair. S. Khan, Moshin. Trade Reform Integration in Africa, International Monetary fund, Washington DC, 1998: 331

230 Nord America Free Trade Agreement.

231 Ivi, p. 332.

232 Commissione Delle Comunità Europeo. Comunicazione Della Commissione Al Consiglio, Al Parlamento Europeo E Al Comitato Economico E Sociale Europeo, Strategia dell’Unione europea per l’Africa: verso un patto euroafricano per accelerare lo sviluppo dell’Africa, {SEC(2005)1255}, Bruxelles, 12.10.2005: 13

Africa. It organised a permanent structure which encompasses the summit of the head of states and government, the Council of ministers, the executive secretary, the Specialised commissions, the tribunal, the Parliament of 150 representatives, the Mediation and security council and its secretariat, the Committees of ambassadors and ministers, a defence security commission, the ad hoc council of elder, a Subregional Security and peace Observation System(an early warning mechanism).Primarily, the Sadc and the Ecowas were established to pursue the economic integration of their region. Their implication into military adventure seems to bring out the fact that, “Coherent policies are also needed regionally, especially in dealing with conflict. Problems are rarely solved on a single country basis, or without regional support, as in different ways experience in both the Balkans and West Africa shows.”<sup>233</sup>

Moreover, the Early Warning system established by these regional arrangements is based on the preventive diplomacy which aims at offering advice to prevent conflict. For Ecowas and Sadc, “success is more readily achievable in the area of conflict prevention, where diplomatic and other dialogue-based interventions are the order of the day.”<sup>234</sup>

To end this paragraph we propose to look at the institutions of the fourth main partnership which “define Europe’s relationship with Africa and raise issues of the consistency of European relations with various regions in Africa”<sup>235</sup>

The enlargement of the European Union changed the pattern of ESDP<sup>236</sup> in the international level whilst, a new dimension has appeared with its partners(political dialogue for example). The agreement with ACP countries (the larger arrangement) include 79 countries with: (48) of Africa, 16 of Caribbean, and 15 of pacific. <sup>237</sup>

The partnership is based on four objectives:

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233 A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy Brussels, 12 December 2003: 14 [www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf).

234 Nieuwkerk, Anthoni. Regionalism into Globalism? War into Peace? SADC and ECOWAS compared. Published in African Security Review Vol. 10 No 2, 2001: 8

235 Towards a Joint Africa-Europe Partnership Strategy: The EU-Africa Partnership in Historical Perspective. ECDPM, Maastricht (Netherlands), December 2006. [www.ecdpm.org](http://www.ecdpm.org).

236 European and Defence Security policy.

237 Annex 1, list of ACP countries.

sustainable development of its Member-States and their gradual integration into the global economy, which entails making poverty reduction a matter of priority and establishing a new, fairer, and more equitable world order ;

coordination of the activities of the ACP Group in the framework of the implementation of ACP-EC Partnership Agreements;

consolidation of unity and solidarity among ACP States, as well as understanding among their peoples ;

establishment and consolidation of peace and stability in a free and democratic society.

We will not go back to the long history of the European and ACP partnership before the end of the Cold War. The late 1990s bring a fundamental shift in the agreement. We recall that, before the 1990s, the agenda between the ACP countries and the EU was based on economic agreement. Globally, it is often claimed that, ACP-EU cooperation has been able to keep the line of non-politicization.

The Stabex were instruments that aim at coping with the commodity crisis. For instance, it provides funds to offset losses on a wide number of agricultural products such as cocoa, coffee, cotton, etc. Whereas, Lomé IV convention introduces the political conditionalities in the European and African partnership.

The agreement stated that, the respect of human rights and democratic principles were an essential aspect of the EU and African cooperation. In addition, measures for the suspension of aid made their appearance in case of non respect of these clauses.

The duration of the agreement, 10 years (from 1990 to 2000) was supposed to contribute to the achievement of its goals.

The Cotonou Agreement was signed in the late 2000s by 77 ACP countries. “It was forged from the Group’s determination to maintain its solidarity - a solidarity which certainly convinced the ACP States’ European partners. In addition, the Agreement, despite not meeting all the ACP demands, took on board their fundamental concerns. First of all by its duration - twenty years- sufficient time to enable ACP Member-States

to get onto the road to development and, especially, to become smoothly integrated into the global market. Indeed, the Agreement envisages the removal of non-reciprocal trade preferences granted ACP countries, but only after a long [transitional] period. In fact, Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) will be negotiated between the European Union and ACP countries between September 2002 and the end of 2007, following which they will come into force.”<sup>238</sup>

Which conclusions can be drawn from this partnership? On the one hand, there are documents which lay emphasis on the “acquis” of the partnership by considering that, “The most notable achievement of ACP-EU cooperation is that, it introduces a new type of relationship between rich and poor countries based on solidarity and partnership, an independent involvement in political arrangements which can boost bilateral relations.”<sup>239</sup>

On the other hand, the discourse about the impact and who benefits of this relationship is controversial. The issue can be interpreted in term of African economy performance, ideology (Nord South partnership), rich and poor, etc. One example can be those who underline on the “laisser-aller”<sup>240</sup> that characterises the management of the preferential agreement funds (Stabex funds) by African governments. This point of view attributes the responsibility of this “squandered period” to a complex mix of events which lead African countries to bankrupt. consequently, the solution to the “laisser-aller” shows that “Africa’s development [...] has little to do with lack of capital.”<sup>241</sup> The development of these arguments will certainly bring us out of our matter.

The European Neighbourhood Policy is the other face of the partnership between European Union and African countries. The EMP was formally launched with the Barcelona process. Informally, this process begin with the end of the Cold War which shake the world in the late 1990s. It gave the opportunity for many countries to welcome a new spirit whose

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238 *Africa-EU Dialogue* <http://europafrica.net/africa-eu-dialogue/>.

239 Ibidem.

240 Palayaret (Jean-Marie). *Da Lomé I a cotonou: morte e transfigurazione della convenzione Cee/Acp* In Calandri, Elena *Il primato sfuggente: L’Europa e l’intervento per lo sviluppo (1957-2007)*, Franco Angeli s.r.l., Milano, Italy, 2010.

241 Ayitteh, George. *Obstacle in African Development in Akeya Agbango, Georges. Issues and trends in contemporary African politics: Stability, development and democratization*, Peter Lang Publishing, Inc, New York 2003, p 321.

enhanced efforts on global peace, human rights and human security etc.

After the 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001, the ESS states that, “The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts. The European Union's interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process.”

Therefore, the ENP process build an alliance based on the principles of joint ownership, dialogue and co-operation, seeking to create a Mediterranean region of peace, security and shared prosperity. The partnership is organized into three main dimensions.

[Political and security dialogue](#), aimed at creating a common area of peace and stability sustain by development, rule of law, democracy and human rights.

The [economic and Financial Partnership](#) which includes the gradual establishment of a free-trade area in order to promote economic opportunity through sustainable and balanced socio-economic development.

The [Social, Cultural and Human Partnership](#), aimed at promoting intercultural dialogue between cultures, religions and people, and facilitating exchanges between civil society and ordinary citizens, particularly women and young people.

Furthermore, the region’s lack of democracy raises serious concern in the European countries. Anxiety increases in recent times because many countries have been victims of terror attacks. Therefore, terrorism prevention has become a major priority in the worldwide as well as in Europe.

“Terrorism puts lives at risk; it imposes large costs; it seeks to undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies, and it poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe. Increasingly, terrorist movements are well-resourced, connected by electronic networks, and are willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties. The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to violent religious extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people

living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also a part of our own society. Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism: European countries are targets and have been attacked. Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium. Concerted European action is indispensable.”<sup>242</sup>

To address this “key threat”, the EU strategy against terrorism assigned a coordinate approach to national politics for the identification of the best practices and exchange of information.<sup>243</sup> As a regional arrangement, the EU cooperates to reinforce the role of the United Nations in the multilateral fight against terrorism with the purpose to ensure security, human rights respect, justice and equity, etc. For this matter, in 2005, the Barcelona Summit agreed on the Euro-Mediterranean code of conduct in order to counter terrorism.

This is considered a victory for the Europe “soft power” strategy which shares with the strategic commitment of the ESS the mission to combat global terrorism whilst respecting human rights, secure Europe and allowing its citizens to live in an era of freedom, security and justice.<sup>244</sup>

South Africa is the only African country which built a strategic partnership with the EU. “The European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 speaks specifically of the establishment of strategic partnerships with China, Japan, Canada and India, as well as with other countries that share the EU’s value systems and goals.”<sup>245</sup>

The strategic importance of South Africa lies on its demographic weight ( 50 millions inhabitants, the 25<sup>th</sup> population in the world), its economy (it is the only African member of the G 20) and its geostrategic importance as member of the SADC. South Africa contributes approximately 50% to sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP and nearly 75% of SACU’s. South African foreign direct investment (FDI) in the rest of Southern Africa

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242 A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy Brussels, 12 December 2003: 4. [www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf).

243 Mascia, Marco. Obiettivo sicurezza umana. Per la Politica Estera dell’Unione Europea. Cleup, Padova, 2010: 147

244 Mascia, Marco. Obiettivo sicurezza umana. Per la Politica Estera dell’Unione Europea. Cleup, Padova, 2010: 147.

245 South Africa: an international actor and partner for the <http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas.pdf>.



represents 49% of the region's total.”<sup>246</sup>

Since 2007s, the EU and South Africa enhance political dialogue. The issues covert broad areas such as: climate change, global economy, bilateral trade, environment, science, technology, security matters, etc.

We recall that, one of the most important innovation of the European strategy of dialogue is the involvement of non state actors (ONG, civil society) in summit and conferences. They seem to be the only voice which can give alternative information to balance the “unilateral sound of clock” that can emerges in these occasions.

The last summit between South-Africa and European Union was held in September 2010. The two partners made a positive assessment of the following issues.

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246 Ibidem.

“The effective implementation and increased ownership of the European Union’s development assistance programme for South Africa. Annual disbursements were projected to reach €120 million in 2010.

The signature of the single largest ever development cooperation programme between the European Union and South Africa, a budget support operation to support Primary Education in South Africa, totalling €123 million.

The commencement of a Customs Project by the end of 2010 in relation to the establishment of the Authorised Economic Operator program in SA and future co-operation aimed at facilitating legitimate trade and combating illicit trade activities between South Africa and the EU.

Excellent progress in establishing a broad ranging dialogue on migration, particularly on issues such as the mobility of highly-skilled workers, brain drain and the trafficking of human beings.

Progress towards the establishment of dialogues and cooperation on crime and justice, and on employment and social affairs.

A special fund (TDCA Facility) has been established to support these dialogues and Cooperation.”<sup>247</sup>

Unfortunately, we did not find alternative reports or documents which can provide a critical assessment of the summit.

In a few decades, the EU has become the first trade partner of the South Africa. “Today, the EU is South Africa’s biggest trade and investment partner, accounting for over 40% of its imports and 30% of its exports, as well as for 66% of foreign direct investment (in December 2006). Total trade has increased five-fold, from R56.5 billion in 1994 to R313 billion in 2007<sup>1</sup>. The EU is also South Africa’s principal development partner representing approximately 80% of all Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) in

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247 Third South Africa-European Union Summit Joint Communiqué Brussels, 28 September 2010. [www.ThirdSouthAfrica-EuropeanUnionSummit2010.pdf](http://www.ThirdSouthAfrica-EuropeanUnionSummit2010.pdf).

2005. South Africa is earmarked to receive €980 million for 2007-2013”<sup>248</sup>

The conclusions that can emerge from the implementation of EU strategy with its African partners are that, there are various complex issues, and it can result with difficult to ensure their coherence. Equally, the EU dealt with multiples actors (states, non states, regional, sub-regional). How can it combines the diversity of African countries while treating it as one.<sup>249</sup>

The next paragraph will focus on the prerequisites in the European and African partnership with the purpose of underlining the diversity, the complexity of these issues as well as the economic and social implications.

### **3.2. The prerequisites of EU-AU partnership**

#### **3.2.1. *Peace, security and state reform***

Behind the economic and the social distress of African countries, security and instability (weak governance, ethnic tensions, leakage of financial resource, criminality, etc.) are believed to be the roots of the problem.

The European Union Strategy for Africa has dedicated broad space to these issues. The report gives a brief characteristic of the remaining chronic area of conflict (Horn of Africa down to eastern Congo in eastern and central Africa) and makes proposals to address the root “cause of the problems that put population at risk, as well as more effective use of direct prevention measures.”<sup>250</sup> Furthermore, peace and security, State reform are the priorities among the eight partnerships identified by the JAES as the following table demonstrates.

Dissatisfaction has been expressed on how “scholars have been made careers of

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248 South Africa: an international actor and partner for the EU: <http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas.pdf>.

249 Towards a Joint Africa-Europe Partnership Strategy: The EU-Africa Partnership in Historical Perspective. ECDPM, Maastricht (Netherlands), December 2006. [www.ecdpm.org](http://www.ecdpm.org).

250 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to protect, Ottawa, 2001: 20.

frequently cataloguing [African] woes.”<sup>251</sup>

Unfortunately, our next paragraph will lose in coherence without a glance at the stark reality. Since the late 1990s “the pendulum swung back” for many incumbent (authoritarian) regime in Africa. In the past, most of the government have organised unjust system of governance based on private wealth accumulation, obsession of political power, rig election, policy of exclusion, pervasive influence of state, etc.

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<sup>251</sup> Ihonvbere O, Julius. Pan-Africanism Agenda for African Unity in the 1990's? in Akeya Agbango, Georges. Issues and trends in contemporary African politics: Stability, development and democratization, Peter Lang Publishing, Inc, New York 2003: 351.

Partnership	Priority actions
1. Peace and security	Enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and security <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Full operationalisation of African peace and security architecture</li> <li>• Predictable funding for African-led peace support operations</li> </ul>
2. Democratic governance and human rights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enhance dialogue at global level and in international fora</li> <li>• Promote the APRM and support the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance</li> <li>• Strengthen cooperation in cultural goods</li> </ul>
3. Trade, regional integration and infrastructure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support the African integration agenda</li> <li>• Strengthen African capacities in the areas of rules, standards and quality control</li> <li>• Implement the EU-Africa Infrastructure Partnership</li> </ul>
4. MDGs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Secure the finance and policy base for achieving the MDGs</li> <li>• Speed up progress towards the MDG food security targets</li> <li>• Speed up progress in meeting the MDG health targets</li> <li>• Speed up progress in meeting the MDG education targets</li> </ul>
5. Energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Intensify cooperation on energy security and access</li> </ul>
6. Climate change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Build a common agenda on climate change policies and cooperation</li> <li>• Address land degradation and increasing aridity, including the 'Green Wall for the Sahara' initiative</li> </ul>
7. Migration, mobility and employment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Implement the declaration of the Tripoli Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development</li> <li>• Implement the EU-Africa Plan of Action on people trafficking</li> <li>• Implement and follow-up the 2004 Ouagadougou Declaration and Action Plan on employment and poverty alleviation in Africa</li> </ul>
8. Science, information society and space	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support the development of an inclusive information society in Africa</li> <li>• Support S&amp;T capacity-building in Africa and implement Africa's science and technology consolidated plan of action</li> </ul>

Table 4. Priority actions and activities for each of the partnerships for 2009-2010<sup>252</sup>

The agenda of the European Security Strategy for Africa recognise that, progress have been made and stable countries such as (Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda, Senegal, South Africa etc.) “play essential role in stabilising their regions and setting an example of

<sup>252</sup> Beyond Structures? Reflections on the Implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, 2009. [www.ecdpm.org/dp87](http://www.ecdpm.org/dp87)

what can be achieved in a favourable climate change.”<sup>253</sup>

Meanwhile, the challenge to manage the inheritance of “opportunistic, corrupt, decadent, irresponsible, largely unproductive, shamelessly subservient, and ideologically barren class [that] ruined Africa and mortgaged the future of the vast majorities to imperialist interest”<sup>254</sup> remains.

The consequence of the mismanagement of African States in the past few decade is that, many countries are facing crisis of legitimacy such as :

weakness structure;

absence of a genuine social contract between state and citizen;

ineffectiveness;

limited capacity to deliver basic social services.<sup>255</sup>

Elections which are believed to be one of the basic expression of democracy become source of instability because they are “flaw” or because the losing side does not accept the defeat.<sup>256</sup>

Referring to the organisation and the role of the state in the past, we can understand that, democracy cannot have an immediate success. As a result, some few countries “accommodate the features and institutions of liberal democracy while suffocating and dividing civil society at the grassroots.”<sup>257</sup> By this way, they squander the regional and international efforts to prevent the recurrence of violence in Africa. Furthermore, they allow insecurity to undermine stability within and between countries.

The ESS provides its global guidelines for its relationship with these countries that are

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253 Commissione Delle Comunità Europeo. Comunicazione Della Commissione Al Consiglio, Al Parlamento Europeo E Al Comitato Economico E Sociale Europeo, Strategia dell’Unione europea per l’Africa: verso un patto euroafricano per accelerare lo sviluppo dell’Africa, {SEC(2005)1255}, Bruxelles, 12.10.2005: 10.

254 Ihonvbere O, Julius. Pan-Africanism Agenda for African Unity in the 1990’s? in Akeya Agbango, Georges. Issues and trends in contemporary African politics: Stability, development and democratization, Peter Lang Publishing, Inc, New York 2003: 344.

255 commodity and ill-chosen policies. In others words, “the state was unable to l’Africa: verso un patto euroafricano per accelerare lo sviluppo dell’Africa, {SEC(2005)1255}, Bruxelles, 12.10.2005.

256 Ibidem.

257 Ihonvbere O, Julius. Pan-Africanism Agenda for African Unity in the 1990’s? in Akeya Agbango, Georges. Issues and trends in contemporary African politics: Stability, development and democratization, Peter Lang Publishing, Inc, New York, 2003: 297.

preventing the ongoing quest of stability, peace, human rights, governance and justice in the world.

“A number of countries have placed themselves outside the bounds of international society. Some have sought isolation; others persistently violate international norms. It is desirable that such countries should rejoin the international community, and the EU should be ready to provide assistance. Those who are unwilling to do so should understand that there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union.”<sup>258</sup>

In addition, the European Union Strategy for Africa states that, the responsibility to build and stabilise African countries is the duty of Africans. The EU can only bring its material and technical support for peace building, peacekeeping, democracy process, governance matters, etc.

Therefore, superficial, cosmetic, and divisionary changes<sup>259</sup> will carry consequences in the future of African people.

For instance, social disintegration, conflict, ethnic war, criminality have pushed donors to invest in crisis management, human rights, governance, and to introduce political conditionality.

“in 1990, for example, the British government announced its intention to treat economic performance and political pluralism as part of a single package. In June of the same year, President François Mitterrand surprised his African colleagues at a summit in La Baule when he indicated that French aid would similarly tied to political reform. In November 1991, the European Community (later renamed the European Union) laid down the principle that the future disbursements of aid would be tied to the furtherance of democracy and human rights.”<sup>260</sup>

The European Union Strategy for democracy lay emphasis on the following issues:

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258 A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy Brussels, 12 December 2003: 11 [www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf).

259 Ihonvebere O, Julius. Pan-Africanism Agenda for African Unity in the 1990's? in Akeya Agbango, Georges. Issues and trends in contemporary African politics: Stability, development and democratization, Peter Lang Publishing, Inc, New York 2003.

260 Nugent, paul. Africa since independence, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004: 373.

the construction of stronger central institutions, governance plans;

the freedom of citizens, the respects of human rights, the election of a national ombudsman;

the effectiveness of the state and public financial management system;

the support for police and judiciary system;

the establishment of election commissions and court of auditors;

the reinforcement of the national parliaments;

conflict resolution;

the national integration and reconciliation;

dialogue with national governments and local authorities;

the decentralisation process etc.<sup>261</sup>

This agenda can remember the implementation of the United Nations framework on global peace, security, human rights, human security in the world. “ there is an obvious connection between democratic practices-such as the rule of law and transparency in decision making- and the achievement of the true peace and security in any new and stable political order. These elements of good governance need to be promoted at all levels of international and national political communities.”<sup>262</sup>

### *3.2.2. The economic aspect of the prerequisites*

The ambition of the European and African countries is to extend the economic growth (where it has been achieved) to the poor peoples. The relevant economic problem that has been identified in most African countries is the unfair distribution of the resources.

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261 Commissione Delle Comunità Europeo. Comunicazione Della Commissione Al Consiglio, Al Parlamento Europeo E Al Comitato Economico E Sociale Europeo, Strategia dell'Unione europea per l'Africa: verso un patto euroafricano per accelerare lo sviluppo dell'Africa, {SEC(2005)1255}, Bruxelles, 12.10.2005.

262 Boutros-Boutros, Ghali. “Un agenda per la pace”, New York, United Nations, 1992, p 13.



“While several African countries have managed to record impressive economic growth, a highly unequal distribution of income often prevent this growth from having a positive impact on poverty levels.”<sup>263</sup>

The reproduction of inequalities seems to undermine stability and peace. Exclusion nurture tensions, hostility and in some cases the rise in violence. For the European and African countries, these dimensions of insecurity must not be allowed to obstacle African development.

Therefore, African and EU partnership present a framework which coverts macroeconomic stability, regional market, private sector which are considered to be the preconditions to sustain economic growth. In addition, transport infrastructures (roads, railways, inland, waterways, ports and imports), communication service, agriculture energy, etc., are believed to be necessary ingredients to achieve these preconditions.

First of all, the average growth of African countries to achieve the millennium goal is estimated to 8 % a year. secondly, the European assessment of the partnership with African countries states that, three decades of aid did not give a real impetus to economic growth in Africa. Whereas, fair condition of trade can improve macroeconomic stability with the support of regional integration, include increasing funding level, support to negotiation with the World Trade Organisation and the EPA.

Progress made by the Common Market for Eastern and Southern African (COMESA) seems to show that, political will can overcome the intra-regional barriers and “regional integration can help to spur direct investment by providing a more stable and attractive climate for investors.”<sup>264</sup>

Equally, Africa has a long history of regional arrangement, and lately there has been a

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263 Commissione Delle Comunità Europeo. Comunicazione Della Commissione Al Consiglio, Al Parlamento Europeo E Al Comitato Economico E Sociale Europeo, Strategia dell'Unione europea per l'Africa: verso un patto euroafricano per accelerare lo sviluppo dell'Africa, {SEC(2005)1255}, Bruxelles, 12.10.2005: 15

264Hufbauer, Gary. Kotschwar, Barbara. Regional Integration: Lessons from Asia and the Western Hemisphere in Iqbal, Zubair. S. Khan, Moshin. Trade Reform Integration in Africa, International Monetary fund, Washington DC, 1998.

Ivi, p. 329.

resurgence of interest in revitalising these initiatives <sup>265</sup> to strengthen the competitiveness of the African economy. Furthermore, private African sector can be key actors for the competitiveness of their economy.

“countries make border policies; firms move goods across those borders.”<sup>266</sup>

The Euro- African Business Forum express the will to promote the private sectors which can play a main role in investment, industry and creating jobs.

Therefore, it seems necessary to encourage the following initiatives:

the development of microfinance;

the innovation of business ;

the establishment of national action plans or programmes on employment;

decent work;

youth employment;

the promotion of dialogue between public and private sector.

### *3.2.3. The social aspect of the prerequisites*

The implementation of the first and the second prerequisites will certainly improve the basic social services. The partnership lay emphasis on education and health care as the priority to achieve the MGs. The low level of education, especially in rural area, communicable diseases, are the critical issues in the social agenda. Similarly, cultural diversity, territorial management, migration, land, management, biodiversity, climate change, etc. are issues which require attention. The next paragraph will look at how the partnership is organising to challenge these issues.

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<sup>265</sup>Ivi, p. 327.

Ivi, p. 329.

<sup>266</sup>Hufbauer, Gary. Kotschwar, Barbara. Regional Integration: Lessons from Asia and the Western Hemisphere in Iqbal, Zubair. S. Khan, Moshin. Trade Reform Integration in Africa, International Monetary fund, Washington DC, 1998: 339

Ivi, p. 329.

### **3.3. The joint institutions of the partnership**

#### **3.3.1. *The ENP and the TCDA***

The framework of the European partnership with African countries (ACP, EMP and the cooperation with South- African) show that particular issues are connected to each regional arrangement. Terrorism is often in connection with Mediterranean countries, chronic instability to Sudan, the Horn of Africa down to eastern Congo in eastern and Central Africa whilst, South Africa seems to be among the stable country of the continent. Let us look at how the institutions of the partnership bring out these differences.

The ENP and South-Africa joint institutions for cooperation with European Union, seems to be lighted compare to those of the ACP countries. They have in common the summit of the Head of the State<sup>267</sup> with the European Union institutions.

The implementation of the ENP is achieved through conference on specific subjects and the Euromediterranean parliament. Concerning the conference, we have the Union Mediterranean conference on tourism, on trade, on high education, on scientific research, on economy and finance etc.

Each conference is organised with the ministers of these specific issues and the commitment of the European commissioner in charge of the issue.

Whilst, with South Africa, the bilateral strategic partnership is achieved through ministerial conference.

Lastly we present the European Union and ACP joint institutions. Providing a summary of these institutions will not bring out its complexity compare to those of the ENP and the South-African partnership. Thus, we choose to present the entire joint institutions.

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<sup>267</sup> The ACP summit is held after tree years, with the South Africa is Every year and with the Mediterranean countries, one summit was held in 2005.

### *3.3.2. The ACP joint institutions*

The article 14 of the Cotonou agreement establishes the joint institutions of the EU and ACP partnership which are: the council of Minister (article 15), the committee of ambassadors (article 16) and the joint parliament (article 17).

The Council of Ministers is the decision-making group. It is responsible for implementing the guidelines laid down by the Summit of the Head of the State. Ministerial sectoral meetings are held regularly, for instance, Meeting of Trade Ministers or Meeting of Ministers of Culture.

The council comprises, the members of the Council of the European Union and members of the Commission of the European Communities and, a member of the government of each ACP State.

The office of the President of the Council of Ministers shall be held alternately by a member of the Council of the European Union and, a member of the government of an ACP State.

It meets twice annually in ordinary sessions and when necessary, in special session, on the advice of the President, after consultation with all the members of the Bureau. the following missions are assigned to the council:

The conduct of the political dialogue (art 9 of the Cotonou agreement).

The adoption of the policy guidelines, it takes the decisions necessary for the implementation of the provisions of this Agreement, in particular as regards development strategies in the specific areas provided for by this Agreement or any other area that should prove relevant, and as regards procedures.

The examination and the resolution of any issue liable to impede the effective and efficient implementation of this Agreement or present an obstacle to achieving its objectives.

The dialogue are organised with the representatives of the social and economic partners and other actors of civil society in the ACP and the EU meetings (we will develop this issue in the next chapter). A system of rotation has been established to ensure that representatives

from the six ACP regions have the opportunity to preside over the Council.

The Committee of Ambassadors is the second decision-making body of the ACP Group. It is composed of the Ambassadors or one representative from every ACP State<sup>268</sup> and, its first mission is to assist the Council of Ministers.<sup>269</sup> It monitors the implementation of the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement in view of achieving its stated objectives.

Its six technical Subcommittees cover various areas (Political, social, humanitarian and cultural affairs, Trade and Commodity Protocols, Investment and the private sector Sustainable development, Financing and development).

The Joint Parliamentary Assembly<sup>270</sup> is composed by an equal numbers of EU and ACP representatives. The members of the Joint Parliamentary Assembly are, on the one hand, members of the European Parliament and, on the other, members of parliament or, failing this, representatives designated by the parliament of each ACP State. In the absence of a parliament, the attendance of a representative from the ACP State concerned shall be subjected to the prior approval of the Joint Parliamentary Assembly. The consultative joint parliament achieve the following missions: the promotion of the democratic processes through dialogue and consultation; it facilitate greater communication between the peoples of the European Union and those of the ACP states through discussion development issues.

### *3.3.3. The Joint African-EU institutions*

The JAES put in place a joint institutional architecture aim at moving progressively from a fragmented cooperation with African countries to a single one. The structure set up is designed to achieve the following commitment: enhanced political dialogue; treating Africa as a single entity; promote joint ownership and responsibility; involve non-state actors; implement a partnership characterised by equality; address common

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<sup>268</sup> It is composed of nine members ( Four African representatives, one per region). One representative from the Caribbean. One representative from the Pacific. A Chairperson selected on the basis of a rotation among the four African regions, the Caribbean, and the Pacific, to ensure that the six regions have an equal opportunity to chair the Committee of Ambassadors. the outgoing Chair and incoming Chair as full members.

<sup>269</sup> Koffi, Annan. In *Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*. <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom>

<sup>270</sup> It meets twice a year.

challenges; identified concrete and measurable outcomes in all areas of the partnership; enhanced coherence with other policy frameworks; strengthen institutional ties; shared responsibility of EU and African states in implementing the partnership; identified appropriate funding.<sup>271</sup>

Moreover, the implementation of the joint agenda is organised alongside key elements:

1. an overarching policy framework;
2. various European and African institutions and actors that are party to the Strategy, both formally and informally;
3. the events and structures set up to jointly manage the relationship;
4. the joint Action Plan to which the institutions and the members of the eight partnerships have committed themselves and which is to be reviewed by ministerial Troikas every six months;
5. financial resources.<sup>272</sup> The actors of the JAES Strategy engaged to held inter-institutional meeting to achieve the agenda. This paragraph focuses attention on the main institutional bodies of the JAES and the division of labour between the EU and the AU.

The joint expert group (JEGS) plays a key role to enhance dialogue on how the JAES should be implemented. It provides suggestions to resolve financing problem and he orientates the priorities of the eight partnerships.

The College to College Meetings (C2C) and the AU-EU Task force are designed to strengthen political and technical cooperation between the African Union Commission and the European Commission.

The Africa-UE Ministerial Troika and the EU-Summit are competent to assess the progress made by the JAES strategy. It held its meeting twice a year.

Firstly, what is relevant to mention is that, the JAES has set up a coordinate structure which presents the division of labour between European and African countries by

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<sup>271</sup> Beyond Structures? Reflections on the Implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. [www.ecdpm.org/dp87](http://www.ecdpm.org/dp87).

<sup>272</sup> Ibidem.

considering the eight partnerships that have been identified. For the first time, the partnership has established the principle of responsibility. For instance, it is important to note that in the following table, the lead countries are displayed in bold because they are responsible for the failure or the success of the issues they are responsible for. For this reason we provide a complete list of these countries.

<b>Partnership</b>	<b>EU</b>	<b>Africa</b>	<b>CSO Lead</b>
<b>1. Peace and security</b>	General Secretariat of the Council, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom, Finland, European Commission	Algeria, Ethiopia, Morocco, Uganda, Burundi, Gabon, Egypt, Cameroon, AUC	European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, / Saferworld
<b>2. Democratic governance, and human rights</b>	Germany, Belgium, Czech Republic, Ireland, Finland, France, Portugal, United Kingdom, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Estonia, Italy, European Commission, General Secretariat Council	Egypt, Zambia, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Morocco, Uganda, Burundi, Algeria, South Africa, Senega	Human Rights and Democratisation Network, Amnesty International
<b>3. Trade, regional integration and infrastructure</b>	European Commission, Belgium, France, Italy, Czech Republic, Sweden, European Commissio	South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Morocco, Uganda, Gabon, Cameroon, AUC, EAC	CONCORD
<b>4. Millennium development goals (MDG)</b>	United Kingdom, Estonia, Germany, France, Italy, Malta, Romania, Luxembourg, General Secretariat Council, Portugal, European Commissio	Tunisia, Gabon, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Kenya, Egypt, Senegal, Tanzania, AUC	Christian Blind Mission (CBM)
<b>5. Energy</b>	Austria, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Czech Republic, The Netherlands, General Secretariat Council, European Commission	African Union Commission, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Gabon, Egypt, Algeria, Benin, South Africa, Cameroon, Congo Brazzaville, Senegal,, CEMAC, ECOWAS, COMESA, CEEC, UEMOA	
<b>6. Climate Change</b>	France, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Sweden, Czech Republic, General Secretariat of the Council, European Commission, Italy, Denmark, United Kingdom	Morocco, Burundi, Gabon, Egypt, South Africa, Cameroon, AUC	Climate Action Network
<b>7. Migration, mobility and employment</b>	Spain, Germany, United Kingdom, Malta, Italy, Portugal, France, Hungary, Denmark, Czech Republic, Belgium, the Netherlands, European Commission, General Secretariat Council, Cyprus, Sweden	South Africa, Egypt, African Union Commission, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Republic of Guinea, Morocco,	ITUC & ETUC
<b>8. Science, information society and space</b>	France, Portugal, Finland, Germany, European Commission, Austria, Belgium, Sweden, General Secretariat Council	Tunisia, Senegal, South Africa, AUC	

Table 3: distribution of partnerships among EU MS, African states and European CSOs.<sup>273</sup>

273 Ibidem. Lead countries are displayed in bold.



Secondly, the table shows that, all African countries are represented in the JAES. The JAES opens the path for a unique EU-AU partnership.

In Addition, the European Commission provides a division of labour for the implementation of the JAES. It involves the commitment of the DG Development (DG DEV), the RELEX (especially DG RELEX) and other DGs such as Environment, Health and Agriculture. The JAES Strategy believed that, dialogue is the cornerstone with is designed to strengthen the cooperation.

The next chapter will present the nature of the dialogue and how it influences the EU-AU cooperation.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE IMPLICATION OF DIALOGUE AND AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS

In the previous chapter, we elaborate our main question on how the European and African partnership is moving in the ground of international cooperation. we limit our argument on the three aspects of the international cooperation (national security, trade, and international solidarity)<sup>274</sup> with the purpose to bring out the human security traits in this partnership. Globally, it seems that there is an attempt to overcome the old concept of national security, whilst trade and international solidarity appear to be the priority in the joint agenda. For instance, a glance at the African regional arrangement shows that, trade is believed to be the pillar for the development of the African countries whilst, international solidarity will boost these initiatives by supporting democracy, stability, good governance, human rights etc.<sup>275</sup>

The commitment in governance, democracy and peace become necessary because of the lapses of some African government. “ The political and economic indiscipline and irresponsibility of Africa’s dominant classes have subverted all possibilities for stability, peace and development, thus making Africa a typical example of blown opportunities, distorted dreams, an illustration of gangster politics.”<sup>276</sup> As a result, some African leaders have played key roles by drawing new strategies aim at achieving the African development agenda.

Moreover, dialogue between European and African countries seems to have favourite the condition for the cooperation. The background of dialogue is rooted in the Foreign European Security Strategy. It should be noted that, with African countries, the dialogue

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274 Papisca, Antonio. Mascia, Marco. Le relazioni internazionale nell’era dell’indipendenza e dei diritti umani, Padova, Cedam, 2004.

275 Commissione Delle Comunità Europeo. Comunicazione Della Commissione Al Consiglio, Al Parlamento Europeo E Al Comitato Economico E Sociale Europeo, Strategia dell’Unione europea per l’Africa: verso un patto euroafricano per accelerare lo sviluppo dell’Africa, {SEC(2005)1255}, Bruxelles, 12.10.2005.

276 Ihonvbere O, Julius. Pan- Africanism: Agenda for African Unity in 1990? Akeya Agbango, Georges. Issues and trends in contemporary African politics: Stability, development and democratization, Peter Lang Publishing, Inc, New York 2003: 345-346.

was formally launched with the ACP group, whilst it intensified over the time and it believed to be pervaded all level of the JAES institutions.

#### **4.1. Dialogue and it implication for EU-AU cooperation**

The common value of EU countries is based on the respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, rule of law, human rights, including minority rights etc. The political dialogue with regional arrangement and others single countries is the extension of the EU values which believed that, these values are preconditions to insure global security. European Union Guidelines on Human Rights Dialogue<sup>277</sup> established the conditions and procedures of these dialogues. They are implemented by the Working Party on human rights (COHOM), the Working Party on development Cooperation (CODEV), the Committee on measures for the development, the consolidation of democracy, the rule of law, the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The guideline identifies the partners which are involved in dialogue:

relations with candidate countries;

the Cotonou Agreement with the ACP States and the Trade;

Development and Cooperation Agreement with South Africa;

relations between the EU and Latin America;

the Barcelona process (Mediterranean countries);

political dialogue with Asian countries in the context of ASEAN and ASEM;

relations with the Western Balkans;

bilateral relations in the framework of association and cooperation agreements.

The guideline enhance dialogue on human rights and democratisation which includes “the signing, ratification and implementation of international human rights instruments,

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<sup>277</sup> Guidelines on Human Rights Dialogue [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/14469EN\\_HR.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/14469EN_HR.pdf).

cooperation with international human rights procedures and mechanisms, combating the death penalty, combating torture, combating all forms of discrimination, children's rights, women's rights, freedom of expression, the role of civil society, international cooperation in the field of justice, promotion of the processes of democratisation and good governance, and the prevention of conflict.”<sup>278</sup>

The ACP countries are engaged in political dialogue with European countries under the articles 8 of the Cotonou agreement:

1. The Parties shall regularly engage in a comprehensive, balanced and deep political dialogue leading to commitments on both sides.
2. The objective of this dialogue shall be to exchange information, to foster mutual understanding, and to facilitate the establishment of agreed priorities and shared agendas, in particular by recognising existing links between the different aspects of the relations between the Parties and the various areas of cooperation as laid down in this Agreement.
3. The dialogue shall cover all the aims and objectives laid down in this Agreement as well as all questions of common, general, regional or sub-regional interest. Through dialogue, the Parties shall contribute to peace, security and stability and promote a stable and democratic political environment.
4. The dialogue shall focus, inter alia, on specific political issues of mutual concern or of general significance for the attainment of the objectives of this Agreement, such as the arms trade, excessive military expenditure, drugs and organised crime, or ethnic, religious or racial discrimination etc.

The agreement seeks to address the social, economic and political roots of underdevelopment. Therefore, the first and the second paragraph of the article 9 gives priority to people development as the basis of the cooperation which believed that “Humanity will not enjoy security without development”<sup>279</sup>

1. Cooperation shall be directed towards sustainable development centred on the human person, who is the main protagonist and beneficiary of development; this entails respect for and promotion of all human rights.

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<sup>278</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>279</sup> Koffi, Annan. In *Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*. <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom>

2. Respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including respect for fundamental social rights, democracy based on the rule of law and transparent and accountable governance are an integral part of sustainable development.

Over the time, dialogue seems to show positive results. For instance, death penalty has been abolished in Burundi and Togo. The EU and AU are working for a joint declaration for the fight against Torture. They also envisaged the ratification of the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture, the promotion of the legislation on civil society organizations in accordance with international standards on human rights.<sup>280</sup>

Besides, if we recall the chronology of the event, the Cotonou agreement was signed whilst the transition from the OAU to the new African institutions was going on. Actually, it seems difficult to assess the effect of the agreement in connection with the new institutions. However, it can be interesting to underline that, some issues of the Cotonou agreement (for instance: the contribution to peace and security; the promotion of stable, democratic and political environment; the commitment for sustainable development; the promotion of social rights and legitimacy of the State etc.) are part of the NEPAD and AU agenda. Furthermore, the recent Charter on Democracy, Election and Governance has formally shifted the landscape of African countries.

Concerning the JAEs Strategy, especial attention has been given to dialogue on peace and security; democratic governance and human rights as we can see below.

Partnership	Priority actions
1. Peace and security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and security</li> <li>• Full operationalisation of African peace and security architecture</li> <li>• Predictable funding for African-led peace support operations</li> </ul>
2. Democratic governance and human rights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enhance dialogue at global level and in international</li> <li>• Promote the APRM and support the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance</li> </ul>

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<sup>280</sup> Mascia, Marco. Obiettivo sicurezza umana. Per la Politica Estera dell'Unione Europea. Cleup, Padova, 2010: 264

	• Strengthen cooperation in cultural goods
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Table 5. Dialogue in the JAES <sup>281</sup>

The assessment of the joint Africa- EU Strategy 2009 reveals that, political dialogue intensified significantly to prevent or to resolve crisis and conflict.

This bring us to the conclusion that, dialogue with AU has reached a level of development that enables (discussion) on a wide range of issues relating to human rights and the adoption of recommendations and commitments.<sup>282</sup>

## 4.2. New African institutions

In the late 1999s, the Libyan president host of the OAU Sirte Summit, use the occasion to call for the unity of African countries and the following decisions conclude the summit in order to:

1. Establish an African Union, in conformity with the ultimate objectives of the Charter of our Continental Organisation and the provisions of the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community.
2. Accelerate the process of implementing the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community, in particular: (a) Shorten the implementation periods of the Abuja Treaty, (b) Ensure the speedy establishment of all the institutions provided for in the Abuja Treaty; such as the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Union, the African Court of Justice and in particular, the Pan-African Parliament. We aim to establish that Parliament by the year 2000, to provide a common platform for our peoples and their grass-root organizations to be more involved in discussions and decision-making on the problems and challenges facing our continent.
3. Strengthening and consolidating the Regional Economic Communities as the pillars for achieving the objectives of the African Economic Community and realising the envisaged Union.

<sup>281</sup> Beyond Structures? Reflections on the Implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy [www.ecdpm.org/dp87](http://www.ecdpm.org/dp87)

<sup>282</sup> Mascia, Marco. Obiettivo sicurezza umana. Per la Politica Estera dell'Unione Europea. Cleup, Padova, 2010: 263.

4. Mandate the Council of Ministers to take the necessary measures to ensure the implementation of the above decisions and in particular, to prepare the constitutive legal text of the Union, taking into account the Charter of the OAU and the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community. Member States should encourage the participation of Parliamentarians in that process. The Council should submit its report to the Thirty-sixth Ordinary Session of our Assembly for appropriate action. Member States should work towards finalising the process of ratification, where appropriate, by December 2000, in order for a constitutive Act to be solemnly adopted in the year 2001, at an Extra-Ordinary Summit, to be convened in Sirte.<sup>283</sup>

The Heads of State also mandate the Algerian, the South Africa and the Senegalese Presidents to meet African creditors to plead for African debt cancellation. Subsequently, the South African President presented the “Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme”, whereas the Senegalese President (Abdoulaye Wade) proposed the “Omega plan” to their partners.

In July 2001, in the Luasaka Summit of the OAU, the Head of State joint the “Millennium Africa Renaissance Programme” (MAP) and the Omega plan which become the “new African initiative (NAI). On October 2001, after a meeting in Abuja, an implementation Committee of Heads of States modified the document and renamed it “The New Partnership for Africa's Development” (NEPAD). This label has stuck to an initiative that seeks acknowledgement beyond the continent. NEPAD has had an office at the Development Bank of Southern Africa in Midrand since October 2001.<sup>284</sup>

Since they come into being, the NEPAD and the African constitutive act are considered as the more actual program aim at accelerating the integration of African countries and therefore, seems to respond to some question that have been raised in the previous chapter.

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283 Sirte Declaration [http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key\\_oau/sirte.htm](http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/sirte.htm).

284 Melber, Henning. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD): Scope and Perspectives. Discussion paper 16, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala 2002: 5.

#### *4.2.1. The New partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD)*

The first paragraph of the programme expresses the collective vision of African leaders “based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development, and at the same time to participate actively in the world economy and body politic. The Programme is anchored on the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalising world.”<sup>285</sup>

It seems useful to recall that, the background of the Heads of State willingness to overcome the scourge of poverty lies on the general malaise on how African countries are perceived in the world.

An African scholar<sup>286</sup> has drawn up some few characteristics of these embarrassing perception:

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<sup>285</sup> The New Partnership For Africa’S Development (NEPAD), [www. Nepad.org/files/inbriefs.php](http://www.Nepad.org/files/inbriefs.php).

<sup>286</sup> Ihonvhere O, Julius. Pan-Africanism: Agenda for African Unity in 1990’s in Akeya Agbango, Georges. Issues and trends in contemporary African politics: Stability, development and democratization, Peter Lang Publishing, Inc, New York 2003.



Africa has more than half of the world's refugees fleeing from war, famine, drought and repressive leaders.

Africa house's about tree-quarters of the least developed nations in the world.

Africa's economic growth rate is the lowest in the world.

With a population of [1 billion], Africa's combined GNP of a little less than 4%<sup>287</sup>

In 2010, with an external debt of around US\$300 billion, African countries spent about 16% of the continent's export earnings on servicing their external debt<sup>288</sup>.

Food production in Africa is 20 percent lower than the 1970 figure, when its population was half of it present size. Only a few percent of sub- Saharan African countries have access to drinking water whereas, the provision in drinking water can eradicate many diseases.

Africa's continent have the highest growing rate productivity in the world.

The most indebt countries in the world are concentrated in Sub-Saharan African etc.

As the result, the NEPAD ambitions is to break down this stigmatisation by overcoming the idea that Africa is a continent where nothing good can happen.

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287World economic outlook <http://www.economywatch.com/economy-business-and-finance-news/economic-forecast-2009-2010-imf-raises-gdp-growth-expectations-09-7.html>, annexe 1

288 External debt in Africa. Policy brief no.3 - October 2010.

Moreover, the second paragraph states that, the poverty and backwardness of Africa [which] stand in stark contrast to the prosperity of the developed world, the continued marginalisation of Africa from the globalisation process and the social exclusion of the vast majority of its peoples constitute a serious threat to global stability.<sup>289</sup>

The historical causes of the impoverishment are mentioned in paragraph (8-26). It gives space to external responsibility such as: the legacy of colonialism; the Cold War; the workings of the international economic system with its inadequacies and the shortcomings in the policies pursued by many countries in the post-independence era. “However, most of these theory progressively fell into disrupt.”<sup>290</sup> For instance, the NEPAD affirm that “Many African governments did not empower their peoples to embark on development initiatives to realise their creative potential.

Actually, the problem of weak states remains a major constraint to sustainable development in the continent. Furthermore, one of the Africa’s major challenge is to strengthen the capacity to govern and to develop long-term policies. Therefore, it seems urgent to implement far-reaching reforms and programmes in many African states.” (paragraph 23).

African studies qualifies this approach as an “institutional or systemic” approach to African crisis because, it lay emphasis on the weak structures build by African states which for many decades, have shared some common characteristics:

the high concentration of the power in the hand of the state or the Heads of the State;

the monopolisation of the political power by a group (ethnic, politic, religious etc.;

the asphyxiation of the ONG and civil society etc.

The NEPAD is an appeal to the African peoples to take up the challenge of mobilising in support of the implementation of this initiative by setting up at all levels, structures for organisation, mobilisation and action (part IV, paragraph 50-58).

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289 The New Partnership For Africa’S Development (NEPAD).

290 Ayithey, Georges. Obstacles to African development in Akeya Agbango, Georges. Issues and trends in contemporary African politics: Stability, development and democratization, Peter Lang Publishing, Inc, New York 2003.

As we state above, the originality of the NEPAD lies on the fact that it recognises the self-responsibility of African States and therefore, build a framework in relation with the stark reality.

Let us look at the articulation of the entire programme, and its implementation which encompasses its objectives and its structures.

- **The objectives**

The two mains objectives of the New Partnership for Africa's Development are on the one hand, to provide an impetus to Africa's development by bridging existing gaps in priority sectors; to enable the continent catch up with developed parts of the world (paragraph 65). On the other hand, To eradicate poverty in Africa and to place African countries, both individually and collectively on a path of sustainable growth and development and thus halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process (paragraph 66). For this matter, it is necessary :

to achieve and sustain an average gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of above 7 per cent per annum for the next 15 years;

to ensure that the continent achieves the agreed International Development Goal (IDGs), which are:

to reduce the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by half between 1990 and 2015;

to enrol all children of school age in primary schools by 2015;

to make progress towards gender equality and empowering women by eliminating gender disparities in the enrolment in primary and secondary education by 2005;

to reduce infant and child mortality ratios by two-thirds between 1990 and 2015;

to reduce maternal mortality ratios by three-quarters between 1990 and 2015;

to provide access for all who need reproductive health services by 2015;

to implement national strategies for sustainable development by 2005, so as to reverse the loss of environmental resources by 2015 (paragraph 68).

The document also underlines the need to increase employment, African integration, export, reduction in poverty and inequality, diversification of productive activities, and the commitment to enhance international competitiveness (paragraph 69).

To ease the implementation of the programme, key issues are identified in various areas. Each issue is identified with its objectives and the action that should be achieved.

The first conclusion that can be drawn is that, the European strategy report for Africa<sup>291</sup> have identified a set of prerequisites as root for African development.

Similarly, the NEPAD lay emphasis on similar preconditions to achieve African development. “African leaders have learnt from their own experiences that peace, security, democracy, good governance, human rights and sound economic management are conditions for sustainable development. They are making a pledge to work, both individually and collectively, to promote these principles in their countries, sub-regions and the continent”<sup>292</sup> (paragraph 71).

One of the most important fact is that, Peace and Security, Democracy and Political Governance have a broad space in the programme (paragraph 71-84).

Let us bring out the elements of these preconditions in order to have a better idea of the similarity within the two documents. The Peace and Security Initiative consists of the three elements as follows: Promoting long-term conditions for development and security; building the capacity of African institutions for early warning, as well as enhancing African institutions’ capacity to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts; institutionalising commitment to the core values of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development through the leadership, (paragraph 72).

The JAEs has focused attention on the priority identified by the NEPAD programme in the matter of peace and security. The paragraph (73-83) of the NEPAD provides the details and the roadmap to achieve stability as a condition of development in Africa.

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291 Commissione Delle Comunità Europeo. Comunicazione Della Commissione Al Consiglio, Al Parlamento Europeo E Al Comitato Economico E Sociale Europeo, Strategia dell’Unione europea per l’Africa: verso un patto euroafricano per accelerare lo sviluppo dell’Africa, {SEC(2005)1255}, Bruxelles, 12.10.2005.

292 The New Partnership For Africa’S Development (NEPAD).

Moreover, the EU Strategy for Africa presents the same preconditions (page 21- 25). If we remember that the NEPAD was launched in 2001, whilst the EU Strategy was published in 2005, and the JAEs in 2007; then following the chronology of the event, we can hypothesize that, the European and African partnership seems to move to a new era characterised by support to African initiatives. Meanwhile, it seems premature to draw the conclusion that we are going through the end of “political conditionalities.”

In addition to these preconditions, sectoral priorities covert issues such as: socioeconomic and environmental matters; all infrastructure sectors; information and communication technologies; energy and transport; human resource and development initiative; education and health; agriculture, environment and culture; water, sanitation, science and technology. (paragraph 99 - 126).

The NEPAD lay the foundation of its success on the capability of African countries to mobilise the human and capital resources. (paragraph 147 - 173).

For this matter, it provides a global partnership to seek the support of development partners. (paragraph 174 - 188).

The critical problem is that, the shadow of the past, characterised by mismanagement seems to have negative consequence in the quest of capital. For instance, “While they submit to African ownership claims, the development partners tend to have reservations regarding making disbursements that are unmindful of the risk of financial mismanagement by African states whose past records attest to a high likelihood of mismanagement. Therefore, if past performance of African states is anything to go by, the fear of corruption and instability that causes a diversion of financial resources from their intended uses is real.”<sup>293</sup>

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<sup>293</sup>Nwonwu, Francis. NEPAD: A New agenda or another rethoric in Africa’s political adventurism Africa Policy Journal, Fall 2006, Vol. 2, pp 18-19.

- **The structure of NEPAD**

The HSGOC is the main decision body of the NEPAD, it provides the necessary leadership to the achievement of its programme by setting policies, priorities and the plan of action. The 20 following countries are members:

Central Africa	East Africa	North Africa	Southern Africa	West Africa
<b>CAMEROON</b>	<b>ETHIOPIA</b>	<b>EGYPT</b>	<b>SOUTH AFRICA</b>	<b>NIGERIA</b>
<b>CONGO</b>	<b>MADAGASCAR</b>	<b>ALGERIA</b>	<b>NAMIBIA</b>	<b>SENEGAL</b>
<b>DR of CONGO</b>	<b>SUDAN</b>	<b>LIBYA</b>	<b>MALAWI</b>	<b>MALI</b>
<b>GABON</b>	<b>RWANDA</b>	<b>TUNISIA</b>	<b>LESOTHO</b>	<b>BENIN</b>

Table 5. <sup>294</sup> The current composition, as at August 2010

The NEPAD agency identified sectoral priorities as we stressed above, and they elaborate report which will be the basis of the HSGOC decision.

For instance, we found report on NEPAD rural dimension, on regional integration and infrastructure, on rural future programme, on food security and on education programme etc. The HSGOC organises the Heads of State and the Government approaches to implement programme and project of development in the following areas:

- identify strategic issues that need to be researched, planned and managed at the continental level;
- set up mechanisms for reviewing progress in the achievement of mutually agreed targets and compliance with mutually agreed standards;
- review progress in the implementation of past decisions and taking appropriate steps to address problems and delays.

In the few past years, the NEPAD has made the assessment of its intervention in terms of:

- accelerating the political and socio-economic integration of the continent through the endorsement of key program and projects with regional impact;
- monitoring the implementation of policies and decisions of NEPAD;

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<sup>294</sup>NEPAD Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee <http://www.nepad.org/>.

- determining the common policies of NEPAD and establishing its priorities;
- efforts to implement the priority sectoral program of NEPAD through the mandate given to the NEPAD Steering Committee;
- establishing sub-committees of the HSGOC, as deemed necessary;
- considering reports and recommendations presented by the NEPAD Agency.<sup>295</sup>

The Steering Committee is the second main body of the NEPAD. It is composed by the members representatives of the Heads of state whereas, the NEPAD Secretary ensures the coordination of the program and it is established in Midran, South Africa. These bodies are responsible for developing and coordinating technical work.

The African peer review mechanism (APRM) insures the assessment of the program. “the peer review process aims to scrutinise all levels of government, parliament and judiciary as well as the private sector. This is likely to lead to rapid poverty eradication and achievement of the objectives of the NEPAD programme and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). APRM seems to be a concrete demonstration of African countries’ commitment of addressing governance issues decisively and controlling their own destinies.”<sup>296</sup>

#### *4.2.2. The constitutive act of the African Union*

After the Sirte Summit held in September in 1999,<sup>297</sup> the Council of Minister of the OAU were mandated to organise the transitional period from the OAU to AU. Between 2001 and 2002, the African Heads of State of the late OAU set up a transitional period characterised by the establishment of the African Commission.

The constitutive act come into being the 26<sup>th</sup> may 2001 and further, the programme was launched in Durban in 2002.<sup>298</sup>As the NEPAD, the background of the constitutive act can be found in the willingness of African leader to challenge the scourge of conflicts in African countries.

The recurrent of instability is believed to prevent the socio-economic development of

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<sup>295</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>296</sup> N’guettia Kouassi, Rene. The Itinerary of African Integration process. African integration review, volume1, n°2. July 2007, p 18

<sup>297</sup> The summit was launched by the Libyan President with the purpose to reform the OAU Charter and strengthen the “African unity”.

<sup>298</sup> The Headquarters of the Union is established Addis Ababa in the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.



the continent; therefore, the need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of the development and integration in Africa<sup>299</sup> become necessary. In the beginning of the 2000 century, the AU constitutive act was the response to the growing impoverishment of the African countries undermine by armed rebellions, areas of insecurity, poverty, lack of democracy, violation of human rights. etc.

The European Union strategy report for Africa and a broad number of reports lay emphasis on the long and common history of European and African countries. Such assumption takes all its sense when we make an overview of the African constitutive act. It can be useful to bring out some similarity with the European institution<sup>300</sup> which can give rise to different interpretation. The current one is that, as the most integrated arrangement group in the world, the EU can be an example for its partners. The objectives, the principles and the organs of the African Union are defined in article 3, 4 and 5 of its constitutive act.

The constitutive act enunciates its main objectives which are designed to achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa; to accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent; to encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; to promote peace, security, and stability on the continent, democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance; to protect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments; to work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent etc.

Its principles are mentioned in the article 4 as follow: sovereign equality and interdependence among Member States of the Union; respect of borders existing on

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<sup>299</sup> [http://www.africanunion.org/aboutau/Constitutive\\_Act\\_en.htm](http://www.africanunion.org/aboutau/Constitutive_Act_en.htm).

<sup>300</sup> The European parliament, the European commission, the council of the European Union, the European Economic and Social committee, the European investment bank etc.

achievement of independence; participation of the African peoples in the activities of the Union; establishment of a common defence policy for the African Continent; peaceful resolution of conflicts among Member States of the Union through such appropriate means as may be decided upon by the Assembly; prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among Member States of the Union; non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another; the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity; condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments etc.

Concerning the function of the organs, the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government or their duly accredited representatives is the supreme organ of the Union. They meet once a year in ordinary session. In the request of one member or the two third, the assembly meet in extraordinary session. Among its missions, we can recall that: it determines the common policies of the Union; it receives, considers and takes decisions on reports and recommendations from the other organs of the Union; it establishes any organ of the Union and monitor the implementation of the policies.

The Executive Council takes its decision by consensus or failing, in the two-third of the quorum which also form the quota for meeting. Its action plan covers a broad number of issues: foreign and trade; energy, industry and mineral resources; food, agricultural and animal resources, livestock production and forestry; water resources and irrigation; environmental protection, humanitarian action and disaster response and relief; transport and communications; insurance; education, culture, health and human resources development; science and technology etc.

The Pan-African Parliament<sup>301</sup> has the function to ensure the participation of African peoples to the development of the continent. Each of the 53 members of the African Union send 5 members of its national parliament to the assembly. The institution has been criticized because of its legacy with national parliament and subsequently, its lack of representation.<sup>302</sup>

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301 It held its first assembly on 16 of September 2004.

302 This criticizes its move toward countries where the parliament is monopolised by the government and thus, have demonstrated lapses on democracy.

The Court of Justice<sup>303</sup> is composed by 11 members elected for 6 years. Their mandate is renewable. It can be useful to note that, competence in human rights issues as well as, high morality are necessary to be elected.

The Financial Institutions of the Union are: The African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund and the African Investment Bank.

The Secretariat of the Union is composed by the Chairman, his or her deputy or deputies and the Commissioners. They shall be assisted by the necessary staff for the smooth functioning of the Commission. Its functions and regulations is determined by the Assembly.

The Permanent Representatives Committee is in charge to prepare the work of the Executive Council and acting on the Executive Council's instructions. The Specialized Technical Committees are composed by the Ministers or senior officials, responsible for sectors falling within their respective areas of competence which are: Rural Economy and Agricultural Matters; Monetary and Financial Affairs; Trade, Customs and Immigration Matters; Industry, Science and Technology, Energy, Natural Resources and Environment; transport, Communications and Tourism; Health, Labour and Social Affairs; Education, Culture and Human Resources. The Assembly whenever it deems it appropriate, restructure the existing Committees or establish other Committees.

The Economic, Social and Cultural Council is the advisory organ of the Union and it is composed of different social and professional groups of the Member States of the Union. Its functions, powers, composition and organization are be determined by the Assembly.

The African Peace and Security Council<sup>304</sup> and the Charter on Democracy, Election and Governance<sup>305</sup> come in addition to the landscape of the new organs. The goals of these framework is to respond to the recurrence of security matter in Africa.

The PSC<sup>306</sup> of the African Union encompasses 15 member States.<sup>307</sup> Since it came into

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303 It come into being the 25<sup>th</sup> January 2004.

304 Adopted in 2003.

305 Adopted in January 2007.

306 Peace and security council.

307 Gabon, Etiopia, Algeria, South Africa, Nigeria, Cameroon, Congo, Kenya, Sudan, Libya, Lesotho. Mozambique, Ghana, Senegal, Togo. ( five countries are elected to serve for 3 years whilst, 10 are elected to serve for 10 years).

force, it deployed peace operation missions in Burundi (AMID) and in Sudan (AMIS). I, The first thing that should be considered is that, these missions have accomplished some success in securing civilians and deter ceasefire, secondly, a set of obstacles emerged. Indeed, they experimented financial, logistical, as well as expertise shortcomings. Therefore “the AU and the international community will need to use a range of tools to deliver on to the new peace and security agenda in Africa.”<sup>308</sup> For this matter, the African Union is sustained by the United Nations, the European Union and the G8.

The article 17 of the PSC is entitled relations with the United Nations and others international organisations. It stresses that, the PSC should work closely with the United Nations who has the primary responsibility for peace keeping in the world.

Boutros Boutros Ghali in his Agenda for Peace (VII) has assigned an increasing role to regional arrangements for peacekeeping, peace building, preventive diplomacy and other common international issues. Following this, “The AU’ emerging security architecture place the continental organization within a robust security system comprised regional arrangement and mechanism, the United Nations (UN) and other key member of the international community.”<sup>309</sup> For instance, in the late 2004, the United Nations took over the AU mission in Burundi (ONUB) demonstrating by this way the division of labour between the two Organisations.

As we usually mention, the European Union is the main partner of AU and it also shows commitment for security matter. In response to the appeal of African countries, the European Union provides a peace facility Fund in march 2004.

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**308** Powell, Christina. The African Union’s emerging peace and security regime. Opportunities and challenge for delivering on the responsibility to protect. The Nord - South Institute, working paper, May 2005: 4

**309** Ivi, p. 3.

The G8<sup>310</sup> contributes to the African peace and security Agenda toward its support to the NEPAD programme. “the G8 agreed to provide technical and financial assistance to enhance the Capacity of African countries and regional organisations to prevent and resolve conflict.”<sup>311</sup>

The Charter on Democracy, Election and Governance with its 53 articles<sup>312</sup> recall various issues such as governance, human rights, fair elections, democracy, rule of law, corruption, human security, political stability, regional cooperation etc.

The articles 23 and 24 (sanctions in case of institutional change of government) of the Charter have raised contradictory debate. In the case of disrupting of democratic government, the state is suspended from the African Union activities. These measures which aim at eradicating the scourge of instability that undermines the African countries since the late independence include:

“Non-participation of the perpetrators of the unconstitutional change in the elections held to restore constitutional order; implementation of sanctions against any Member State that is proven to have instigated or supported an unconstitutional change in another State; and implementation by the Assembly of other sanctions including punitive economic sanctions. It further decided that, Member States should, upon the occurrence of an unconstitutional change of Government, refrain from granting any accreditation to the de facto authorities in non-African international bodies, including the United Nations and its General Assembly, thus strengthening the automatic suspension measure taken by the AU against the countries in which unconstitutional changes of Government have taken place”<sup>313</sup>

Although a few number of countries have been sanctioned in the past few years, the unconstitutional change of government seems difficult to overcome.

Therefore, doubts have been raised about the capability of the African Charter to

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310 It establishes the African Action Plan.

311 Powell, Christina. The African Union’s emerging peace and security regime. Opportunities and challenge for delivering on the responsibility to protect. The Nord - South Institute, working paper, May 2005: 20.

312 Annexe 2.

313 Results of the 14th African Union Summit <http://www.capitaleritrea.com/press-release/results-of-the-14th-african-union-summit/>.

discourage the famous “coup d’état” and other form of illegal change of government in African countries.

Meanwhile, in the absence of other instruments of guarantee, the Charter seems to open the path to political stability in Africa. The Solemn Declaration on a common Africa Defence and security Policy (CADPS)<sup>314</sup> is another instrument that aims at dealing with the security problems in Africa. Going deeply through the whole documents adopted by the African Union will bring us to an infinite development.

Concerning the assessment of the new institutions, debates have move in two different paths. For “pessimists, NEPAD is not the answer to Africa’s nagging problem of underdevelopment occasioned by bad political and corporate governance epitomized by unending political crises and deep-seated corruption. Widespread leadership crises and political instability have dealt devastating blows to the economies of African states to degrees beyond quick and total recoveries. Therefore, under highly depleted economies, increasing human rights abuse, limited infrastructure, poverty, unemployment, hunger, and the ravaging effects of HIV/AIDS, Africa’s economic recovery becomes a dream rather than an achievable reality.”<sup>315</sup>

Whilst other commentators claimed that, the NEPAD and the AU constitutive act seems to be the appropriate solution which can give the necessary impetus to Africa’s economic growth and improve the daily conditions of African peoples.

For sceptical commentators, in the past decade African countries have taken various initiatives to challenge development issues, none of them was successful. One example is that, “In 1963, African unity was given a weak and mediocre expression in the creation of a toothless, clawless lion in a decorated cage in the name of the Organization of African Unity OAU). In the place of unity, peace, nationalism, an pan-Africanism, the new African leaders who had taken over the privileges and powers of the colonial

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314 Adopted in Sirtes, Libya in February 2004.

315 Nwonwu, Francis. NEPAD: A New agenda or another rethoric in Africa’s political adventurism Africa Policy Journal, Fall 2006, Vol. 2: 24

imperialists, came to rely on nepotism, corruption, repression, intimidation, depoliticization, diversions, ideological containment, pedestrian manipulation of primordial loyalties, shameless collusion with profit and hegemony-seeking translational corporations, incredible subservience to Western and imperialist dictate, and a total lack of vision for the future of Africa and Africans.”<sup>316</sup>

As a result, the new institutions seem to be considered as “new wine in the old bottle.” To sustain this assumption, these commentators bring out the indefinite list of declarations, charters, programmes which have preceded the establishment of the NEPAD and the AU constitutive act.

- The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos (1980); incorporating programmes and strategies for self-reliant development and cooperation among African countries.

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316 Ihonyhber O, Julius. Pan- Africanism: Agenda for African Unity in 1990's in Akeya Agbango, Georges. Issues and trends in contemporary African politics: Stability, development and democratization, Peter Lang Publishing, Inc, New York 2003: 342.

The African Charter on Human and People's Rights (Nairobi 1981) and the Grand Bay Declaration and Plan of Action on Human rights: two instruments adopted by the OAU to promote Human and People's Rights in the Continent. The Human Rights Charter led to the establishment of the African Human Rights Commission located in Banjul, The Gambia.

Africa's Priority Programme for Economic recovery (APPER) – 1985: an emergency programme designed to address the development crisis of the 1980s, in the wake of protracted drought and famine that had engulfed the continent and the crippling effect of Africa's external indebtedness.

OAU Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes taking place in the World (1990): which underscored Africa's resolve to seize the initiative, to determine its destiny and to address the challenges to peace, democracy and security.

The Charter on Popular Participation adopted in 1990: a testimony to the renewed determination of the OAU to endeavour to place the African citizen at the center of development and decision-making.

The Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) in 1991.

The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (1993): a practical expression of the determination of the African leadership to find solutions to conflicts, promote peace, security and stability in Africa.

Cairo Agenda for Action (1995): a programme for relaunching Africa's political, economic and social development.

African Common Position on Africa's External Debt Crisis (1997): a strategy for addressing the Continent's External Debt Crisis.



The Algiers decision on Unconstitutional Changes of Government (1999) and the Lome Declaration on the framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes (2000)

The 2000 Solemn Declaration on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation: establishes the fundamental principles for the promotion of Democracy and Good Governance in the Continent etc.<sup>317</sup>

Following this, it can be easy to conclude that, “African leaders have become experts at coming up with well-written, well-worded, even sympathy-evoking documents all designed to give the impression that, they are serious-minded and have embraced a new commitment to challenging the poverty and squalor in which their peoples are immersed.”<sup>318</sup>

Furthermore, it seems that the new institutions are laid in a handful of African elites that “ ignores the relevance and contributions of the grassroots, civil society and a host of other stakeholders in its formulation.”<sup>319</sup>

In the aftermath of the establishment of the two institutions, the national ONG, and the civil society express their frustrations as the leaders seek primary the sustain of international community instead of those of African people.<sup>320</sup>

Similarly, such scepticism argues that, whilst world history seems to show that, deep shift always come from a long process of fight, (elites) offer it with a suspicious facility. “After all, social progress (including the original Renaissance in Europe) emerged from and was based upon popular struggles. Social achievements since then did not fall from heaven but were the result of organised movements by people for the people. Welfare states were not the product of bourgeois generosity but of popular demands and organised labour movements. Political and human rights, as well as civil and civic participation, were

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**317** Constitutive Act of the AfricaUnion.

[http://www.africaunion.org/root/au/Aboutau/Constitutive\\_Act\\_en.htm](http://www.africaunion.org/root/au/Aboutau/Constitutive_Act_en.htm).

**318** Ihonvbere O, Julius. Pan- Africanism: Agenda for African Unity in 1990's in Akeya Agbango, Georges. Issues and trends in contemporary African politics: Stability, development and democratization, Peter Lang Publishing, Inc, New York 2003: 352-353.

**319** Nwonwu, Francis. NEPAD: A New agenda or another rethoric in Africa's political adventurism Africa Policy Journal, Fall 2006, Vol. 2: 20.

**320** Presumably that, people will follow.

achieved through of grassroots activities and by collective movements from below.”<sup>321</sup>

Moreover, NEPAD “blends nicely” into the globalisation, whilst “Further criticisms levelled against NEPAD are its perceived capitulation to the global capitalist market, its elite inception, and its large-scale concession to the precepts of the neoliberal orthodoxy. This orthodoxy, critics argue, perpetuates an unfavourably skewed distribution of resources, wealth, and power and does not allow the free markets to play a role in allocating”<sup>322</sup>

Other critics claimed that, NEPAD provides opportunity to African leaders to work closely and on equal terms with its development partners. “It is already dawning on the architects of NEPAD that the development partners do not see mutual reciprocity when Africa relies wholly on the developed countries for much of the money needed to implement NEPAD initiatives including the fund for setting up the NEPAD Secretariat.”<sup>323</sup>

Furthermore, the past record of African countries, illustrated by mismanagement couple with those which refuse to reform their system influence western partners. “As a result, development partners exercise extreme caution in dealing with states with such high propensity for volatility. This attitude places African states, many of which are incapable of self-financing, in a state of limbo. In the absence of alternatives, countries in desperate need of funds sacrifice much of their liberty to attract funds and investment.”<sup>324</sup>

Finally, the presentation of some issues in the programme can raise scepticism. For instance, to attain the International Development Goals (IDGs), the Nepad suggests an average growth of GDP 7% every year, actually, the average is around 4%. An overview of the programme seems to show that it will be unrealistic to come through its realisation. This is a far-reaching and wide ranging, almost all-embracing comprehensive catalogue, which looks like a stock taking exercise of all contentious issues which ought to be acknowledged. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the initiative

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321 Melber, Henning. Cornwell, Richards. Gathaga, Jephtah. Wanjala, Smokin. *The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD): African Perspectives*. Discussion paper 16, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala 2002: 33.

322 Nwonwu, Francis. *NEPAD: A New agenda or another rethoric in Africa's political adventurism*. *Africa Policy Journal*, Fall 2006, Vol. 2: 22.

323 Ivi, p. 20.

324 Ivi, p. 22.

will be able to come to a meaningful implementation stage on all the tasks identified<sup>325</sup>.

Optimist commentators state that it is premature to predict the failure of the new African institutions. They argue that, “the philosophy that established the NEPAD programme, as well as the priority programmes articulated around it, makes it necessary to recognize that the programme constitutes a real change of direction for the African people.”<sup>326</sup>

The evidence seems to be that, the commitment of the G8 and some Western countries is a sign that, they have been impressed by the determination of African leaders to overcome the challenges of impoverishment.

For this matter, instead of underlining the lapses of the new institutions, they found better to highlight the positive implication for the African countries as well as the path to improve the shortcomings. Africans can no longer rely on the past generation, which squandered their future,[...] and reduced their worth in the eyes of the world.<sup>327</sup>

Therefore, it seems more useful to look at how these institutions can be sustained so that they can regain the confidence of African citizens. For instance, to come out with the critics on civil society, the AU launched the Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the African Union (ECOSOCC) in may 2005. It is an attempt to devolve power to low level and to commit all social level to the new initiatives. Finally, it seems that “[...] the current crisis, difficult and costly as it has been, is very good for Africa. It has opened up the palaces, mansions and fortresses to attack. It reduced the room for manoeuvre available to African leaders. It has shown the limits of populist diversionary modes of governance. The crisis is encouraging new questions, new alignments and realignments, new modes of struggle, and the development of holistic programs for restructuring the politics and economy in Africa.”<sup>328</sup>

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325 Melber, Henning. Cornwell, Richards. Gathaga, Jephtah. Wanjala, Smokin. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD): African Perspectives. Discussion paper 16, Nordiska.

326 N'guettia Kouassi, Rene. The Itinerary of African Integration process. African integration review, volume1, n°2. July 2007: 19.

327 Ihonyhberere O, Julius. Pan- Africanism: Agenda for African Unity in 1990's in Akeya Agbango, Georges. Issues and trends in contemporary African politics: Stability, development and democratization, Peter Lang Publishing, Inc, New York 2003: 362.

328 Akeya Agbango, Georges. Issues and trends in contemporary African politics: Stability, development and democratization, Peter Lang Publishing, Inc, New York 2003: 42.

How can the new institutions overcome the shortcomings that appear above in order to improve human being condition in African? This question brings us to look at the capability of African Union to achieve the prerequisites enhanced in the partnership with the European countries.

#### **4.3. The capabilities of African institutions to challenge human security issues**

Given the conclusion that we draw above, the capabilities seems to be rely on the capacity of the twin institutions to adjust the structure and, to adapt the suggestions that have been made by African peoples as well as the international partners.

To address the concerns about the new institutions, the African peer review has been established since 2003.

The peer review mechanism is most spread in academic and professional field. Its purpose is to give a fair evaluation of a work or a performance. The basis is that, it is difficult to spot one's mistakes, errors and weaknesses in a work. Policymaking use the peer review mechanism "to ensure their policies are not only in the best interests of their electorates, but that they follow the best tried and tested experience available."<sup>329</sup>

Since 40 years, OECD countries have use the peer review mechanism to assess the economy performance of their countries. A country is assessed every 4 years. The success of the experience have lead the African countries to ask for technical support for the implementation of their peer review. The OECD peer review is lead by "examiner countries" in sectorial issues such as (employment, environmental issues, energy etc.). it includes tree stages:

the phase of preparation, (pieces of information are collected from the existing source and send to the reviewed country government

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329 Pagani, Fabrizio, Peer review, A tool for global co-operation and change OECD [http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/881/Peer\\_review.html](http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/881/Peer_review.html).

the second and the third phase, are characterised by discussion and the adoption of the final report.

“At the final phase, a collective discussion on a draft report is held in the review body. In some cases there may be disagreements over assessment or recommendations. These reports may be hotly negotiated since they have to be accepted by the whole review body. In some cases, exceptions to the rule of consensus are possible and the report can be adopted without the agreement of the reviewed country. However, generally, the final report is the fruit of consensus. This can occasionally mean a rather prudently neutral report that none of the actors object to, leading to criticism of blandness, even political expediency. But mostly, governments are ready to accept considerable criticism, even if they disagree with it, as a price for participating in the peer review system. In a sense, peer pressure prevents individual governments from seeking favourable treatment.”<sup>330</sup>

Competence, independence, and competition are required to ensure as much as possible the credibility of the peer review mechanism. Meanwhile, the accountability of the OECD peer lies on the fact that, non-governmental organisations and civil society are involved in the process. Moreover, it is interesting to note that, the examiner country represents the collectivity which decided the topic, the principles and the criteria of the review.

Turning to the African peer review experience, “It is a self-monitoring mechanism intended to foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that will lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated regional and continental economic integration through sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful best practices, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs for capacity building of participating countries”<sup>331</sup>

The members of the leading group (between 5 and 7 eminent persons) are elected for 4

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<sup>330</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>331</sup> The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM): The Rules and procedure of the APR Panel and the APR secretary.

years<sup>332</sup> and they should fulfil the following profile:

distinction in careers that considered relevant for APRM;

they should have high moral stature;

they should demonstrated commitment to serve African ideal.

The article 15 of the APRM states that its main competence are to proposes to the APR Forum rules and regulations as may be necessary for the effective implementation of the APRM; to reviews and approves the work programme and the relevant budget estimates of the APR Secretariat; to reviews and approves the staffing requirements of the APR Secretariat; to Approves plans for country reviews and the composition of the APR Teams; to recommends to the APR Forum a list of appropriate African institutions or individuals, and, in exceptional circumstances, appropriate Non-African institutions and individuals; to conduct technical assessments and country reviews; to examine the country review reports and make recommendations to the APR Forum; to Present an annual report to the APR Forum on the implementation of the APRM. <sup>333</sup>

The secretariat of the panel provides technical as well as coordinating and administrative support for the implementation of the APRM. It is incredulous that, despite the establishment of such instrument aim at challenging African countries shortcoming in all sectors, “The political systems in [some] African states portray clear deviations from the NEPAD objectives of democracy, good political and corporate governance, respect for human rights, and the rule of law. Corruption remains the rule rather than the exception in many African countries. The damage to investor confidence and therefore the flow of investment funds in the form of FDI and ODA into Africa can be phenomenal and damaging.”<sup>334</sup>

The APRM continued to face resistance from a large number of countries. The misunderstanding lies on the fact that, the process is view as an attack to the state

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<sup>332</sup> The mandate is renewable.

<sup>333</sup> The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM): The Rules and procedure of the APR Panel and the APR secretary.

<sup>334</sup> Nwonwu, Francis. NEPAD: A New agenda or another rethoric in Africa’s political adventurism Africa Policy Journal, Fall 2006, Vol. 2: 23.

sovereignty more than a technical tool to improve policymaking.

Therefore the APRM usually face the following challenges:

in many countries, adequate steps have not been taken to prepare for the review exercise;

the national structures have not been established;

some countries have not organised a Focal Point or a National Commission to follow the project;

usually, when the National Commissions have been set up, they are not representative of all the stakeholders, as required in the APRM document;

the more critical question is the lack of budgetary allocations for the review exercise.<sup>335</sup>

Public revenue and expenditure in relation with corruption is other plague in many African countries. Thus, “responsive African states have set up anticorruption squads and campaigns against corruption. This is intended to flush out the “bad eggs” within the government and to set the pace for expanding the anticorruption movement to civil society.”<sup>336</sup>

Similarly, some political elites are pointed out about their commitment in capital flight which characterises a large number of countries. “Money generated in the domestic economy, the bulk of which is government revenue, is often misappropriated and stashed away in foreign banks. While some recoveries have been made in recent times, the amounts recovered have been comparatively low and represent mere tips of the iceberg in comparison with the amount of outflow.”<sup>337</sup>

Many people believed that, financial resource is a key aspect of these programme, meanwhile, it is difficult to envisaged the future without human resources. Therefore, it

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**335** N’guettia Kouassi, Rene. The Itinerary of African Integration process. African integration review, volume1, n°2. july 2007: 19.

**336** Nwonwu, Francis. NEPAD: A New agenda or another rethoric in Africa’s political adventurism. Africa Policy Journal, Fall 2006, Vol. 2: 12.

**337** Ibidem.

seems urgent to empower African citizens in all stage of the decision making in order to overcome the idea that “the democracy and governance initiative in NEPAD ‘seems designed more to pander to a donor audience than responding to or representing the concerns of the domestic socio-political forces.’”<sup>338</sup> In addition, it is necessary to seek the commitment from school, through households to government, for a new spirit and enthusiasm for democracy, empowerment, accountability, social justice, equality, human rights, popular participation, the guarantee of freedoms and liberties.<sup>339</sup>

In summary, the following suggestions have been made to improve the implementation of the NEPAD programme.<sup>340</sup>

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338 Melber, Henning. Cornwell, Richards. Gathaga, Jephtah. Wanjala, Smokin. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD): African Perspectives. Discussion paper 16, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala 2002.

339 Ihonvhere O, Julius. Pan- Africanism: Agenda for African Unity in 1990's in Akeya Agbango, Georges. Issues and trends in contemporary African politics: Stability, development and democratization, Peter Lang Publishing, Inc, New York 2003: 355.

340 Melber, Henning. Cornwell, Richards. Gathaga, Jephtah. Wanjala, Smokin. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD): African Perspectives. Discussion paper 16, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala 2002: 34.



That Africa's leaders individually and jointly explain what they understand by the contents of NEPAD and express their commitments to it politically in word and deed.

That NEPAD's orientation is currently too state-centred. Therefore, it should organise meetings in each of Africa's regions to engage civil society in the broadest sense in about NEPAD. This will help to ensure that Africa's peoples and their organisations take ownership of the initiative and drive it forward.

That following a thorough discussion of NEPAD and its endorsement by civil society, it be incorporated in the founding instruments of the African Union.

That African security has to be understood not as state security but as human security, which consist of freedom from fear and freedom from want.

That African leaders join the international community in committing themselves in word and deed to the eradication of corruption, which is one of the gravest impediments to development.

That NEPAD requires that the international community deals consistently with Africa in an equitable and ethical manner.

That clarity should be obtained about the relationship of NEPAD to previous agreements between Africa and the international community with the aim of maximising mutual advantage.

That priority be given to identifying pilot projects related to functional literacy, especially among women in disadvantaged communities.

## **CHAPTER V**

### **THE FUTURE OF THE EU-AU COOPERATION**

The aim of this chapter is to give a general interpretation of the arguments we developed in the previous one. In the basis of our main question in reference with human security, we consider that the future of European and African partnership can be influenced by elements which can favour, encourage, discourage or postpone the implementation of the joint agenda. Following this line, the United Nations as the “common home” for human rights and human security is the first reference for the partnership. Therefore, we will underline the capability of the United Nations to favour the partnership. In addition, matters such as: the European and African common intervention for peacekeeping, the EU contribution for MDGs goals, the institutional organisation of the joint partnership will also be taken into consideration. Whilst, financial shortfalls seems to be the problematic issue which can postpone the achievement of the joint agenda.

#### **5.1. The partnership and the United Nations**

How can the commitment of the United Nations favour or encourage the future of European and African cooperation especially in the area of human security?

As the global “supranational organization”<sup>341</sup>, the United Nations brings its influence to bear on national and international action by proposing global goals.<sup>342</sup>

The European and African partnership act on behalf of the International Organisation. As any International Organisation, the main objectives of the UN is to promote cooperation between states and then, to prevent conflict between its members or to settle it by peaceful means. It Performs functions such as:

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341 Papisca, Antonio. Mascia, Marco. Le relazioni internazionale nell’era dell’indipendenza e dei diritti umani, Padova, Cedam, 2004.

342 Jolly, Richard. Emmerij, Dharam Ghai. Lapeyre, Frédéric. UN contributions to development and practices. United Nations intellectual history project series, Indiana University Press, 2004 : 257

- Ensure communication among governments and therefore among the bureaucracies of the member states
- Develop and implement intervention policies etc.<sup>343</sup>

In the past decade, the UN contribution to Human Security was conceptualised by the UNDP reports on development as well as the contribution of its specialised agencies such as UNICEF, FAO, UNESCO, UNIDO, WFP, WHO, UNFPA, IFAD, ILO.

The UN strategy often focused on gathering and analysing data and the formulation of development agenda. In this area, the UNDP plays a fundamental role in the human security by enhancing human poverty, deprivation, gender development and gender empowerment.

As the pioneering in the area of human security, the UNDP integrated approaches success which are summarised by the fourth contributions of human development reports as follows:

Its human development integrated different development concerns.

It provides social and economic measures to evaluate human development all over the world.

Its integrated human rights objectives in its development strategy more than ever.

It analyses the impact of development strategies and policies on human development in a broad area: human rights, security, governance, democracy, trade, foreign aid, environment, gender, technologies etc.<sup>344</sup>

Moreover, “the UN’s decision to identify the problems of the least-developed countries as a special case and develop specific proposals in response to their needs was more original and positive.”<sup>345</sup>

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<sup>343</sup> Papisca, Antonio. Mascia, Marco. Le relazioni internazionale nell’era dell’indipendenza e dei diritti umani, Padova, Cedam, 2004 : 213.

<sup>344</sup> Jolly, Richard. Emmerij, Dharam Ghai. Lapeyre, Frédéric. UN contributions to development and practices. United Nations intellectual history project series, Indiana University Press, 2004.

<sup>345</sup> Ivi, p. 283.

As a result, regional arrangement always make reference to United Nations and his agencies as the “world government embryo”<sup>346</sup> designed to foster international solidarity and multilateral cooperation, to ban the use of force, to ensures peaceful settlement and the respect for human rights.<sup>347</sup>

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy recognises that, the UN is among the privileged partner which will strengthen the partnership by “jointly promote and sustain a system of effective multilateralism, with strong representative and legitimate institutions, and the reform of the United Nations (UN) system and of other key international institutions, and to address global challenges and common concerns such as human rights, including children’s rights and gender equality, fair trade, migration, HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and other pandemics, climate change, energy security and sustainability, terrorism, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the illicit trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, and knowledge-based society issues such as ICT, science, technology and innovation.”<sup>348</sup>

In the same way, the ESS reports mentioned that “the fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority. We want international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken.”<sup>349</sup>

In addition, Since 2007, the AU PSC and the UN Security Council (UNSC) alternate meeting between Addis Ababa and New York. Discussion are focused on the UN/AU missions in Africa and naturally on the abrasive issues of funding to peace operation support. Indeed, the African Peace and security council, under its article 17, act under

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346 Papisca, Antonio. Mascia, Marco. Le relazioni internazionale nell’era dell’indipendenza e dei diritti umani, Padova, Cedam, 2004 : 238.

347 Ivi, P. 191

**348**The Africa -EU Partnership A Joint Africa-EU Strategy  
[EAS2007\\_joint\\_strategy\\_en.pdf](#)**STRATEGIC 2007.**

349 A Secure Europe in a Better World European Security Strategy Brussels, 12 December 2003, [www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf).

the responsibility of the united Nations.

1. In the fulfillment of its mandate in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, the Peace and Security Council shall cooperate and work closely with the United Nations Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Peace and Security Council shall also cooperate and work closely with other relevant UN Agencies in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa.

2. Where necessary, recourse will be made to the United Nations to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the African Unions' activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on the role of Regional Organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security etc.<sup>350</sup>

Usually, United Nations report provides general guidelines to its partners. In the previous chapters, we make reference to the Agenda For Peace of the former Secretary General. We will also recall the report on Millennium Goals.<sup>351</sup>

In the last few years, these reports became a reference for the global development agenda. In this sense, international assessment on development often refers to the various aspects of the human security enriched by the United Nations Millennium Declarations.

The report underlines values such as: Freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature and share responsibility. Moreover it also enhanced the issue of development eradication, human right, special needs for Africa, the protection of vulnerable, democracy and good governance. To sum up, the MDGs underlines the key role of the United Nations by stating that, the UN will not spare no effort to make the United Nations a more effective instrument to achieve its global missions which are : the fight for development for all peoples of the world, the fight against poverty; ignorance and disease; the fight against injustice; the fight against violence, terror and crime; and the

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<sup>350</sup> Peace and security council Africa [http://www.africaunion.org/rule\\_prot/PR](http://www.africaunion.org/rule_prot/PR).

<sup>351</sup> United Nations A/RES/55/2, General Assembly, United Nations Millennium Declaration, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, Fifty-fifth session Agenda item 60 (b), 18 September 2000.

fight against the degradation and destruction of our common home”<sup>352</sup>

In the same line, in the late 2005s, the UN report “In larger freedom”<sup>353</sup> was another contribution to the human security issue. The former Secretary General of the UN states that “While purposes should be firm and constant, practice and organization need to move with the times. If the UN is to be a useful instrument for its Member States, and for the world’s peoples, in responding to the challenges laid out in the previous three parts, it must be fully adapted to the needs and circumstances of the 21st century.”<sup>354</sup>

Concern have been raised about the capability of the United Nations to ensure the global objectives of its agenda. For instance, we can remember its incapacity to prevent the Rwanda genocide in 1994, as well as the inertia of the UN Human Rights Commission in the front of documented violations of human rights in China.<sup>355</sup> to prevent such shortcomings, regional arrangements (EU, AU etc.) often act in the banners of the United Nations by recognising the division of labour in the International arena.

As we stressed in the second chapter, if the international agenda is moving toward the human security issue and human rights, then it seems that the United Nations is designed to catalyse this global trends to secure the world by considering that, nowadays, World politics are not just for the needs of sovereignty of the states (independence, security, territorial integrity), but also acting to satisfy human needs, those of the individual and the community (people, groups, minorities, peoples, indigenous).<sup>356</sup>

In this sense, an overview of the UN agenda in the past 50 years reveals the general trends of its framework.

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352 United Nations A/RES/55/2, General Assembly, United Nations Millennium Declaration, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, Fifty-fifth session Agenda item 60 (b), 18 September 2000: 8.

353 Koffi, Annan. In *Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*.

354 Ivi, p. 5.

355 Mascia, Marco. *Obiettivo sicurezza umana. Per la Politica Estera dell’Unione Europea*. Cleup, Padova, 2010: 253.

356 Papisca, Antonio. Mascia, Marco. *Le relazioni internazionale nell’era dell’indipendenza e dei diritti umani*, Padova, Cedam, 2004: 188.

**Table 11.1. An Overview of UN Contributions to Development**

Areas of Contribution to Ideas and Thinking	Impact on Action				
	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s
<b>Human Rights</b>					
<b>Development Goals and Objectives</b>					
Economic					
Human and Social					
Population					
<b>National Development Policies and Planning</b>					
Development Planning					
Industrialization					
Agriculture and Rural Development					
<b>International Cooperation for Development</b>					
Development Assistance					
Foreign Debt and Development					
Special Needs of LDCs					
<b>Trade Inequalities and Trade Policy</b>					
<b>Disarmament and Development</b>					
<b>Transnational Enterprises</b>					
<b>Technology Transfer</b>					
<b>Environment and Development</b>					
<b>Transition in Transition Countries</b>					
<b>Equity in Development</b>					
Empowering Women					
Children in Development					
Greater Global Equity					
<b>Human Development</b>					

<b>Key</b>			
widespread impact on action	limited impact on action	minimal impact on action	negligible impact on action

**Figure 5.**<sup>357</sup> UN contribution for Human security

In the basis of the information above, it is not a surprise that, the issue of human rights and human security became the basis of any reflexion in the global level and therefore in the European and African partnership.

The new standard set out by the UN is not without consequences in the medium and long term. One example is that, these principles legitimate political leaders, increase the ranks of international actors different from states, which work for human development. They report violations of these principles, the incompatibility of the old principles and they make autonomous initiatives for the promotion of the new principles.<sup>358</sup>

<sup>357</sup> Jolly, Richard. Emmerij, Dharam Ghai. Lapeyre, Frédéric. UN contributions to development and practices. United Nations intellectual history project series, Indiana University Press, 2004.

<sup>358</sup> Papisca, Antonio. Mascia, Marco. Le relazioni internazionale nell'era dell'indipendenza e dei diritti umani, Padova, Cedam, 2004: 188.

## **5.2. The joint European and African partnership assessment report**

### *5.2.1. Common intervention in peacekeeping mission*

Referring to the EU and African partnership future, one relevant element can be the JAES assessment report which is designed to give a complete overview of what has been achieved, the shortfalls and obviously the means to address it.

A glance at the document reveals that, it reviews the whole issue of the partnership with a clear vision of the joint framework. Meanwhile, to have a different approach of the matter, we will also refer to additional commentators whose analyst contribute to improve the EU and African partnership.<sup>359</sup>

The past of the partnership is positively strengthen by the EU and AU common intervention, especially in the field of security. The Joint EU-Africa Strategy underlines that much progress of the partnerships have been made in the area of peace and security.<sup>360</sup> The Ecdpm report reveals that, “Some partnerships are more advanced than others in terms of modalities, action priorities and road maps. These differences may well stem from the degree of involvement of the various actors, their individual preparations for the partnerships and certainly their commitments.”<sup>361</sup>

In addition, the ESS and the Helsinkin reports, the NEPAD programme, the AU constitutive act, the European Strategy for Africa and the JAES report lay emphasis on the same matter.

In the lines with these considerations, many people believe that, the common intervention in peacekeeping mission can favour the EU and African partnership in the future. “In the aftermath of the Cold War, the African Union (AU) and the European

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359 Beyond Structures? Reflections on the Implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy [www.ecdpm.org/dp87](http://www.ecdpm.org/dp87).

360 Assessment of Joint Africa-EU Strategy structures, modalities and follow-up Mechanisms, Assessment report, (9 Oct. 2009 FINAL, as endorsed by JTF)

361 Beyond Structures? Reflections on the Implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy [www.ecdpm.org/dp87](http://www.ecdpm.org/dp87).



Union (EU) have emerged as critical contributors to international efforts at supporting African states in the transition from armed violence to sustainable peace. Their role as peacekeepers has become increasingly crucial as the rising number and complexity of crisis situations around the globe continue to exceed the United Nations' (UN) capacity for prompt and effective interventions.<sup>362</sup>

Broad missions can be evoked in this area: AMISOM (mission to Somalia), MICOPAX (the multinational Mission in the central Africa), AMIB (mission in Burundi), AMIS (mission in Sudan, UNAMID (mission in Darfur) etc.

The common intervention of the EU-AU is believed to be favoured by the proximity to the epicentres of conflicts, the sentiments of common humanity as well as the real economic and strategic incentives.<sup>363</sup>

Moreover, the assessment report underlines that peace and security is necessary “to reinforce and elevate the Africa-EU political partnership to address issues of common concern. This includes strengthening of institutional ties and addressing common challenges, in particular peace and security, migration and development, and a clean environment. To this end, both sides will treat Africa as one and upgrade the Africa-EU political dialogue to enable a strong and sustainable continent-to-continent partnership, with the AU and the EU at the centre.”<sup>364</sup>

As a result of the collaboration, the architecture of the joint peace operation covers various levels such as, providing funding through the African Peace Facility to support the operational and institutional capacity, or direct commitment peacekeeping mission.

First of all, the efficacy of the operational and institutional capacity support can be evaluated in connection with the establishment and the funding provided for the following structures:

- African Stand-by Force; it is organised with police, civilian and military.
- The APSA, African peace and security architecture

<sup>362</sup> Aning, Kwesi and F. Danso, Kwaku. EU and AU Operations in Africa: Lessons Learned and Future Scenarios. An African Perspective. Istituto Affari Internazionali, May 2010: 50.

<sup>363</sup> Ivi, p. 47.

<sup>364</sup> The Africa -EU Partnership A Joint Africa-EU Strategy  
[EAS2007\\_joint\\_strategy\\_en.pdf](#) **STRATEGIC 2007.**

- The continental warning system
- Support for the establishment of the REC, regional economic community and the RIPS, regional indicative programmes.

Secondly, its objectives are defined as follow :

- planning and technical assistance;
- additional military observers;
- training and evaluation of African troops;
- support to African training center;
- mediation activities through dialogue;
- development of roadmap.

The African Peace Fund is designed to cover peacekeeping expenditures such as : soldiers' per diem allowances; communications equipment; medical facilities; civilian equipment; transport and logistics. We note that, the APF is not permitted to cover military and arms expenditure.<sup>365</sup> The following table provides recent contribution of EU contribution for peace and security.

Operationalisation of the APSA (continental and regional), dialogue and challenge on peace	€65 million
Contribution to AFP under the 9 <sup>th</sup> EDF	€7.5 million
Support for the establishment of EWS in Central Africa	€4 million
Futher support to Central Africa for peace and security	€15 million

Table 6. EU contribution to peace operation<sup>366</sup>

Moreover, the EU finances the ongoing African peace mission in Darfur. “While the EU did not engage in intense crisis management operations in Darfur, the organisation, together with its member states, contributed some €500M (€300M from the APF, and €200M from individual EU member states) to the AMIS, from its commencement in 2004 until the mission was personnel costs including salaries, allowances, insurance, travel, rations and medical costs; communications equipment; political support to the

<sup>365</sup> Ivi, p.52.

<sup>366</sup> Assessment of Joint Africa-EU Strategy structures, modalities and follow-up Mechanisms, Assessment report, (9 Oct. 2009 FINAL, as endorsed by JTF).

Darfur peace talks (leading to the DPA); and the Ceasefire Commission. EU support to the AMIS also came in the form of planning and technical assistance to AMIS levels of command, provision of additional military observers, training of African troops, provision of strategic and tactical airlifts and support for the civil police (CIPOL) component of AMS.”<sup>367</sup>

Giving the details that appears above, we can conclude that the EU and African partners choose to focus in Peace and security matter as an element which can favour the future of the partnership.

This fact can be understood as a relevant contribution to the United Nations agenda which states that, “collective security today depends on accepting that the threats each region of the world perceives as most urgent are in fact equally so for all. These are not theoretical issues, but ones of deadly urgency.”<sup>368</sup>

As the first partner of African countries in the matter of peace and security, this transitional period, can be the occasion to give an impetus to African mission so that there can be increasingly competitiveness.

The ECOWAS is an example which shows that, this challenge can be affordable in the future. The regional organisation provides 80%<sup>369</sup> of its peacekeeping operations budget which is provided by taxes.

We close this paragraph by considering that, the global comment on EU an AU common peacekeeping missions seems to show that, “the EU is the best placed regional body to lean on the international effort to support African endeavours in establishing peace and security. The EU possesses the administrative and technical capacity as well as the

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367 Aning, Kwesi and F. Danso, Kwaku. EU and AU Operations in Africa: Lessons Learned and Future Scenarios. An African Perspective. Istituto Affari Internazionali, May 2010: 54-55

368 Koffi, Annan. In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, 2005: 3

369 Assessment of Joint Africa-EU Strategy structures, modalities and follow-up Mechanisms, Assessment report, (9 Oct. 2009 FINAL, as endorsed by JTF).

political clout and reputation necessary for the task. In practice, the EU has already taken the leading role through the Lisbon Treaty, which includes the.”<sup>370</sup>

Further paragraphs will add the shortcomings of the joint mission on the ground.

In the previous chapter we developed the role of regional arrangement which is considered by the partnerships as one of the pillars of the peace and security matter in Africa. “One of the major advantages of regional integration is the strengthening of peace and security in a given region. The more nations interact with each other in pursuit of common goals, the less likely they are to engage in armed conflict against each other. Moreover, as regional groupings, they have more capacity than individual states to deal effectively with internal conflicts, which are more frequent in Africa than interstate conflicts. Thus, the current AU security agenda stands to benefit positively from the historical reconstruction of the pan-African project under the African Union. In 2002, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was transformed into the African Union.”<sup>371</sup>

In the same line, democracy, governance and human rights is connected to the matter of peace and security. It is hardly thinkable that, failed states can promote values lie to human rights and human security.

Therefore, the EU cooperation with African countries in the matters of peace and security often include attention for the post- reconstruction of democratic institutions, especially through fair elections.

The JAES report assessment stresses that, “2009 has seen a significant reinforcement of cooperation in the area of election observation, including consultations on the ground between AU and EU Election Observation Missions (EOMs), support to the AU's Electoral Assistance Fund (€1 m), AU observers' participation in EU Parliamentary elections in June 2009 and their training in EU Election Observation missions. Capacity building for election observation is also an area of cooperation between the EC and

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370 Vines, Alex. G8 and EU Support to African Efforts in Peace and Security A European Perspective, Istituto Affari Internazionali, May 2010: 106.

371 Nzungu-Ntalaja, Georges. Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa: Implementing a New Africa-EUPartnership. An African Perspective. Istituto Affari Internazionali, May 2010: 15-16.

RECs such as in the case of ECCAS MS.”<sup>372</sup>

Actually, except few countries, over the African continent, election are organised.<sup>373</sup> Globally, what can be noticed is the implication of the election process for the future of African countries. Progressively, It seems difficult to envisaged the African countries with the past authoritarian regimes.

The commitment of the EU diplomacy in political dialogue aims at preventing such shortfalls. Political dialogue is classified in the top of the European and partnership agenda. In the past few month relevant discussion was made in the following area:

- In April 2009 Africa-EU Civil Society Human Rights dialogue tackled critical issues such as torture and the freedom of association.
- An EU-AU ambassador-level Troika coordination meeting was held to discuss the possibility of joint positions before the 11th session of the Human Rights Council.
- The joint Africa-EU round-table on women and conflict (UNSCR 1325 and 1820) was held in New York on 27 February 2009.
- The EU side presented a paper proposing areas and formats of enhanced cooperation in international fora.<sup>374</sup>

As a result of the commitment in the joint political dialogue, we can hypothesize that, it contributes to encourage some African countries which where reluctant to Join the APRM and to accept the process. The number of countries have increased and the EU provides (€ 2.5 billion) for the support of it secretary.

### *5.2.2. EU contribution for the MDGs goals*

The MDGs agenda absorbes the highest European contribution for human security. The funding includes a number of wide initiatives which encompass food security, agriculture, health, education MDGs and they seem to be the more critical area of the partnerships.

Despite the determination of the partnership to eradicate poverty by providing basic

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<sup>372</sup> Assessment of Joint Africa-EU Strategy structures, modalities and follow-up Mechanisms, Assessment report, (9 Oct. 2009 FINAL, as endorsed by JTF).

<sup>373</sup> The recent election were organised in guinea and Ivory coast.

<sup>374</sup> Ibidem.

social service, the implementation and the coordination of the action for these matters in 53 countries is a challenge. For instance it remains difficult to keep inform and update all initiatives and activities.<sup>375</sup>

However, the JEAs provides the amount of the EU contribution for the MDGs goals in Africa.

Food security	€1 billion
Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme( CAADP)	€5 from EC and €5 million from Netherlands
Strengthening of regional farmers' organisations in East, West, Central and Southern Africa through a project that started in early 2009	€5 million
Contribution to the realisation of the MDGs through the 7 <sup>th</sup> Framework Programme (FP7) and its international cooperation on health research.	€121 million
Contribution to education for all 2007-2009	€32.1 million
Supports to others MDGs initiatives	€1,8 million

Table 7. <sup>376</sup> EU contribution for the MDGs goals in Africa.

In the view of the amount above, it can be useful to quest the impact of the contribution in terms of development assessment.

In the past few years, the GDP of many countries shows positive signs (annexe II) even if, this result is the interaction between a broad number of intervention such as the will of some African countries to address the development issue.

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<sup>375</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>376</sup> Ibidem.

### 5.2.3. *Institutional aspects*

The institutional aspect of the partnership can be considered as too descriptive and technical to find space in our issue. On one hand, it is interesting to observe that, the elements we recall in favour of the future of the European and African partnership is rooted in a strong institutional organisation. On the other hand, the assessment of the institutional aspect can give an overview of the difference that can be drawn with other African partners (China, Japan, Brasil, India etc.)

The Heads of State and Government meet every three years. The last summit held in Sirte in Libya is a positive point in terms of prevision. Concerning the substance of the discussion, commentators identified key issues to be addressed by the Heads of State during the summit: reform forms of governance, infrastructure projects, food security to climate change, renewable energy, MDGs, the disparity between the two partners, the lack of coherence between the different positions of EU member states, new agreements on climate change etc.<sup>377</sup> Criticism often highlight the rhetoric of these summit which use to focus on global and general matter hardly achievable.<sup>378</sup> The conclusion of the third UE and AU summit did not bring significant difference. The general trend of the debate can be draw in the following lines.

“Our partnership should guide the transformations the world needs: tackle the effects of climate change, conflict prevention, good governance, achieve a sustainable energy market including investment particularly in renewable energy resources, develop infrastructure, provide food security, achieve the Millennium Development Goals, combat HIV/AIDS, etc. To flourish, private investment needs, a transparent and well-governed business environment, partnerships with the public sector, better productivity, social protection of workers both in formal and informal economies, etc. We recognize the equally important dimension of regional integration for growth and development and commit to conclude Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) that support socio-economic development, regional integration and the integration of Africa into the global economy. Peace and security remain a cornerstone of our cooperation.”<sup>379</sup>

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377 Miranda. Valerie, Ue e Africa in cerca di un nuovo equilibrio, AffarInternazionali UE UA Summit

378 Ibidem

379 Tripoli Declaration after the 3rd Africa EU Summit <http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/news/tripoli-declaration-after-3rd-africa-eu-summit>

However, referring to the chapter IV, the Head of States Summit is the result of Ministerial Troika meetings as well as the Joint Expert Groups, which review and monitor the implementation of the Joint Strategy in different levels with the involvement of experts and senior officials. On one hand, the EU Troika consists of EU Presidency turn, the European Commission, and its Council Secretariat, on the other hand, for the African countries, the Troika consists of the Presidencies of the AU and the AU Commission, as well as the “chef de file” countries at the expert and senior official levels.

To close this institutional aspect, we note that, civil society and ONG are believed to be the Non-state partners which can favour the future of the partnership.

#### *5.2.4. Funding*

The second part of this paragraph aims at focusing on elements which can disfavour or postpone the future of the EU and African partnership.

Since the initiation of the partnership, the first limit to the implementation of its agenda lies on financial problems. Finance seems to be the “problematic issues ” of the joint partnership. We resume in the following line some arguments related to this matter. “In 2007-2008, the issue of financing the architecture of the Partnership was not addressed. Consequently, even whereas many Member States on the African side have expressed interest in actively participating in the JEGs and have designated competent experts based on their respective capitals, the participation of such experts in JEG meetings have remained a difficulty due to the problem of financing. As a first measure, a decision was taken recently to finance the cost of participation of the African experts in JEG meetings from the US\$ 1 million available for the Africa-EU Dialogue (from the EC-financed 55 million Euro support programme in the AU Commission’s 2009 Budget). Both sides should work together to find more sustainable answers to finance the functioning of the architecture.”<sup>380</sup>

This shortcomings take all his sense if we considered that, “poverty will not be

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<sup>380</sup> Assessment of Joint Africa-EU Strategy structures, modalities and follow-up Mechanisms, Assessment report, (9 Oct. 2009 FINAL, as endorsed by JTF)



eradicated through slogans and target dates adopted by multilateral agencies or international conferences.”<sup>381</sup>

In addition, relevant comment have been made in the field of African peacekeeping operation. “Even if progress has been made by establishing the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), this structure is up against challenges due to the lack of funding and inadequate human resource capacity for its peace missions. For instance, the African Union Peace Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and African Union Peace Mission in Sudan (AMIS) have shown the limitations of the AU’s capacity to conduct peacekeeping operations”<sup>382</sup> especially related to finance.

Moreover, African countries feel that specific funding has not gone beyond the theoretical stage. Therefore, they are not prepared to commit additional human resources for the joint partnership process unless there is clarity about the funding. Another side of the financial problem is that, the global financial crisis could make partners more reluctant to contribute additional funds. Yet there does seem to be some recognition that the responsibility for funding does not rely exclusively on the European side.<sup>383</sup>

The disturbing character of the global crisis seems to exacerbate the financial problem. As the global supranational international organisation design to carry out the new principles of human rights and human security such as international solidarity, social justice, equal participation, the United Nations has organised an international conference to address the root of the global crisis<sup>384</sup> which is believed to affect a wide number of States as well as people all over the world.

We found an interpretation and the consequence of the past financial crisis in the world.

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381 Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges. Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa: Implementing a New Africa-EUPartnership. An African Perspective. Istituto Affari Internazionali, May 2010: 25.

382 Juma Mulanda. Report of the Conference “Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa: Implementing the New Africa-EU Partnership and Developing Cooperation in De-mining and Disarmament”, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, 7-9 October 2009 in Istituto Affari Internazionali, May 2010: 108.

383 Beyond Structures? Reflections on the Implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. [www.ecdpm.org/dp87](http://www.ecdpm.org/dp87).

384 Recommendations by the Commission of Experts of the President of the General Assembly on reforms of the international monetary and financial system, Sixty-third sessions mAgenda item 48, March 2009.

[http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/commission/financial\\_commission.shtml](http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/commission/financial_commission.shtml).

It is certainly premature to draw a conclusion in connection with the current crisis. What seems to be useful for the EU and African partnership future, is to root as more as possible in the stark reality to prevent or to minimise the disturbing characters of the crisis because the “Past economic crises have had a disproportionate adverse impact on the poor, who are least able to bear these costs and that can have consequences long after the crisis is over.”<sup>385</sup>

History of the international relation<sup>386</sup> shows that the past financial crisis shifted the geopolitics, the geo-economics as well the social structure of the world.<sup>387</sup> They have shared some common characteristics.

loose of monetary policy;

inadequate regulation;

lax supervision interacted to create financial instability;

the results were manifested in the large global imbalances.<sup>388</sup>

social conflicts.

The crisis has an indirect effect on the African countries even if the future of the partnership is not yet in question.

In the last UE and AU summit, the European partner reaffirms the commitment to increase the aid spending in order to reach the collective target of 0.7% of Gross National Income by 2015. It seems useful to note that, the global crisis can disfavour or postpone this agenda.

To summarise the crisis impact, “more generally, the current crisis has exposed deficiencies in the policies of some national authorities and international institutions

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<sup>385</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>386</sup> Arrighi, Giovanni. J.Silver. *Caos e governo del mondo: come cambiano le egemonie e gli equilibri planetary*. Paravia Bruno Mondadori Editori, 2003.

<sup>387</sup> ( the Britain crisis in the XIX century and United States crisis in the XX century).

<sup>388</sup> Recommendations by the Commission of Experts of the President of the General Assembly on reforms of the international monetary and financial system, Sixty-third sessions mAgenda item 48, March 2009,

[http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/commission/financial\\_commission.shtml](http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/commission/financial_commission.shtml).

based on previously fashionable economic doctrines, which held that unfettered markets are, on their own, quickly self-correcting and efficient. Globalization too was constructed on these flawed hypotheses; and while it has brought benefits to many, it has also enabled defects in one economic system to spread quickly around the world, bringing recessions and impoverization even to developing countries that have developed good regulatory frameworks, created effective monetary institutions, and succeeded in implementing sound fiscal policies.”<sup>389</sup>

Once again, the United Nations already provides the guidelines for the global reflexion as the recommendations by the Commission of Experts of the President of the General Assembly on reforms of the international monetary and financial system shows.

In the basis of the assessment of the International Labour Organization, unemployment can rise in 2009 compared to 2007. It can move to 30 million to reach more than 50 million if conditions continue to deteriorate. Moreover, some 200 million people, mostly in developing economies, unless poverty rapid action is taken to counter the impact of the crisis on developing countries. Even in some developed countries, millions of households are faced with the threat of losing their homes and access to health care, while economic insecurity and anxiety is increasing.<sup>390</sup>

The future of the partnership could gain in terms of prevision if such aspect can be integrated in the financial request of African countries by considering that, EU seems to be perceived primarily as a fund from which to draw money.<sup>391</sup>

Therefore, in the field of peace and security, “the inadequacy of AU capabilities and resources in addressing peace and security issues, and the need for material support from the EU, risks compromising the view of the EU and Africa as equal partners. Thus, to ensure a partnership of equals it is necessary to move away from the language of support and create a partnership founded on mutual interests rather than funding alone.

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389 Recommendations by the Commission of Experts of the President of the General Assembly on reforms of the international monetary and financial system, Sixty-third sessions mAgenda item 48, March 2009,

[http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/commission/financial\\_commission.shtml](http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/commission/financial_commission.shtml)

390 Ibidem.

391 Miranda, Valerie. Ue e Africa in cerca di un nuovo equilibrio, AffarInternazionali UE UA Summit.

Support should therefore be seen as an entry, and not an exit, strategy.”<sup>392</sup>

In terms of prevision African countries, with the support of ILO<sup>393</sup> attempt to provide a solution to address some aspects of the international crisis. In 2009, the African Union Commission Labour and Social Affairs Commission (LSAC) draw the roadmap for Productivity in Africa, the guidelines for Social Dialogue and a Programme on upgrading the Informal Economy. The framework focuses on the Four Year Priority Programme actions to improve on the labour market.<sup>394</sup>

Alongside the financial problem, other constraints can be underlined.<sup>395</sup>

African officials have a multiple of interested potential partners and Europeans also have other policy frameworks to invest in.

Common European and African positions take time to develop and solidify.

Both the European Commission and the African Union Commission have had to initially cajole the EU and the AU member states to joint the partnerships.

There is a critical lack of awareness of existence, let alone its substance, architecture, processes and recent achievements. Also, it is difficult to hold a dialogue of equals without both parties enjoying equal access to knowledge on the JAES.

Much of the information produced are not accessible to those who need it. Consequently, some member states will wait until they see progress before deciding to engage fully.

There has been a distinct lack of clarity, continuity and direction from the main institutional partners about how civil society and parliaments could actually engage with the strategy and its action plan.

The common coordination of peace meeting in the field rise limit such as division of labour.

African institutions, their human resources and the nature of the integration process do not mirror those in the European Union.

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392 Juma Mulanda. Report of the Conference “Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa: Implementing the New Africa-EU Partnership and Developing Cooperation in De-mining and Disarmament”, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, 7-9 October 2009 in Istituto Affari Internazionali, May 2010: 112.

393 International Labour Organisation.

394 Assessment of Joint Africa-EU Strategy structures, modalities and follow-up Mechanisms, Assessment report, (9 Oct. 2009 FINAL, as endorsed by JTF)

395 Beyond Structures? Reflections on the Implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, 2009: 28-31 [www.ecdpm.org/dp87](http://www.ecdpm.org/dp87)

In the view of the different elements we exposed above, how can we prospect the EU and African partnership? The JAES assessment already provides the first approach by enhancing the positive aspect of the cooperation “More than two thirds of the 24 activities agreed in the three priority actions of the first Action Plan have now been launched. Significant progress has been made in many partnerships, while others are at an advanced stage. The political dialogue intensified remarkably: regular consultations on crisis and conflicts and operational and strategic discussions on country situations are held as required under the circumstances.”<sup>396</sup>

The commitment of the EU and the AU in the process seems to have reached a point of “no return” for the common interest of the two partners as well as for their citizens. However, the partnership has to deal with a wide number of challenges, “they are concerned in particular that dialogue is going to ‘replace’ development cooperation, and that the JAES doesn’t really provide the framework to address the major contentious issues between Europe and Africa in terms of the Economic Partnership Agreements. Or that it is an attempt by Europe solely to counter the rise of China and other emerging actors in Africa. In Europe, there is concern about Africa’s real ability to make the JAES or any policy process work and the motivation of African states and the AU to engage in critical and difficult dialogue where the subtext isn’t financial resources. While this mutual wariness is the so-called ‘elephant in the room’, it is this that often underpins the nature of EU-Africa dialogue, and for the JAES it is no different. Those involved in the JAES from both European and African sides will have to overcome this through action if they are to make it a success. This does not necessarily mean that common ground must be found on all issues but rather that a robust dialogue promotes understanding and respect between Europe and Africa, and also of the different positions within Europe and Africa. In this regard, the JAES must in some way contribute to the transformation of the dialogue rather than reinvent the past.”<sup>397</sup>

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396 Assessment of Joint Africa-EU Strategy structures, modalities and follow-up Mechanisms, Assessment report, (9 Oct. 2009 FINAL, as endorsed by JTF)

397 Beyond Structures? Reflections on the Implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, 2009: 28. [www.ecdpm.org/dp87](http://www.ecdpm.org/dp87).

### **5.3. African and EU interest and the partnership**

The common objectives enhanced by the partnership is to work together to promote peace and security for European and African citizens. For this matter, common exchange in various issues and levels with stockholders is organised.

Over the time, the significance and implication of the common interest have changed to root in the new international agenda. The common interest of the European and African countries is in connection with the aspect of international solidarity as an element of international cooperation. In reference to our main question, if the two partners focus their attention on international solidarity in order to achieve the common interest of their citizens, then it can be useful to find out the main characteristics that the relationship should present in the future, to contribute to the new “culture of collective security and people’s security.”<sup>398</sup>

Along side the notion of common interest, principles of equality, ownership in connection with the matter of civil society, democratic institution, media are important to ensure the implementation. Equality is recalled in the joint strategy as one of the basis of the European and African partnership.

To be able to challenges the issue of the common interest in the global level, experiences seems to show that, it is necessary to couple economic capability as well as human resources. The problem is that, African countries lack the means to speak equally with its partners both European countries and others (Asian countries and Brasil). A permanent state of marginalisation believed to nurture, tensions and this can be a threat for the EU and African partnership

African countries will certainly gain to enter the arena of international decisions to safeguard their interest and gain the interest of their partners. The first step has been made by South-Africa. “In the G20, South Africa is the only member from Africa. The

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<sup>398</sup> Papisca, Antonio. Mascia, Marco. Le relazioni internazionale nell’era dell’indipendenza e dei diritti umani, Padova, Cedam, 2004.

AU remains an invitee only, at the discretion of the G20 Presidency, and thus does not enjoy the privileges of the EU in this international forum. The immediate concern over the G20 is that low income countries, including the African ones, will remain marginalised. There is no guarantee that Africa will have more of a voice or that its problems will receive greater attention than before.”<sup>399</sup>

Equality also means that, African countries should find alternative sources to finance their development roadmap. For sceptic commentators, it is out of way of the African countries because “Without sufficient income and political structures which are responsive to their needs, people cannot meet their minimum nutritional requirements, pay school fees for their children, and ensure for themselves and their families access to a healthy environment – an environment that includes primary health care (PHC), clean water and decent housing. Failure to meet these needs leads to greater social deprivation and therefore reinforces poverty. Failure to transform agriculture and other economic activities in rural areas through education, training and agricultural extension and credit programs has meant a relative lack of innovations in production tools, methods and techniques, low productivity and the reproduction of poverty.”<sup>400</sup>

As a consequence, it seems impossible for African countries to ensure development through additional tax. However, some African elites sustain the contrary. The African Development Bank’s President (AFDB), Donald Kaberuka called African countries to reduce aid dependency and explore alternative sources of development. He affirms that, Africa’s development can be driven by well organised private sector and he makes the following suggestions:

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399 Juma Mulanda. Report of the Conference “Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa: Implementing the New Africa-EU Partnership and Developing Cooperation in De-mining and Disarmament”, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, 7-9 October 2009 in Istituto Affari Internazionali, May 2010: 116.

400 Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges. Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa: Implementing a New Africa-EUPartnership. An African Perspective. Istituto Affari Internazionali, May 2010: 26.

Africans should build effective administrations.

Raise their own revenues to finance their own needs.

Become more accountable to taxpayers for their performance.

Build stronger economic integration across the continent.

Be able to compete in the arena of global economy.

Following this, African countries should change the philosophy of aid, by considering it as a means which can be progressively put out of business.<sup>401</sup> We recall that, private sector is believed to be the basis of the NEPAD programme.

In addition to this comment, the African new institutions is often based on the leadership of African heads of state and some of whom are no longer in power.<sup>402</sup>

Africans can learn from the partnership with European countries that the breach of division needs to be seriously addressed to serve the common interest of the partners. Moreover speak with one voice can favour their position in the international arena even if it seems to be a holistic approach.

In the line of international solidarity, it is well known that, when domestic issues such as regional arrangements are competitive, then it can be more easy for single States to afford external challenge. For instance referring to European countries, the financial crisis originated in the United States in 2008, which has spread to become a world economic crisis have found a common internal response of European countries. The EU endorsed the responsibility to save the Greece and recently Ireland from bail- out. In this field, a range of lessons can learned about what means interest international solidarity, shared responsibility to ensure “collective and people security.”

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401From Aid to Development Effectiveness – AfDB Advocates Paradigm Shift  
<http://www.afdb.org/en/news-events/article/from-aid-to-development-effectiveness/>

402 Juma Mulanda. Report of the Conference “Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa: Implementing the New Africa-EU Partnership and Developing Cooperation in De-mining and Disarmament”, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, 7-9 October 2009 in Istituto Affari Internazionali, May 2010: 117.



The principle of ownership lie on the capability for the two partners to involve their citizens in the implementation of their programme. The basis is that, the more the citizens are committed, the more they human and financial resource can be mobilised. Following this, it seems essential for African countries to mobilise their citizens along side their new institutions namely AU and NEPAD. If the aim of the partnership is the interest of the citizens, then, African countries should overcome critics about lack of civil society participation. Once again, the Western partners already build a guidelines of what can be done.

Europeans have a “citizenship”, the Erasmus programme to involve their students, the European Ombudsman to defend the interest of European etc. In a nut shell, there is a range of privilege in connection with European citizens aim at making single members of state feeling “European.” One question for African elites can be: how can it be possible to make Africans feeling “African” in order to encourage their commitment for development and to joint the implementation of the partnership.

Actually, the immediate challenge seems to lie on the abrasive issue of financial capability. Is it possible to maintain the discourse of ownership whilst depending on financial aid?

## CONCLUSION

Various contribution have provided consensus in defining human security issue. As we stressed in the introduction, the main concern of this research is to underline some aspects of human security in the European and African partnership. The data suggest that, it is possible to use different approaches to have a comprehensive vision of the issue.

Our main question focuses on the relation between human security and international cooperation with the purpose to underline that “the cause of larger freedom can only be advanced by broad, deep and sustained global cooperation among States.”<sup>403</sup> Following this, we lay emphasis on tree aspects of international cooperation; national security, trade and international solidarity.<sup>404</sup>

The first step of the EU and AU partnership was dominated by the concept of national security. The relation progressively move on the field of the new international principles which focuses on people’s security, human rights and human security etc.<sup>405</sup> The United Nations has built a link of international solidarity aim at achieving this international agenda.

The European and African countries collaborate to implement a common agenda through various initiatives which are strongly rooted in the international agenda. After a decade overlap by successes and failures, the partnership seems to have found it path in the Joint African and European Strategy.

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy changed the nature of the partnership between European and African countries. It has the ambition to “move away from a traditional relationship and forge a real partnership characterised by equality and the pursuit of common

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403 Koffi, Annan. In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All. <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom>.

404 Papisca, Antonio. Mascia, Marco. Le relazioni internazionale nell’era dell’indipendenza e dei diritti umani, Padova, Cedam, 2004.

405 Ibidem.

objectives.”<sup>406</sup>

The question of political conditionalities which were introduced in the aftermath of the Cold War was among the problematic issue which characterised the partnership for a decade. A large number of African countries were reluctant to join the new approaches of the Common European Foreign Policy standard, which purpose were to share in the responsibility for a global security in building a better world.<sup>407</sup>

However, they were compelled by financial need and the United Nations Agenda. Further, African countries have set out new institutions (NEPAD and the African constitutive act and regional community) which are believed to provide Africa with political, economic roadmaps and vision for the future.<sup>408</sup> Moreover, African institutions share the new principles enshrined by the United Nations which are based on human security, human rights, democracy, rules of law, governance and the primary of people's security.

The basis of human security is that, non violent threats (poverty, diseases, natural disasters etc.) kill more people than violent conflicts. Therefore, the European and African countries have choose to strengthen their partnership in this matter through international solidarity which became the central tenets of the EU strategy in Africa.<sup>409</sup>

Despite the painful aspect of political conditionalities which began in the aftermath of the Cold War, it seems to have carried out tangible results.

The European and African countries seems to have found the basis of their Joint partnership on political issues whilst, less present in some technical issues.<sup>410</sup> The partnership is pervaded by a culture of dialogue with aim at promoting transparency,

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<sup>406</sup> The Africa-EU Partnership A Joint Africa-EU Strategy. <http://ec.europa.eu/development/2007>.

<sup>407</sup> A Secure Europe in a Better World European Security Strategy Brussels, 12 December 2003, [www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf).

<sup>408</sup> Commissione Delle Comunità Europeo. Comunicazione Della Commissione Al Consiglio, Al Parlamento Europeo E Al Comitato Economico E Sociale Europeo, Strategia dell'Unione europea per l'Africa: verso un patto euroafricano per accelerare lo sviluppo dell'Africa, {SEC(2005)1255}, Bruxelles, 12.10.2005.

<sup>409</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>410</sup> Beyond Structures? Reflections on the Implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy [www.ecdpm.org/dp87](http://www.ecdpm.org/dp87).

fight against corruption, money laundering, terrorism. It also enhance human rights, equal opportunities and the protection of the vulnerable groups, especially women.<sup>411</sup>

In opposite to the European Foreign Policy, new African partners such as China, Brasil, India, Japan seems to focus their attention alongside technical issues.

The inroad of the new partners has shifted the strategic position of African countries because it introduces “non conditionalities” as the criteria for the partnership. Sensitive issues such as peace, security, democracy, governance are out of the debate. One question is that, how can technical issue will be implemented whilst political violence is maintained through lies, propaganda, violence and civil war.<sup>412</sup> One example can be that the international community is worrying because the Ivory Coast<sup>413</sup> slide back into violence after election dispute. France said it might intervene to protect its considerable economic interests along with the French community.

Dispute election are common case in Africa as the recent case in Ivory Coast shows. “African leaders who foolishly refused to accede to popular demands for democracy only did so at their own peril and the destruction of their countries.”<sup>414</sup>

Over the time, the European and African partnership have mobilised financial and human resources to prevent regional instability. Unfortunately, the process is always challenge by incumbent president which refuse to stand down after losing election. The case of Ivory Coast seems to show that European and African countries have made enormous progress over the past decade in strengthening their position in matter of democracy and election. The EU and AU have move alongside a common position to

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411 Commissione Delle Comunità Europeo. Comunicazione Della Commissione Al Consiglio, Al Parlamento Europeo E Al Comitato Economico E Sociale Europeo, Strategia dell'Unione europea per l'Africa: verso un patto euroafricano per accelerare lo sviluppo dell'Africa, {SEC(2005)1255}, Bruxelles, 12.10.2005.

412 Ihonvbere O, Julius. Pan- Africanism: Agenda for African Unity in 1990? Akeya Agbango, Georges. Issues and trends in contemporary African politics: Stability, development and democratization, Peter Lang Publishing, Inc, New York 2003.

413 Ivory Coast is the world's largest cocoa producer.

414 Ayittey, Georges. Obstacles to African development in Akeya Agbango, Georges. Issues and trends in contemporary African politics: Stability, development and democratization, Peter Lang Publishing, Inc, New York 2003: 328.

condemn the incumbent and they join the United Nations position which believed that “Humanity will not enjoy security without development, it will not enjoy development without security, and it will not enjoy either without respect for human rights.”<sup>415</sup>

As a result, the Ivory Coast crisis will test the capability of the European and African partnership to achieve the joint agenda. How persuasive can be the common sanction of European and African countries?

Furthermore, European countries face resistance of some EU members when it comes in the matter of financial support to African countries. Sceptic commentators found their arguments on the remaining few example of incumbent regimes which “adamantly refused to reform their abominable systems and resorted to tricks and manipulation of the electoral process to maintain their grip on power.”<sup>416</sup>

It is also interesting to note that, civil-society organisations are involved as experts in the European and African partnership. As non state members the commitment of the CSOs is designed to give different views from those of state members. For this matters, the European and African countries have decided:

to establish mechanisms for closer cooperation and dialogue between the PAP (Pan-African Parliament) and the EP (European parliament) as well as between the AU, AU/ ECOSOCC and the EESC<sup>417</sup> to map existing European and African civil-society networks;

- to organise a platform (EARN) for European and African research institutes and think-tanks to provide independent policy advice;
- to facilitate consultations with CSOs ahead of key policy decisions;
- to invite representatives from civil society in Europe and Africa to express themselves ahead of the Ministerial troika meetings;
- to establish joint expert groups on all priority actions identified in the Action Plan in which CSOs can participate.<sup>418</sup>

In addition civil-society organisations have believed to attract the attention of

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415 Koffi, Annan. In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All. <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom>.

416 Ivi, p. 327.

417 European Economic and Social Committee.

418 Beyond Structures? Reflections on the Implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy [www.ecdpm.org/dp87](http://www.ecdpm.org/dp87).

international community alongside abrasive issues such as human rights, governance, elections etc.

Despite a range of challenges, the European and African partnership is moving forward. In the issue of peace and security, the partnership has build a comprehensive and integrated framework which focus on priority action and prevision.

One example is that it enhances dialogue; A Joint AU PSC and EU PSC meetings will be held on an annual basis. A Joint evaluation missions to CAR<sup>419</sup>, Burundi, Comoros, and Somalia was made in 2009. In December 2009, an African SALW Strategy was developed. In the same line, the modalities to engage African experts in the field of SALW by a joint workshop on eradication of ERW was organised.<sup>420</sup>

Moreover, the Joint peace security partnership is sustained by the United Nations which African countries consider as a model. In the basis of this consideration, the rapprochement between EU-UN-AU in the matter of peacekeeping operation seems to have gave a relevant impetus to the European and African partnership. This can suggest that the “triangle dialogue” EU-UN-AU should be experienced with the seven JAEs partnerships:

Democratic governance and human rights.

Trade, regional integration and infrastructure.

MDGs.

Energy.

Climate change.

Migration, mobility and employment.

Science, information society and space.

The commitment of the United Nations in the partnership seems to be useful to

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419 Central Africa Republic.

420 Beyond Structures? Reflections on the Implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy  
[www.ecdpm.org/dp87](http://www.ecdpm.org/dp87).

harmonise various solution to African woes which seem to suffer a high number of intervention (EU, Russia, China, Japan, India, Brasil etc.)

The conclusion is not a lieu to call to minds the critics that have been mentioned in the previous chapters; we found better to consider that the success of the partnership “does not necessarily mean that common ground must be found on all issues but rather that a robust dialogue promotes understanding and respect between Europe and Africa, and also of the different positions within Europe and Africa. In this regard, the JAES must in some way contribute to the transformation of the dialogue rather than reinvent the past.”<sup>421</sup>

Concerning dialogue, the European Union has intensified the process in relation with the uprisings in Mediterranean countries.

The cause of the revolt is believed to stem from conditions of lack of freedom and democracy with nurture frustrations and social tensions. Moreover, it is useful to mention that, the desperate act of a Tunisian<sup>422</sup> derided in his rights and dignity because of misery has become the symbol of Arab spring. Therefore, the question of daily basic need as the precondition to insure human beings' dignity is the challenge of human security matter. Furthermore, these revolution<sup>423</sup> has raised the abrasive issue of democracy and fair election in Mediterranean countries. The scale of the revolt shows that, authoritarian regime which are characterised by asphyxiation of human rights nurture inequity and frustrations. For this matter, the European Union already put the cause of democracy in the top of his agenda with Mediterranean countries ahead of migration problems and energy interest. Financial incentive will be allocated to sustain those who engage in political reforms. The issue of democracy, state reform and good governance is among the priority of the joint EU-AU strategy. On the one hand, some countries have deliberately decided to ignore these point of the joint agenda. On the other hand, the widespread of revolt seems to show that aspiration for freedom and dignity is universal.


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421 Ibidem

422 Mohamed Bouazizi immolate itself in December 2010 by fire as a sign of protest against the harassment of misery and humiliation.

423 Tunisia, Egypt, Libya.

**ANNEX 1**  
**THE DEVASTATING IMPACT OF DEBT**  
**ON THE POOR COUNTRIES<sup>424</sup>**



- SILIC: Severely indebted low-income country (or HIPC: Highly indebted poor country)
- SIMIC: Severely indebted middle-income country MILIC: Moderately indebted low-income country\_MILIC

424 [www.globalissues.org/article/225](http://www.globalissues.org/article/225).



## **ANNEXE 2**

### **ACP COUNTRIES MEMBERS**

#### African members

Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa.

#### Caribbean members

Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Martinique, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Saint Barthélemy, Saint Martin, Turks and Caicos Islands.

#### Pacific members

Cook Islands, Federal State of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Samoa, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.

### ANNEXE 3

#### GDP OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES (2009-2012)

Country	2009 GDP%	2010 GDP%	2011 GDP%	2012 GDP%
<u>Algeria</u>	2.1	3.7	3.9	4.2
<u>Angola</u>	0.2	9.3	8.4	5.4
<u>Benin</u>	3.8	3.0	5.7	6.0
<u>Botswana</u>	-10.3	4.1	8.5	13.8
<u>Burkina Faso</u>	3.5	4.1	5.3	6.0
<u>Burundi</u>	3.2	3.6	4.2	4.8
<u>Cameroon</u>	1.6	2.7	4.0	4.2
<u>Cape Verde</u>	3.5	4.0	6.6	6.6
<u>Central African Republic</u>	2.4	3.1	4.0	5.0
<u>Chad</u>	1.6	4.7	3.3	3.4
<u>Comoros</u>	1.0	1.5	2.5	3.5
<u>Congo, Democratic Republic of</u>	2.7	5.4	7.2	6.9
<u>Congo, Republic of</u>	7.4	12.2	7.0	1.8
<u>Côte d'Ivoire</u>	3.7	4.0	4.5	5.1
<u>Djibouti</u>	5.1	5.4	5.8	6.3
<u>Equatorial Guinea</u>	-5.4	-2.8	3.8	2.5
<u>Eritrea</u>	0.3	1.4	2.0	2.5
<u>Ethiopia</u>	7.5	7.0	8.0	7.5
<u>Gabon</u>	-1.0	2.6	4.7	3.6
<u>Gambia, The</u>	3.6	4.3	4.6	4.9
<u>Ghana</u>	4.5	5.0	22.5	7.1
<u>Guinea</u>	0.0	2.7	3.6	4.0
<u>Guinea-Bissau</u>	1.9	2.5	3.0	3.5
<u>Kenya</u>	2.5	4.0	5.0	6.3
<u>Lesotho</u>	-1.0	3.1	4.8	4.8
<u>Liberia</u>	4.9	6.3	9.2	12.8
<u>Madagascar</u>	-0.4	0.9	2.9	5.2
<u>Malawi</u>	5.9	4.6	3.2	3.2

Mali	4.1	4.5	4.8	5.0
Mauritania	2.3	4.7	5.7	13.1
Mauritius	2.1	2.0	4.7	4.2
Morocco	5.0	3.2	4.5	5.0
Mozambique	4.3	5.2	6.0	6.2
Namibia	-0.7	1.7	2.2	2.7
Niger	1.0	5.2	4.5	12.9
Nigeria	2.9	5.0	5.2	5.9
Rwanda	5.3	5.2	6.0	6.0
São Tomé and Príncipe	4.0	4.5	5.0	6.0
Senegal	1.5	3.4	4.4	4.8
Seychelles	-8.7	4.0	5.1	5.0
Sierra Leone	4.0	4.0	5.5	6.0
South Africa	-2.2	1.7	3.8	4.3
Sudan	4.0	5.5	4.8	4.3
Swaziland	0.4	2.6	3.1	2.6
Tanzania	5.0	5.6	6.7	7.5
Togo	2.4	2.6	4.0	4.0
Tunisia	3.0	4.0	5.0	5.6
Uganda	7.0	6.0	6.8	7.0
Zambia	4.5	5.0	5.5	6.0
Zimbabwe	3.7	6.0	6.0	6.0

**Source:** the global growth rate is estimated at 4%: world economic outlook <http://www.economywatch.com/economy-business-and-finance-news/economic-forecast-2009-2010-imf-raises-gdp-growth-expectations-09-7.html>

## **ANNEXE 4**

# **AFRICAN CHARTER ON DEMOCRACY, ELECTION AND GOVERNANCE**

### **Preamble**

We, the Member States of the African Union (AU);

Inspired by the objectives and principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the African Union, particularly Articles 3 and 4, which emphasise the significance of good governance, popular participation, the rule of law and human rights;

Recognising the contributions of the African Union and Regional Economic Communities to the promotion, nurturing, strengthening and consolidation of

democracy and governance;

Reaffirming our collective will to work relentlessly to deepen and consolidate the rule of law, peace, security and development in our countries;

Guided by our common mission to strengthen and consolidate institutions for good governance, continental unity and solidarity;

Committed to promote the universal values and principles of democracy, good governance, human rights and the right to development;

Cognizant of the historical and cultural conditions in Africa;

Seeking to entrench in the Continent a political culture of change of power based on the holding of regular, free, fair and transparent elections conducted by competent, independent and impartial national electoral bodies;

Concerned about the unconstitutional changes of governments that are one of the essential causes of insecurity, instability and violent conflict in Africa;

Determined to promote and strengthen good governance through the institutionalization of transparency, accountability and participatory democracy;

Convinced of the need to enhance the election observation missions in the role they play, particularly as they are an important contributory factor to ensuring the regularity, transparency and credibility of elections;

Desirous to enhance the relevant Declarations and Decisions of the OAU/AU (including the 1990 Declaration on the political and socio-economic situation in Africa and the fundamental changes taking place in the world, the 1995 Cairo Agenda for the Re-launch of Africa's Economic and Social Development, the 1999 Algiers Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government, the 2000 Lomé Declaration for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government, the 2002 OAU/AU Declaration on Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa, the 2003 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union);

Committed to implementing Decision EX.CL/Dec.31(III) adopted in Maputo, Mozambique, in July 2003 and Decision EX.CL/124(V) adopted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in May 2004

respectively, by the adoption of an African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance;  
Have agreed as follows:

## **Chapter 1**

### **Definitions**

Art. 1. In this Charter, unless otherwise stated, the following expressions shall have the following meaning:

“AU” means the African Union;

“African Human Rights Commission” means the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights;

“African Peer Review Mechanism” APRM means the African Peer Review Mechanism;

“Assembly” means the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union;

“Commission” means the Commission of the Union;

“Constitutive Act” means the Constitutive Act of the Union;

“Charter” means the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance;

“Member States” means the Member States of the African Union;

“National Electoral Body” means a competent authority, established by the relevant legal instruments of a State Party, responsible for organizing and supervising elections;

“NEPAD” means the New Partnership for Africa’s Development;

“Peace and Security Council” means the Peace and Security Council of the African Union;

“Regional Economic Communities” means the regional integration blocs of the African Union;

“State Party” means any Member State of the African Union which has ratified or acceded to this Charter and deposited the instruments for ratification or accession with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission;

“Union” means the African Union.

## **Chapter 2: Objectives**

**Art. 2.** The objectives of this Charter are to:

1. Promote adherence, by each State Party, to the universal values and principles of democracy and respect for human rights;

2. Promote and enhance adherence to the principle of the rule of law premised upon the respect for, and the supremacy of, the Constitution and constitutional order in the political arrangements of the State Parties;
3. Promote the holding of regular free and fair elections to institutionalize legitimate authority of representative government as well as democratic change of governments;
4. Prohibit, reject and condemn unconstitutional change of government in any Member State as a serious threat to stability, peace, security and development;
5. Promote and protect the independence of the judiciary;
6. Nurture, support and consolidate good governance by promoting democratic culture and practice, building and strengthening governance institutions and inculcating political pluralism and tolerance;
7. Encourage effective coordination and harmonization of governance policies amongst State Parties with the aim of promoting regional and continental integration;
8. Promote State Parties' sustainable development and human security;
9. Promote the fight against corruption in conformity with the provisions of the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption adopted in Maputo, Mozambique in July 2003;
10. Promote the establishment of the necessary conditions to foster citizen participation, transparency, access to information, freedom of the press and accountability in the management of public affairs;
11. Promote gender balance and equality in the governance and development processes;
12. Enhance cooperation between the Union, Regional Economic Communities and the International Community on democracy, elections and governance; and
13. Promote best practices in the management of elections for purposes of political stability and good governance.

### **Chapter 3: Principles**

**Art. 3.** State Parties shall implement this Charter in accordance with the following principles:

1. Respect for human rights and democratic principles;
2. Access to and exercise of state power in accordance with the constitution of the State Party and the principle of the rule of law;
3. Promotion of a system of government that is representative;
4. Holding of regular, transparent, free and fair elections;
5. Separation of powers;

6. Promotion of gender equality in public and private institutions;
7. Effective participation of citizens in democratic and development processes and in governance of public affairs;
8. Transparency and fairness in the management of public affairs;
9. Condemnation and rejection of acts of corruption, related offenses and impunity;
10. Condemnation and total rejection of unconstitutional changes of government;
11. Strengthening political pluralism and recognising the role, rights and responsibilities of legally constituted political parties, including opposition political parties, which should be given a status under national law.

#### **Chapter 4: Democracy, Rule of Law and Human Rights**

**Art. 4.** 1. State Parties shall commit themselves to promote democracy, the principle of the rule of law and human rights.

2. State Parties shall recognize popular participation through universal suffrage as the inalienable right of the people.

**Art. 5.** State Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure constitutional rule, particularly constitutional transfer of power.

**Art. 6.** State Parties shall ensure that citizens enjoy fundamental freedoms and human rights taking into account their universality, interdependence and indivisibility.

**Art. 7.** State Parties shall take all necessary measures to strengthen the Organs of the

Union that are mandated to promote and protect human rights and to fight impunity and endow them with the necessary resources.

**Art. 8. 1.** State Parties shall eliminate all forms of discrimination, especially those based on political opinion, gender, ethnic, religious and racial grounds as well as any other form of intolerance.

2. State Parties shall adopt legislative and administrative measures to guarantee the rights of women, ethnic minorities, migrants, people with disabilities, refugees and displaced persons and other marginalized and vulnerable social groups.

3. State Parties shall respect ethnic, cultural and religious diversity, which contributes to strengthening democracy and citizen participation.

**Art. 9.** State Parties undertake to design and implement social and economic policies and programmes that promote sustainable development and human security.

**Art. 10. 1.** State Parties shall entrench the principle of the supremacy of the constitution in the political organization of the State.

2. State Parties shall ensure that the process of amendment or revision of their constitution reposes on national consensus, obtained if need be, through referendum.
3. State Parties shall protect the right to equality before the law and equal protection by the law as a fundamental precondition for a just and democratic society.

## **Chapter 5: The Culture of Democracy and Peace**

**Art. 11.** The State Parties undertake to develop the necessary legislative and policy frameworks to establish and strengthen a culture of democracy and peace.

**Art. 12.** State Parties undertake to implement programmes and carry out activities

designed to promote democratic principles and practices as well as consolidate a culture of democracy and peace. To this end, State Parties shall:

1. Promote good governance by ensuring transparent and accountable administration.
2. Strengthen political institutions to entrench a culture of democracy and peace.
3. Create conducive conditions for civil society organizations to exist and operate within the law.
4. Integrate civic education in their educational curricula and develop appropriate programmes and activities.

**Art. 13.** State Parties shall take measures to ensure and maintain political and social dialogue, as well as public trust and transparency between political leaders and the people, in order to consolidate democracy and peace.

## **Chapter 6: Democratic Institutions**

**Art. 14.1.** State Parties shall strengthen and institutionalize constitutional civilian

control over the armed and security forces to ensure the consolidation of democracy and constitutional order.

2. State Parties shall take legislative and regulatory measures to ensure that those who attempt to remove an elected government through unconstitutional means are dealt with in accordance with the law.

3. State Parties shall cooperate with each other to ensure that those who attempt to remove an elected government through unconstitutional means are dealt with in accordance with the law.

**Art. 15.1.** State Parties shall establish public institutions that promote and support democracy and constitutional order.

2. State Parties shall ensure that the independence or autonomy of the said institutions is guaranteed by the constitution.



3. State Parties shall ensure that these institutions are accountable to competent national organs.
  4. State Parties shall provide the above-mentioned institutions with resources to perform their assigned missions efficiently and effectively.
- Art. 16.** State Parties shall cooperate at regional and continental levels in building and consolidating democracy through exchange of experiences.

## **Chapter 7: Democratic Elections**

**Art. 17.** State Parties re-affirm their commitment to regularly holding transparent, free and fair elections in accordance with the Union's Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa. To this end, State Parties shall:

1. Establish and strengthen independent and impartial national electoral bodies responsible for the management of elections.
2. Establish and strengthen national mechanisms that redress election related disputes in a timely manner.
3. Ensure fair and equitable access by contesting parties and candidates to state controlled media during elections.
4. Ensure that there is a binding code of conduct governing legally recognized political stakeholders, government and other political actors prior, during and after elections. The code shall include a commitment by political stakeholders to accept the results of the election or challenge them in through exclusively legal channels.

**Art. 18. 1.** State Parties may request the Commission, through the Democracy and Electoral Assistance Unit and the Democracy and Electoral Assistance Fund, to provide advisory services or assistance for strengthening and developing their electoral institutions and processes.

2. The Commission may at any time, in consultation with the State Party concerned, send special advisory missions to provide assistance to that State Party for strengthening its electoral institutions and processes.

**Art. 19. 1.** Each State Party shall inform the Commission of scheduled elections and invite it to send an electoral observer mission.

2. Each State Party shall guarantee conditions of security, free access to information, non interference, freedom of movement and full cooperation with the electoral observer mission.

**Art. 20.** The Chairperson of the Commission shall first send an exploratory mission during the period prior to elections. This mission shall obtain any useful information and documentation, and brief the Chairperson, stating whether the necessary conditions have been established and if the environment is conducive to the holding of transparent, free and fair elections in conformity with the principles of the Union governing democratic elections.

**Art. 21 1.** The Commission shall ensure that these missions are independent and shall provide them with the necessary resources for that purpose.

2. Electoral observer missions shall be conducted by appropriate and competent experts in the area of election monitoring, drawn from continental and national institutions such as, but not

limited to, the Pan- African Parliament, national electoral bodies, national legislatures and eminent persons taking due cognizance of the principles of regional representation and gender equality.

3. Electoral observer missions shall be conducted in an objective, impartial and transparent manner.

4. All electoral observer missions shall present the report of their activities to the Chairperson of the Commission within a reasonable time.

5. A copy of the report shall be submitted to the State Party concerned within a reasonable time.

**Art. 22.** State Parties shall create a conducive environment for independent and impartial national monitoring or observation mechanisms.

### **Chapter 8: Sanctions in Cases of Unconstitutional Changes of Government**

**Art. 23.** State Parties agree that the use of, *inter alia*, the following illegal means of accessing or maintaining power constitute an unconstitutional change of government and shall draw appropriate sanctions by the Union:

1. Any putsch or coup d'Etat against a democratically elected government.
2. Any intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected government.
3. Any replacement of a democratically elected government by armed dissidents or rebels.
4. Any refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party or candidate after free, fair and regular elections; or
5. Any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments, which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government.

**Art. 24.** When a situation arises in a State Party that may affect its democratic political institutional arrangements or the legitimate exercise of power, the Peace and Security Council shall exercise its responsibilities in order to maintain the constitutional order in accordance with relevant provisions of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol.

**Art. 25. 1.** When the Peace and Security Council observes that there has been an unconstitutional change of government in a State Party, and that diplomatic initiatives have failed, it shall suspend the said State Party from the exercise of its right to participate in the activities of the Union in

accordance with the provisions of articles 30 of the Constitutive Act and 7 (g) of the Protocol. The suspension shall take effect immediately.

2. However, the suspended State Party shall continue to fulfil its obligations to the Union, in particular with regard to those relating to respect of human rights.

3. Notwithstanding the suspension of the State Party, the Union shall maintain diplomatic contacts and take any initiatives to restore democracy in that State Party.

4. The perpetrators of unconstitutional change of government shall not be allowed to participate in elections held to restore the democratic order or hold any position of responsibility in political institutions of their State.

5. Perpetrators of unconstitutional change of government may also be tried before the competent court of the Union.

6. The Assembly shall impose sanctions on any Member State that is proved to have instigated or supported unconstitutional change of government in another state in conformity with Article 23 of the Constitutive Act.

7. The Assembly may decide to apply other forms of sanctions on perpetrators of unconstitutional change of government including punitive economic measures.

8. State Parties shall not harbour or give sanctuary to perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of government.

9. State Parties shall bring to justice the perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of government or take necessary steps to effect their extradition.

10. State Parties shall encourage conclusion of bilateral extradition agreements as well as the adoption of legal instruments on extradition and mutual legal assistance.

**Art. 26.** The Peace and Security Council shall lift sanctions once the situation that led to the suspension is resolved.

## **Chapter 9: Political, Economic and Social Governance**

**Art. 27.** In order to advance political, economic and social governance, State Parties shall commit themselves to:

1. Strengthening the capacity of parliaments and legally recognised political parties to perform their core functions;

2. Fostering popular participation and partnership with civil society organizations;

3. Undertaking regular reforms of the legal and justice systems;

4. Improving public sector management;

5. Improving efficiency and effectiveness of public services and combating corruption;

6. Promoting the development of the private sector through, inter alia, enabling legislative and regulatory framework;

7. Development and utilisation of information and communication technologies;

8. Promoting freedom of expression, in particular freedom of the press and fostering a professional media;

9. Harnessing the democratic values of the traditional institutions; and

10. Preventing the spread and combating the impact of diseases such as Malaria, Tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, Ebola fever, and Avian Flu.

**Art. 28.** State Parties shall ensure and promote strong partnerships and dialogue between government, civil society and private sector.

**Art. 29. 1.** State Parties shall recognize the crucial role of women in development and strengthening of democracy.

2. State Parties shall create the necessary conditions for full and active participation of women in the decision-making processes and structures at all levels as a fundamental element in the promotion and exercise of a democratic culture.

3. State Parties shall take all possible measures to encourage the full and active participation of women in the electoral process and ensure gender parity in representation at all levels, including legislatures.

**Art. 30.** State Parties shall promote citizen participation in the development process through appropriate structures.

**Art. 31**

1. State Parties shall promote participation of social groups with special needs, including the Youth and people with disabilities, in the governance process.

2. State Parties shall ensure systematic and comprehensive civic education in order to encourage full participation of social groups with special needs in democracy and development processes.

**Art. 32.** State Parties shall strive to institutionalize good political governance through:

1. Accountable, efficient and effective public administration;
2. Strengthening the functioning and effectiveness of parliaments;
3. An independent judiciary;
4. Relevant reforms of public institutions including the security sector;
5. Harmonious relationships in society including civil-military relations;
6. Consolidating sustainable multiparty political systems;
7. Organising regular, free and fair elections; and
8. Entrenching and respecting the principle of the rule of law.

**Art. 33.** State Parties shall institutionalize good economic and corporate governance through, inter alia:

1. Effective and efficient public sector management;
2. Promoting transparency in public finance management;
3. Preventing and combating corruption and related offences;
4. Efficient management of public debt;
5. Prudent and sustainable utilization of public resources;

6. Equitable allocation of the nation's wealth and natural resources;
7. Poverty alleviation;
8. Enabling legislative and regulatory framework for private sector development;
9. Providing a conducive environment for foreign capital inflows;
10. Developing tax policies that encourage investment;
11. Preventing and combating crime;
12. Elaborating and implementing economic development strategies including private-public sector partnerships;
13. An efficient and effective tax system premised upon transparency and accountability.

**Art. 34.** State Parties shall decentralize power to democratically elected local authorities as provided in national laws.

**Art. 35.** Given the enduring and vital role of traditional authorities, particularly in rural communities, the State Parties shall strive to find appropriate ways and means to increase their integration and effectiveness within the larger democratic system.

**Art. 36.** State Parties shall promote and deepen democratic governance by implementing the principles and core values of the NEPAD Declaration on Democracy,

Political, Economic and Corporate Governance and, where applicable, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

**Art. 37.** State Parties shall pursue sustainable development and human security through achievement of NEPAD objectives and the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

**Art. 38. 1.** State Parties shall promote peace, security and stability in their respective countries, regions and in the continent by fostering participatory political systems with well-functioning and, if need be, inclusive institutions;

2. State Parties shall promote solidarity amongst Member States and support the conflict prevention and resolution initiatives that the Union may undertake in conformity with the Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council.

**Art. 39.** State Parties shall promote a culture of respect, compromise, consensus and tolerance as a means to mitigate conflicts, promote political stability and security, and to harness the creative energies of the African peoples.

**Art. 40.** State Parties shall adopt and implement policies, strategies and programmes required to generate productive employment, mitigate the impact of diseases and alleviate poverty and eradicate extreme poverty and illiteracy.

**Art. 41.** State Parties shall undertake to provide and enable access to basic social services to the people.

**Art. 42.** State Parties shall implement policies and strategies to protect the environment to achieve sustainable development for the benefit of the present and future generations. In this regard, State Parties are encouraged to accede to the relevant treaties and other international legal instruments.

**Art. 43. 1.** State Parties shall endeavour to provide free and compulsory basic education to all, especially girls, rural inhabitants, minorities, people with disabilities and other marginalized social groups.

2. In addition, State Parties shall ensure the literacy of citizens above compulsory school age, particularly women, rural inhabitants, minorities, people with disabilities, and other marginalized social groups.

## **Chapter 10: Mechanisms for Application**

**Art. 44.** To give effect to the commitments contained in this Charter:

### **1. Individual State Party Level**

State Parties commit themselves to implement the objectives, apply the principles and respect the commitments enshrined in this Charter as follows:

(a) State Parties shall initiate appropriate measures including legislative, executive and administrative actions to bring State Parties' national laws and regulations into conformity with this Charter;

(b) State Parties shall take all necessary measures in accordance with constitutional provisions and procedures to ensure the wider dissemination of the Charter and all relevant legislation as may be necessary for the implementation of its fundamental principles;

(c) State Parties shall promote political will as a necessary condition for the attainment of the goals set forth in this Charter;

(d) State Parties shall incorporate the commitments and principles of the Charter in their national policies and strategies.

## **2. Commission Level**

### **A. At Continental Level**

(a) The Commission shall develop benchmarks for implementation of the commitments and principles of this Charter and evaluate compliance by State Parties;

(b) The Commission shall promote the creation of favourable conditions for democratic governance in the African Continent, in particular by facilitating the harmonization of policies and laws of State Parties;

(c) The Commission shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the Democracy and Electoral Assistance Unit and the Democracy and Electoral Assistance Fund provide the needed assistance and resources to State Parties in support of electoral processes;

(d) The Commission shall ensure that effect is given to the decisions of the Union in regard to unconstitutional change of government on the Continent.

## **B. At Regional Level**

The Commission shall establish a framework for cooperation with Regional Economic Communities on the implementation of the principles of the Charter. In this regard, it shall commit the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to:

- a) Encourage Member States to ratify or adhere to this Charter.
- b) Designate focal points for coordination, evaluation and monitoring of the implementation of the commitments and principles enshrined in this Charter in order to ensure massive participation of stakeholders, particularly civil society organizations, in the process.

### **Art. 45. The Commission shall:**

- (a) Act as the central coordinating structure for the implementation of this Charter;
- (b) Assist State Parties in implementing the Charter;
- (c) Coordinate evaluation on implementation of the Charter with other key organs of the Union including the Pan-African Parliament, the Peace and Security Council, the African Human Rights Commission, the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council, the Regional Economic Communities and appropriate national- level structures.

## **Chapter 11: Final Clauses**

**Art. 46.** In conformity with applicable provisions of the Constitutive Act and the Protocol. Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African

Union, the Assembly and the Peace and Security Council shall determine the appropriate measures to be imposed on any State Party that violates this Charter.

**Art. 47. 1.** This Charter shall be open for signature, ratification and accession by Member States of the Union in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures.

2. The instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Chairperson of the Commission.

**Art. 48.** This Charter shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the deposit of fifteen (15) Instruments of Ratification.

**Art. 49. 1.** State Parties shall submit every two years, from the date the Charter comes into force, a report to the Commission on the legislative or other relevant measures taken with a view to giving effect to the principles and commitments of the Charter;

2. A copy of the report shall be submitted to the relevant organs of the Union for appropriate action within their respective mandates;

3. The Commission shall prepare and submit to the Assembly, through the Executive Council, a synthesized report on the implementation of the Charter;

4. The Assembly shall take appropriate measures aimed at addressing issues raised in the report.

**Art. 50. 1.** Any State Party may submit proposals for the amendment or revision of this Charter;

2. Proposals for amendment or revision shall be submitted to the Chairperson of the Commission who shall transmit same to State Parties within thirty (30) days of receipt thereof;

3. The Assembly, upon the advice of the Executive Council, shall examine these proposals at its session following notification, provided all State Parties have been notified at least three (3) months before the beginning of the session;

4. The Assembly shall adopt amendments or revisions by consensus or failing which, by two-thirds majority;

5. The amendments or revisions shall enter into force when approved by two-thirds majority of State Parties.

**Art. 51. 1.** The Chairperson of the Commission shall be the depository of this Charter;

2. The Chairperson of the Commission shall inform all Member States of the signature, ratification, accession, entry into force, reservations, requests for amendments and approvals thereof;

3. Upon entry into force of this Charter, the Chairperson of the Commission shall register it with the Secretary General of the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

**Art. 52.** None of the provisions of the present Charter shall affect more favourable provisions relating to democracy, elections and governance contained in the national legislation of State Parties or in any other regional, continental or international conventions or agreements applicable in these State Parties.

**Art. 53.** This Charter, drawn up in four (4) original texts, in Arabic, English, French and Portuguese languages, all four (4) being equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Chairperson of the Commission who shall transmit certified copies of same to all Member States and the United Nations General Secretariat.

Adopted by the eight ordinary session of Assembly held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 30 January 2007.



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